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Ausmita Ghosh 
ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS 
My dissertation is a collection of three essays on the design of public health 
insurance in the United States. Each essay examines the responsiveness of health behavior 
and healthcare utilization to insurance-related incentives and draws implications for health 
policy in addressing the needs of disadvantaged populations. The first two essays evaluate 
the impact of Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on health and 
healthcare utilization. The Medicaid expansions that included full coverage of 
preconception care, led to a decline in childbirths, particularly those that are unintended. 
In addition, these fertility reductions are attributable to higher utilization of Medicaid-
financed prescription contraceptives. The second essay documents patterns of aggregate 
prescription drug utilization in response to the Medicaid expansions. Within the first 15 
months following the policy change, Medicaid prescriptions increased, with relatively 
larger increases for chronic drugs such as diabetes and cardio-vascular medications, 
suggesting improvements in access to medical care. There is no evidence of reductions in 
uninsured or privately-insured prescriptions, suggesting that Medicaid did not simply 
substitute for other forms of payment, and that net utilization increased.  The effects on 
utilization are relatively higher in areas with larger minority and disadvantaged 
populations, suggesting reduction in disparities in access to care. 
Finally, the third essay considers the effect of Medicaid coverage loss on 
hospitalizations and uncompensated care use among non-elderly adults. The results show 
that coverage loss led to higher uninsured hospitalizations, suggesting higher 
uncompensated care use. Most of the increase in uninsured hospitalizations are driven by 
visits originating in the ED - a pattern consistent with losing access to regular place of care. 
These results indicate that policies that reduce Medicaid funding could be particularly 
harmful for patients with chronic conditions. 
Anne Beeson Royalty, PhD, Chair 
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1 Public Health Insurance, Fertility and Contraception 
 Introduction 
Women’s healthcare access has featured prominently in the recent health reforms, 
with the Affordable Care Act (ACA) promoting greater insurance coverage of 
contraception (Becker and Polsky, 2015; Carlin et al., 2016), and prioritizing women’s 
preventive care as one of the ten essential health benefits (Cuellar et al., 2012). Several of 
these policy features were motivated as important for reducing unplanned births. However, 
there are as yet no studies that have examined the effect of the ACA 2014 coverage 
expansions on fertility and prescription birth control, and this study fills that gap.  
According to recent estimates, nearly 4 out of 10 pregnancies in the United States 
are unintended (Finer and Zolna, 2016).  The Institute of Medicine has emphasized the 
need to increase access to FDA-approved contraceptives as part of preventive services in 
order to reduce unintended births (Institute of Medicine, 2011). Generally, there is evidence 
that timing of childbearing has effects on several aspects of women’s lives including 
marriage, and human capital accumulation through education  and employment (Bailey, 
2006; Goldin and Katz, 2002). Improved control over fertility also has spillovers to the 
next generation (Ananat and Hungerman, 2012; Bailey et al., 2014).  
Although the ACA raised Medicaid eligibility level for all medical services to 
138% of the federal poverty level (FPL) regardless of categorical eligibility for the non-
elderly population in expansion states, Medicaid already paid for pregnancy-related care, 
childbirth services and medical costs of the child for low-income pregnant women in all 
states beginning in 1984 (Zavodny and Bitler, 2010). Thus, the ACA Medicaid expansions 
constitute new coverage only for the preconception period and may therefore have 
important implications for childbearing behaviors and outcomes in this population.  
Even though there was no nationwide coverage under Medicaid for the 
preconception period for low-income women, since 1994, several states have established 
programs that provide Medicaid-funded family planning services to the near-poor. 
Therefore, it is possible that the ACA Medicaid expansions may have no detectable effects 
on preconception care, such as the use of contraceptive healthcare, and consequently, there 
may not be any effect on fertility rates.  On the other hand, take-up of these state programs 
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may have been low because of lack of knowledge about these programs and contrastingly, 
the ACA Medicaid expansions were very visible. The literature shows that insured women 
are more likely to use contraceptives (Culwell and Feinglass, 2007); and low income and 
low educational attainment are both associated with gaps in contraceptive use (Frost et al., 
2007). This is further highlighted by the fact that Medicaid-paid prescription contraceptives 
increased substantially following the ACA Medicaid expansions (Ghosh et al., 2017). 
Thus, the ACA Medicaid expansion provides a valuable opportunity to examine how 
insurance expansions that fully cover contraceptive coverage and continuous healthcare 
coverage, not just during the prenatal period, affects fertility. 
Although there is a large empirical literature on the relationship between insurance 
coverage and fertility, theory offers competing hypotheses on how insurance-related 
incentives affect fertility decisions when coverage is comprehensive for the entire 
continuum of reproductive and perinatal health (preconception, during pregnancy, 
childbirth, interconception and covering the newborn child as well). There are numerous 
pathways that could link health insurance expansions to fertility. Health insurance reduces 
the cost of medical care related to pregnancy, childbirth and resulting offspring, which 
could lead to an increase in fertility. Conversely, reduction in the cost of pregnancy 
prevention will have a negative impact on fertility when insurance coverage benefit 
includes contraception without cost-sharing. In addition, health insurance can lead to 
changes in other behaviors such as employment and marriage which have their own effects 
on demand for children by altering the costs of parenthood. Under the assumption that 
children are normal goods, health insurance can also affect demand for children through 
its direct influence on financial well-being. The net effect on aggregate fertility will depend 
on the responsiveness along these margins.  
Recent research evaluating the ACA Medicaid expansions have found significant 
decline in uninsurance rates since early 2014 (Courtemanche et al., 2017; Frean et al., 2017; 
Kaestner et al., 2017; Sommers et al., 2015), improvements in financial health (Hu et al., 
2016), but little or no effect on labor market outcomes (Gooptu et al., 2016; Kaestner et 
al., 2017). While the ACA Medicaid expansions seem to have modestly affected healthcare 
use like hospitalizations and ED visits (Freedman et al., 2017; Wherry and Miller, 2016), 
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the impact on prescription drug use has been substantial (Ghosh et al., 2017; Maclean et 
al., 2017; Wen et al., 2016). Ghosh et al. (2017) show that Medicaid prescription drug 
utilization increased 19% in the first 15 months following the ACA Medicaid expansions, 
and that contraceptives increased 22%. Their results indicate that there was a net increase 
in utilization as there was no evidence of Medicaid crowding out other payment sources in 
their claims data. No study of the ACA 2014 Medicaid expansion effects on contraceptive 
use have examined whether effects differ for states already with Medicaid family planning 
waivers prior to the ACA, and no previous research has examined effects for fertility in 
any expansion states.  
As previous research has shown, state policies that extended income-based 
eligibility for Medicaid family planning services to women aged 20 to 44 led to a fall in 
the birth rate, with the bulk of this decrease being attributable to an increase in the use of 
contraception (Kearney and Levine, 2009). Nevertheless, the growth in contraceptive 
utilization following the ACA expansions is suggestive evidence that family planning 
waivers may have been inadequate and conditional on higher contraceptive use, one might 
expect attendant effects on childbearing decisions.  
In this study, I use the quasi-natural experiment that resulted from the 2012 
Supreme Court ruling that led the 2014 insurance expansions under the ACA Medicaid 
provision to be implemented only in some states and not in others, to examine the causal 
effect of health insurance on fertility and contraception patterns among low-income 
populations. I find that the ACA Medicaid expansions led to a decline in fertility among 
less-educated first-time mothers. For first-time mothers without a high school diploma, a 
group that is most likely to be affected by the Medicaid eligibility extensions, fertility 
decreased 4.5 to 6.6 %. Fertility fell by 4.1 to 5.7% among unmarried women in this 
subgroup, suggesting a reduction in unintended births as a result of the expansions. I also 
document a similar pattern of decline in childbirths for younger mothers between ages 18-
24. As Medicaid participation is negatively associated with educational attainment, in a 
falsification test, I show that there is no evidence of change in fertility among highly 
educated mothers.  
 4 
To explore the mechanism behind this observed impact on childbearing, I provide 
complementary evidence using administrative Medicaid prescription drugs data that these 
fertility reductions are attributable to a contemporaneous 24% increase in Medicaid-
financed contraceptive utilization indicating greater access to subsidized contraception. 
Finally, the effect on Medicaid-funded birth control differed across states based on 
availability of Medicaid-funded family planning services through preexisting state 
programs, which is consistent with the expansions increasing access to contraceptives in 
areas with lesser prior access to subsidized contraceptives. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, in contrast to prior 
policy shifts in Medicaid and commercial insurance that extended piecemeal coverage for 
family planning services or for pregnancy and resulting offspring, the results from this 
study provide evidence on how the complementarities between zero cost-sharing 
contraception and subsidized physician access afforded by comprehensive coverage affect 
fertility and contraceptive use among disadvantaged women through a nationwide analysis. 
Second, I leverage the large sample size and rich detail in the vital statistics data to explore 
heterogeneity in the impact of the policy by birth parity and maternal demographic 
characteristics. Third, to explore the mechanism behind fertility responses I document 
complementary evidence of the policy impact on aggregate Medicaid contraception 
patterns by using national-level administrative data on Medicaid-financed prescription 
drugs. In doing so, I confirm findings from the earlier literature and provide new evidence 
on the evolution of aggregate Medicaid contraceptive utilization in the 3 years following 
the expansions. Finally, utilizing pre-expansion variation in Medicaid family planning 
programs across states, I document a differential effect of the expansions on Medicaid-
financed contraceptive use in states with and without waiver programs. This provides 
suggestive evidence of coverage gaps in existing Medicaid-funded family planning 
services, and how the ACA Medicaid expansions are closing these gaps in unmet needs in 
women’s reproductive healthcare services. 
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 Background  
 Institutional Setting 
Medicaid is a means-tested health insurance program for low-income populations 
(pregnant women, children, parents and the disabled) that is jointly administered by the 
federal and state governments. The ACA provided additional federal financing to states in 
2014 for extending Medicaid coverage to non-elderly adults with incomes below 133% 
FPL (138%, with the inclusion of a 5% income disregard), regardless of categorical 
eligibility.  As modified by a 2012 Supreme Court ruling, participating in Medicaid 
expansion under the ACA was a voluntary decision for states. As of January 1, 2017, 32 
states including the District of Columbia have adopted the expansions, while the remaining 
19 states have not.  
Prior to the 2014 policy change, Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women and 
parents was already more generous than the ACA level (138% FPL) in most states. For 
instance, 42 states plus Washington DC had expanded Medicaid eligibility to include 
pregnant women with incomes higher than 138% FPL in 2013 (Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2013). In this respect, the ACA extends Medicaid eligibility 
broadly to cover all low-income adults under age 65, unlike previous Medicaid expansions 
that were conditional on parental and pregnancy status. Additionally, under federal rules,  
Medicaid programs in expansion states must provide the new enrollees preventive services, 
including FDA-approved  prescription birth control without cost-sharing, as part of the ten 
“essential health benefits” (Ranji et al., 2016; Sonfield, 2016). Thus, the ACA Medicaid 
expansions may enhance access and early use of preconception care which may lead to a 
fall in fertility. However, fertility may rise as result of reduced costs of prenatal care and 
childbirth-related care through Medicaid. The literature on the ACA has now examined 
impacts on many outcomes, but comprehensive nationwide health impacts of this health 
reform remain understudied. Changes in childbearing decisions are an important pathway 
through which insurance coverage expansions may affect both health and non-health 
outcomes of women. 
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 Related Literature 
Theory is less clear on how comprehensive insurance coverage would affect 
fertility. If insurance coverage is extended to pregnancy-related healthcare services and 
care for newborn, then expansions could increase fertility. The earliest studies evaluating 
Medicaid expansions for pregnant women and children in the 1980s and 1990s that reduced 
the cost of childbearing find fertility to increase among certain demographic subsamples. 
Using data from 15 states, Joyce et al. (1998) find a rise in childbirths among low educated 
white women between ages 19 to 27. Similarly, Zavodny and Bitler (2010) using 
nationwide data document higher fertility among low educated women, while DeLeire et 
al. (2011) do not find any fertility impacts. At the same time, experimental evidence from 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) demonstrated an increase in fertility among 
women with free health insurance relative to a control group assigned to health plans with 
patient cost-sharing (Leibowitz, 1990).  
In contrast to the ACA Medicaid expansions, several insurance expansions in the 
past few decades have been targeted towards the preconception period specifically such as 
mandated insurance coverage of contraceptives for those with employer sponsored health 
insurance and state expansions of Medicaid-funded family planning services. If mandated 
coverage is only for preconception period, then theoretically fertility may decline due to 
increased access to contraceptives. State health insurance mandates that required employer-
based health insurance plans to provide contraceptive coverage were associated with an 
increase in contraception use (Mulligan, 2016; Raissian and Lopoo, 2015) and abortion 
rate but no corresponding fall in fertility for reproductive-age women (Mulligan, 2016). 
However, recent research  demonstrates that these mandates had intended effects of 
reducing childbirths among younger women (Trudeau and Conway, 2017). More recently, 
the ACA contraceptive mandate required private health insurance plans to cover 
prescription contraceptives without any patient cost-sharing, starting in August 2012 and 
was implemented nationally (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). This 
mandate was associated with substantial reductions in out-of-pocket spending and higher 
contraceptive use among privately-insured women (Becker and Polsky, 2015; Carlin et al., 
2016; Pace et al., 2016). Similarly, beginning in 1994, several states expanded eligibility 
for Medicaid-covered family planning services to women who were otherwise ineligible 
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for traditional Medicaid. These limited expansion waivers reduced gaps in contraceptive 
use by 5.3% and childbirths declined by 2% among women aged 20-44 (Kearney and 
Levine, 2009). Similarly, Lindrooth and McCullough (2007) also document that Medicaid 
family planning expansions led to a 2 percentage point fall in fertility. 
Recent studies have shown that the 2010 ACA provision that extended “dependent 
coverage” to young adults up to age 26 reduced fertility (Heim et al., 2017) through 
increased access to contraceptives (Abramowitz, 2017). Fertility could also decline if there 
is a reduction in family formation; Heim et al. (2017)’s analysis using tax data in the 
context of the ACA young adult mandate finds evidence in support of this mechanism. 
However, the behavior of young adults of higher socio-economic status parents (those with 
access to employer health insurance) may not mirror the behavior of the population newly 
eligible for adult Medicaid expansions. In contrast to prior research on insurance and 
fertility, I examine a policy setting in which a recent and large public health insurance 
expansion affected a low-income population.  
In a closely related study, Apostolova-Mihaylova and Yelowitz (2015) consider 
fertility impacts of coverage expansion for low-income populations that includes 
preconception care along with the benefits of traditional Medicaid, but their analysis is 
limited to the experience of a single state (Massachusetts). The authors find that the 
Massachusetts health reform in 2006 did not affect overall fertility, but increased the 
likelihood of childbirths among married women aged 20-34, while reducing childbirths 
among their unmarried counterparts. However, there is no specific emphasis on birth parity 
or on an exploration of the mechanism driving these results. 
Unlike the ACA Medicaid expansions, most previous coverage expansions for 
reproductive-age women have been piecemeal—for example, state policies that extend 
contraceptive coverage or maternity coverage through private insurance mandates – that 
only cover certain aspects of the reproductive/perinatal health continuum and not others. 
Additionally, unlike policies that solely mandate contraceptive coverage for the already 
insured, these Medicaid expansions are more comprehensive in coverage because in 
addition to pregnancy related health care services, the benefits include physician visits, 
preventive care and family planning services as well. Taken together, the combination of 
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lowered cost for physician visits as well as subsidized contraceptives may be stronger than 
the effect of mandated coverage of contraceptives alone. Furthermore, greater awareness 
of the ACA Medicaid expansions than of state contraceptive mandates may further amplify 
the potential impact. This policy setting is thus closely related to Medicaid family planning 
waivers and state plan amendments (SPAs) of the 1990s and 2000s, although the 2014 
Medicaid expansions were arguably more broadly advertised than state Medicaid family 
planning programs. Thus, Medicaid expansions under the ACA offer a unique large-scale 
policy experiment through which the effects of comprehensive subsidized public health 
insurance on childbearing decisions and healthcare utilization can be studied. This paper 
combines detailed data from several sources to address these questions.  
 Estimating the Impact of 2014 Medicaid Expansions on Fertility   
 Data 
 I use detailed micro data on all births from Natality Detail restricted-use files 
produced as part of the National Vital Statistics System by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention to examine whether Medicaid expansions affected fertility in general, and 
specifically among low-educated mothers. The data I obtained are repeated cross-sections 
covering the years 2012 to 2015, and contain information gathered from birth certificates 
for the census of all births occurring in the United States during these calendar years with 
restricted geographic identifiers for mother’s state of residence. Detailed demographic 
information such as mother's age, educational attainment and pregnancy history is 
provided, allowing me to stratify fertility rates by mother’s demographic characteristics 
(such as by age and education) and by parity of birth.  
To isolate the effect of coverage on childbearing decisions, I date births in the data 
to the year and quarter of conception by utilizing a hypothetical 39-week gestation which 
is roughly equivalent to 3 quarters. I aggregate the universe of births into demographic 
subgroups by maternal education/birth parity/age/conception year and quarter, with the 
actual time series running from Q2 of 2011 to Q1 of 2015, in an approach similar to 
DeLeire et al. (2011). Using the geographic identifiers and data on month and year of birth, 
I map this microdata with publicly available information related to state's Medicaid 
expansion status, unemployment rates and poverty rates that correspond to the time of 
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conception.  I obtain state-level unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program, measured monthly. State 
poverty rates are obtained from Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) 
produced by the Census Bureau. These data dimensions are important because 
identification rests on policy change at the state level, and I expect heterogeneous response 
to the insurance expansions across demographic sub-groups and state characteristics.   
For this analysis I focus on mothers between ages 18 and 44. In an ideal dataset, 
family income would be reported for each birth record. However, as the Vital Statistics 
data do not report income, I examine effects among mothers with low education, as well 
as mothers whom I expect to respond more to the policy change due to other demographic 
characteristics such as birth parity and marital status. The standard birth certificate items 
in the US during the study time period were changed in 1989 and 2003. As states 
implemented the 2003 birth certificate revisions over a staggered timeline, 38 states and 
the District of Columbia complied in 2012, while in 2015 (the last year in our study period) 
only two out the 50 states were non-compliant. While data elements from both 1989 and 
2003 versions of birth certificates were included in the files, unrevised variables that were 
not comparable with 2003 revisions were not recorded (National Center for Health 
Statistics, 2010). Among the Vital Statistics variables used in this study, only birth counts, 
mother’s age and parity of birth are comparable across birth certificate revisions of 1989 
and 2003. Maternal educational attainment is only reported in states adopting the 2003 
revisions over all or part of our sample period. As a result, for models stratified by maternal 
educational attainment, to obtain a balanced panel of states with data available 8 quarters 
before and after the policy change, I trade off geographic coverage against panel length.1 I 
also consider fertility responses for samples stratified by mother’s age, as a proxy for 
pregnancy intendedness, to uncover heterogeneous policy impact on childbearing 
behavior. 
                                               
1 The unrevised states excluded from models stratified by mother’s education in the Vital 
Statistics data are AL, AK, AR, AZ, CT, HI, ME, MS, NJ, RI, VA and WV.  
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 Estimation strategy 
To empirically evaluate the relationship between expanded Medicaid eligibility and 
fertility, I will exploit the quasi-experimental variation in states’ decisions to implement 
Medicaid expansions across states and over time. Specifically, I estimate the following 
differences-in-differences (DD) regression of the following form: ln($%&'ℎ)*+) = 	/0 +	/234)'+ ∗ 6789:)%4:* +	/;34)'+ +	/<6789:)%4:* +/=>*+ + /? ln(848*+) +	q* + µ+ + @*+                  (1-1) 
The primary outcome is ln($%&'ℎ)*+), representing the natural logarithm of the total 
birth count measured for women between the ages of 18 and 44, where ) indexes state and ' indexes time, expressed as a year/quarter combination. While most states implemented 
the Medicaid eligibility changes beginning January 2014, several states expanded later in 
our study period, namely: Indiana (2/2015), Michigan (4/2014), New Hampshire (8/2014) 
and Pennsylvania (1/2015). To account for this staggered state-level implementation, I 
assign 34)'+ ∗ 6789:)%4:* = 1 if Medicaid expansion is in place in state ) at the expected 
time of conception '.  
To control for differences in local labor market conditions that may influence 
women’s childbearing decisions, I include conception year state unemployment and 
poverty rates in vector >*+. Additional demographic covariates in >*+	include fraction of 
births in a cell that is white, black, Hispanic, other and average maternal age. Equation (1) 
also controls for state fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant state 
characteristics, q*	,	and fixed effects for each quarter in the data, µ+,	 to control for 
seasonality of births and to remove unobserved time-varying factors that are common to 
all mothers in each state. The regression includes the covariate ln(848*+) which denotes 
the natural logarithm of the state population of women aged 18-44. I estimate equation (1) 
separately for women with low educational attainment and for first-time mothers as 
coverage gains due to the ACA Medicaid eligibility changes have been larger for childless 
adults compared to parents (Kaestner et al., 2017). Additionally, as a falsification test, I 
examine fertility among highly educated women in the sample – those with a master’s 
degree and higher educational attainment. I hypothesize that broadening of Medicaid 
eligibility for low-income individuals under the ACA are unlikely to affect childbirths 
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among highly educated mothers as Medicaid eligibility is negatively correlated with 
mother’s educational attainment.  
To identify the impact of Medicaid expansions on fertility, I assume that absent the 
policy change, fertility would have evolved similarly across the treated and non-treated 
states over time. While the counterfactual cannot be tested directly, I evaluate the existence 
of differential pre-treatment trends in the outcome using the following equation:  ln($%&'ℎ)*+) = 	/0 +	/2 	∑ D(EF9&, G'&+) ∗ 6789:)%4:*+ +	/;34)'+ +/<6789:)%4:* + /? ln(848*+) + /=>*+ +	q* + µ+ + @*+                                          (1-2) 
If the change in fertility is due to the Medicaid coverage expansions, the coefficient 
on the interaction terms D(EF9&, G'&+) ∗ 6789:)%4:* should be close to zero prior to the 
policy change. In all models the standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. 
The vectors >*+,q*	and µ+are defined as before. I obtained state female population between 
ages 18 to 44 from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End 
Results (SEER) Program to use as weights for all reported regressions with fertility as the 
dependent variable.  
 Results 
Before reporting the results from empirical analysis of fertility, I begin with Figure 
1-9 which depicts how the use of Medicaid-paid prescription contraceptives have evolved 
since 2012 through 2016 in the expansion and non-expansion states, using the 
administrative Medicaid data. Specifically, I use data from the Centers for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services’ (CMS) State Drug Utilization Database (SDUD), which records total 
Medicaid funded prescriptions in each state. These data have been used in prior research 
on Medicaid policy (Alpert et al., 2013; Simon et al., 2009)  and the recent health reform 
(Wen et al., 2016). These data show that the pre-expansion trends follow a similar pattern 
across both groups with a sharp trend break in the expansion states after the policy 
implementation in the first quarter of 2014. This suggests that the ACA Medicaid 
expansions were associated with substantial increases in Medicaid birth control utilization 
and is consistent with findings in the prior literature. With these trends in prescription 
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contraceptive access as background, I now turn to the results of my empirical specification 
to examine women’s childbearing decisions. 
Panel A of Table 1-1 presents the results of estimating equation (1) for a high-
impact group – the sample of women without a high school diploma. Tabulations from the 
American Community Survey suggest that 35% of reproductive-age women without a high 
school diploma and 19% of those without a college degree are covered by Medicaid, as 
shown in Figure 1-8. In contrast, Medicaid covers only 3% of women with a master’s 
degree or higher education. As Medicaid participation is negatively correlated with 
educational attainment, I explore fertility responses among high school dropouts to proxy 
for low-income. The estimates in Panel A indicate that following Medicaid expansion, 
fertility among this group decreased significantly. For the sample of high school dropouts, 
total fertility (log total births) decreased by 3.4%, and by 6.6% among those giving birth 
for the first time. In addition, fertility decreased 2.3% among parous women, and this effect 
is smaller in magnitude compared to that for first time mothers.  
Recent empirical evidence from the ACA Medicaid expansions indicate that 
Medicaid coverage increased 24% among parents, compared to a 53% increase for 
childless adults, in the less-educated populations (Kaestner et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
unintended pregnancies are far more common among less-educated women than those with 
higher educational attainment (Finer and Zolna, 2016). Consistent with these findings in 
the literature, the results in Panel A demonstrate that the Medicaid expansions had a 
negative impact on childbirths among high school dropouts and that the effects were 
concentrated among those giving birth for the first time. In addition to maternal education, 
using marital status as a proxy for pregnancy wantedness, I find a 5.7% decline in fertility 
among single women who are giving birth for the first time, as shown in column (4) of 
Table 1-1. This indicates that unintended births among less-educated mothers declined as 
a result of the ACA Medicaid expansions. 
As an extension and as an alternative mechanism for identifying women who are 
more likely to be participating in Medicaid, I examine fertility responses among women 
without a college degree. As stated previously, similar to high school dropouts, women 
with a high school diploma or with some college experience but did not complete college 
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are more likely to be on Medicaid than their counterparts with higher educational 
attainment. If estimated effects are due to changes in Medicaid coverage, the effects on 
fertility are expected to be more pronounced for the disadvantaged subgroups. The results 
for mothers without a college degree are displayed in Panel B of Table 1-1. The point 
estimates suggest that fertility decreased overall in this subsample and within subgroups 
by parity and marital status. However, the decrease is statistically significant only for high 
parity births. Notably, as predicted by the implicit negative correlation between Medicaid 
eligibility and educational attainment, the treatment effects for this group of mothers 
without a college degree are in general smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant 
compared to the corresponding estimates for their counterparts who are high school 
dropouts.  
To ensure that contemporaneous factors are not driving these results, I present a 
falsification test. I examine fertility among highly educated women in the spirit of a placebo 
test as this group is expected to be least affected by the policy change. I proceed by 
estimating equation (1) for the sample of women with a master’s degree or higher 
education. The underlying hypothesis here is that the Medicaid expansions for low-income 
populations are far less likely to affect coverage among highly educated mothers. Hence, 
the Medicaid eligibility expansions should not affect childbirths among this group. These 
results are presented in Table 1-2, and while they are negatively signed, these estimates are 
statistically insignificant. This falsification test shows that there is no effect of the policy 
change on childbearing among highly educated women, which provides implicit support 
for the identification strategy.  
Having detected effects on fertility among subgroups that are most likely to gain 
coverage through the Medicaid expansions (extensive margin), I next consider whether 
there is a differential impact on various maternal age subgroups. I stratify the sample in to 
4 mutually exclusive categories based on mother’s age at the time of birth: age 18-24, 25-
30, 31-35, and 36-44. These results are displayed in Table 1-3. Overall fertility fell 
significantly across each age group by 2-4%. There is also a statistically significant decline 
in first births among the younger groups, and among those who are unmarried. High parity 
births decreased across all the categories. The negative impact among younger first-time 
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mothers who are unmarried suggests that there is a reduction in unintended pregnancies, as 
marital status proxies for intendedness of pregnancies. As Medicaid eligibility for parents 
was already more generous before the ACA, younger, near-poor women are more likely to 
have gained coverage through the expansions. Thus, higher contraceptive access through 
coverage gains may lead to a negative impact on childbearing within this subsample. This 
is broadly consistent with studies that find Medicaid contraceptive utilization to have risen 
following the 2014 expansions.  
 Robustness and Specification Checks 
Identification in the difference-in-differences framework relies on the assumption 
of parallel trends – that absent the 2014 Medicaid expansion, trends in outcomes would not 
have differed significantly across expansion and non-expansion states. While this 
assumption is not directly testable, I compare trends in fertility among less-educated 
women across the treatment and comparison states prior to the policy change. This 
approach allows an explicit examination of the validity of the control group by testing for 
differences in pre-treatment trends in outcomes across the two groups. To test whether the 
observed decrease in fertility in the main analysis is a true effect of the policy change, I run 
event-time regressions using the specification represented by equation (2), where Q3 of 
2011 is the reference period. For the parallel trends assumption to be valid, the interaction 
terms in 2011, 2012 and 2013 should be statistically indistinguishable from 0. 
The point estimates for less-educated women are presented in Appendix Tables A-
3 and A-4 and are displayed graphically in Figures 1-2 and 1-3. The results in these tables 
show that there is some evidence of statistically significant declines in fertility among high 
school dropouts following the implementation of the reform consistent with the regression 
results in Table 1-2. However, there are also some statistically significant differential pre-
trends for both education groups. While majority of the coefficient estimates are negatively 
signed in the post policy period with a few significant at conventional levels, there is, 
however, no systematic pattern of either growth or decline in treatment effects over time. 
To address this issue of differences in pre-treatment trends across states that 
expanded Medicaid eligibility and states that did not, I examine the policy impact on 
fertility using a synthetic control methods approach (Abadie et al., 2010). This method 
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involves creating a control group, from the pool of untreated states, that more closely 
resembles the characteristics of the treated states in period preceding the policy change. 
This control group is chosen by selecting a set of weights that minimizes the pre-treatment 
differences between the treatment and the control states in outcome and the observed 
demographic characteristics of the mother, including race/ethnicity and maternal age, and 
state unemployment and poverty rates. The pool of control states comprises of those that 
did not expand Medicaid during our study period. For constructing the synthetic control 
unit, I estimate a set of weights by matching the pre-treatment values of the outcome 
variable averaged over each conception year, and covariates averaged over the entire pre-
treatment period. Figure 1-4 illustrates the results after applying this method to the sample 
of high school dropouts and provides a clear visual confirmation of the close match in pre-
policy trends of the outcome in the treatment and synthetic control group before the policy 
change, which provides additional confidence in the validity of this approach. In the post-
treatment period, the graphs reveal a discernible fall in first births overall and among single 
mothers. 
The resulting synthetic control matching estimates are displayed in Table 1-4 for 
low-educated women and show the average treatment effect in the expansion states relative 
to the synthetic control states. For high school dropouts, Panel A displays the average 
treatment effect, and the corresponding p-values in row (2) are computed through a 
permutation method based on repeated randomized treatment assignment to states in the 
“donor pool” (randomized inference). For comparison, I also present the corresponding 
DD estimates from Table 1 in the rows below. There is a 4.5% and 4.1% reduction in 
childbirths to first time mothers and among first time mothers who are unmarried. These 
estimates are statistically significant as implied by the p-values of 0.065 and 0.085, and are 
similar in magnitude to the DD estimates in magnitude and direction. The estimates for 
total births and high parity births in this subgroup are however not significant.  However, 
the similarity in direction, magnitude of the DD and synthetic control estimates lend 
support to a causal interpretation of the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansions on 
fertility. 
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I also conduct a similar synthetic control matching analysis for births to women 
without a college degree. While the estimates in Panel B of Table 1-4 are signed similarly 
as the DD estimates from Table 1-1 (except for high parity births), they are imprecisely 
estimated suggesting that the effects of Medicaid expansion on fertility of women with 
higher than high school education are less robust than among those with less than high 
school education. Results from a similar analysis examining childbirths among women 
with master’s degree or higher education are presented in Panel C. As stated previously, 
conceptually this is akin to conducting a placebo test on a group that is not expected to be 
affected by the policy change. Consistent with our DD analysis, the synthetic control 
matching estimates do not provide any evidence of a policy impact in this highly educated 
demographic subgroup. 
Next, I examine childbirths by maternal age and the corresponding synthetic control 
matching estimates are shown in Table 1-5. These results are quite similar and reinforce 
the main findings from the DD model in Table 1-3, specifically for women aged 18-24. 
Among this group, overall fertility decreased by 2.2%, by 3.3% for first births and by 6.1% 
for unmarried first-time mothers. The corresponding DD estimates for these subsamples 
are 3.3%, 3.1% and 3.9% respectively. While the estimate for high parity births is negative, 
it is statistically insignificant. For the older subgroups, synthetic control estimates are all 
statistically insignificant, and in some cases opposite in sign relative to the DD estimates. 
These results confirm that the impact of the coverage expansion and subsequent broader 
access to contraceptives was concentrated among younger women, that were likely 
unintended pregnancies. Because the effects from synthetic matching are comparable to 
the results from the DD models, and because the DD method is more transparent even 
though susceptible on grounds of parallel trends assumptions, I use those in my main 
analysis tables. 
Taken together, these results provide evidence that the ACA Medicaid expansions 
led to a decline in fertility among low educated mothers. Specifically, for the sample of 
mothers who are giving birth for the first time and did not complete high school, a group 
that is most likely to be affected by the Medicaid eligibility extensions, fertility decreased 
4.5 – 6.6 %, and by 4.1 – 5.7% among those who are single mothers in this subgroup. There 
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is no clear evidence of change in childbirths among women without a college degree. As a 
placebo test, I find no evidence of any change in fertility among highly educated mothers. 
These results are consistent with research that finds the Medicaid expansions under the 
ACA to have increased coverage and access to care among low SES groups. Overall these 
findings on fertility responses also support the idea that there is more “bite” from these 
ACA Medicaid expansions which provides more comprehensive coverage prior to 
pregnancy compared to previous Medicaid expansions that specifically targeted income-
eligible parents and pregnant women. One possible reason is that complementarity between 
subsidized physician visits and zero cost-sharing contraception in the preconception 
period, which lowers the cost of pregnancy prevention is manifested through the reductions 
in childbirth.  
 Heterogeneous Effects on Fertility 
The findings of Kearney and Levine (2009) and Lindrooth and McCullough (2007), 
which show that state-level policies that extend Medicaid family planning services to low-
income populations have a positive impact on contraceptive use and a negative impact on 
fertility, would predict that incremental coverage through ACA Medicaid would have little 
or no impact on fertility in expansion states with pre-existing Medicaid family planning 
policies. Studies evaluating state and federal policies allowing access to over-the-counter 
(OTC) emergency contraceptives finds no significant effect on fertility (Gross et al., 2014; 
Mulligan, 2016). However, findings of Ghosh et al. (2017) suggests that there may have 
been gaps in coverage through Medicaid family planning services and one may expect 
Medicaid-paid contraceptives to increase in response to the 2014 policy change. Thus, to 
test between these two competing hypotheses, I categorize states into 4 groups that vary in 
“bite” of the expansion based on prior state Medicaid family planning policies.  
As of this writing, low-income women who are otherwise categorically and income 
ineligible for traditional Medicaid qualify for standalone family planning services through 
Medicaid in 26 states (Ranji et al., 2016). Using this variation in access to subsidized 
contraceptives across states, for this analysis, I classify the states as follows, in increasing 
order of expected treatment intensity: light (no Medicaid expansion/ no waiver), moderate 
(expansion/ pre-ACA waiver) and heavy (expansion/ no waiver). For this analysis, the base 
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group comprises a pool of states where the policy impact of expanded access to 
contraceptives is expected to be negligible – those not expanding Medicaid and with pre-
existing waivers or state plan amendments (SPA) for the provision of Medicaid family 
planning services to low-income populations. Appendix Table 2 presents the grouping of 
states by their pre-ACA status of Medicaid family planning programs and Medicaid 
expansion status under the ACA in 2014.  
There is considerable variation in coverage of family planning services across 
states, which provides the basis for this identification. To isolate the effect of treatment 
intensity on fertility I estimate the following equation: ln($%&'ℎ)*+) = 	/0 +	/234)'+ ∗ HF9IJ* +	/;34)'+ ∗ K4LF&9'F* +	/<34)'+ ∗M%Nℎ'* +	/=	HF9IJ* + /?K4LF&9'F* +	/OM%Nℎ'* +	/P34)'+ + /Q	>*+ +/R ln(848*+) +	q* + µ+ + @*+     (1-3) 
Here the omitted category consists of the states in the base group. The terms HF9IJ*, K4LF&9'F* and M%Nℎ'*	are perfectly collinear with state fixed effects and drop 
out of the equation. The vectors >*+,q*	and µ+	carry the usual connotation as defined 
previously in equation (1-1). Because the ACA Medicaid expansions represent a larger 
policy change facilitating coverage gains and access to care relative to the states in the base 
group with waivers, the coefficients for the interaction terms corresponding to the heavy 
and moderate states are expected to be negative for fertility responses, indicating higher 
treatment intensity. Even though states in the	M%Nℎ' treatment group did not expand 
Medicaid in 2014, absent any pre-ACA family planning services’ programs, one may 
expect contraceptive utilization to rise due to latent demand for subsidized contraceptives 
as a result of unmet family planning needs (August et al., 2016) and woodwork/welcome 
mat effect of increased enrollment among those who were previously Medicaid-eligible 
but did not enroll (Frean et al., 2017). As a result, childbirths in this group may decline. 
Results from the estimation of equation (3) can be found Tables 1-6 and 1-7, for 
the subsamples stratified by maternal education and by mother’s age at birth. Panel A of 
Table 1-6 presents the estimates for high school dropouts. The estimated coefficients for 
fertility are negatively signed which is consistent with the notion that coverage expansions 
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would primarily reduce childbearing through increased access to contraceptives. This 
negative effect on fertility across the three groups of states also accords with the DD results 
presented before. In addition, the effects are generally larger for the subgroups representing 
first-births. Splitting the states by expansion status and family planning services’ programs 
allows me to tease out the effect of policy-induced changes in access to contraception on 
fertility, indicating that there were heterogeneous treatment affects. However, the estimates 
for the three treatment groups are not statistically different from each other, and the 
estimates for heavy treatment states are generally smaller in magnitude relative to the 
remaining groups.   
Table 1-7 shows that fertility among first-time mothers aged 18-44 declined 
significantly in all three treatment groups. The results for the other groups are similar 
although not always precisely estimated. The analyses presented here are merely 
suggestive and without a clear causal interpretation. Nonetheless, these results support an 
interpretation that the policy effect on childbirths exhibited considerable heterogeneity 
across states based on pre-ACA access to Medicaid-financed family planning services. 
In investigating the connections between health insurance and fertility, there are 
several mechanisms potentially at work. It is quite plausible that Medicaid expansions do 
not directly influence childbirths other than through an increased access to contraception. 
This would be violated, however, if pregnant women strategically relocated to states with 
expanded Medicaid eligibility and better access to care. While not examining pregnant 
women per se, Goodman (2017) investigates this possibility and finds no empirical support 
for cross-state migration in response to the Medicaid expansions in 2014. The other 
obvious mechanism is through increased use of contraceptives. Although I examined this 
issue in a cursory manner in Fig 1-1 to motivate the fertility analysis, I next examine the 
regression magnitudes and robustness checks need to now examine magnitude of contra 
effect in regression to be able to gauge the plausibility of magnitudes and mechanisms.  
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  Estimating the Impact of 2014 Medicaid Expansions on Prescription 
Contraceptives 
 Data 
I next test whether Medicaid expansions affect contemporaneous changes in 
Medicaid contraceptive utilization using administrative data on Medicaid-paid prescription 
drugs. The primary source for data on Medicaid-financed prescription contraceptives for 
our analysis is the State Drug Utilization Database (SDUD), compiled by the Centers for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) using data submitted by state Medicaid programs. 
The SDUD includes aggregate utilization by NDC in each quarter from the universe of 
covered outpatient prescriptions for which Medicaid serves as a third-party payer (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2012) from all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. While the SDUD has included information from fee-for-service (FFS) since its 
inception, data on prescriptions financed by managed care (MC) plans were added to the 
SDUD in March 2010 following implementation of the Drug Rebate Equalization Act 
(2009). I use SDUD data in all quarters from 2012 to 2016 at the state-level, yielding 20 
periods of data: 8 and 12 periods of pre- and post-treatment data, respectively.2  
 Estimation strategy 
To understand the mechanism behind the observed decline in fertility due to 
expanded Medicaid coverage, I turn to examine changes in Medicaid-paid contraception 
use in response to these program expansions. Cross-state variation in state Medicaid 
expansion status before and after 2014 facilitates identification, and I estimate a regression 
model of the form, following (Ghosh et al., 2017): ln(E*+) = 	/0 +	/234)'+ ∗ 6789:)%4:* +	/;34)'+ +	/<6789:)%4:* +/=>*+ + q* + µ+ + @*+                 (1-4) 
The level of analysis here is a state-time cell with ) indexing state and ' indexing 
time, expressed as a year/quarter combination. The dependent variable here is the logged 
Medicaid prescription contraceptives per 100 women aged 18-44, where source for state 
female population between ages 18 to 44 are the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, 
                                               
2 I exclude Arizona, North Carolina and Rhode Island from all contraceptive utilization analysis 
due to odd data patterns in at least one quarter during the study period. 
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Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program data. Note that, in addition to states that 
implemented Medicaid expansions late in 2014 or 2015, data on contraceptive utilization 
covers the calendar year 2016, during which MT (1/2016) expanded Medicaid. Hence, 34)'+ ∗ 6789:)%4:*	takes the value of 1 if Medicaid expansion is in place in state ) at 
time ', to account for this staggered policy implementation at the state-level. To control for 
differences in local labor market conditions that may influence contraception use, the 
vector >*+ includes state unemployment and poverty rates. Equation (1-4) also includes 
state fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects denoted by the vectors q*	and 
µ+	respectively.  
To identify the impact of Medicaid expansions on contraceptives, the implicit 
assumption is that the outcome would have evolved similarly across treated and non-treated 
states, absent any policy change. As an indirect evaluation of the preceding assumption, I 
empirically the existence of differential pre-treatment trends in the outcome using the 
following equation:  ln(E*+) = 	/0 +	/2 	∑ D(EF9&, G'&+) ∗ 6789:)%4:*+ +	/;34)'+ +/<6789:)%4:* + /=>*+ +	q* + µ+ + @*+                                             (1-5) 
Here, 6789:)%4:* switches to 1 if a state has expanded Medicaid, which is 
interacted with year-quarter dummies (the reference period is 2012Q1), instead of the 34)'+	indicator.  If change in utilization is due to the Medicaid coverage expansions, the 
coefficient on the interaction terms D(EF9&, G'&+) ∗ 6789:)%4:* should be close to zero 
prior to the policy change. One would also expect that wider access to preconception would 
increase utilization, and hence post-2014 estimates should be positive. In all models the 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of the state. 
 Results 
Federal rules require that Medicaid programs in states that have implemented 
eligibility expansions for low-income populations under the ACA guidelines, to provide 
the newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries preventive services, including prescription 
contraceptives, without any cost-sharing, as part of the ten “essential health benefits” 
(Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services, 2016).  
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Table 1-8 presents differences-in-differences results from estimating the 
specification in equation (1-4) for aggregate Medicaid prescription birth controls. The pre-
period is 2012-2013, and the post-period is 2014-2016. The estimate in column (1) shows 
that the effect of the 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions was 24% increase in contraceptive 
utilization that was financed by Medicaid. This finding is very similar to the 22% policy 
impact detected by Ghosh et al. (2017) for Medicaid-paid contraceptives using proprietary 
pharmacy claims database, although those data only went through Q1 of 2015. Hence, this 
present analysis adds 7 additional quarters of post-treatment data. The fact that 
contraceptive utilization increased in response to the policy change provides evidence that 
expanded ACA Medicaid coverage led to fertility declines through increased access to 
prescription contraception. 
 Robustness and Specification Checks 
Next, I use an event study framework, as outlined by equation (1-4), to understand 
the impacts of the expansion. In addition to allowing for the examination of the assumption 
of parallel trends that is critical for identification in a DD study design, this approach offers 
the added advantage of an examination of the change in policy impact over time. For the 
parallel trends assumption to be valid, the interaction terms in 2012 and 2013 should be 
statistically insignificant. Appendix Table A-5 shows the results from this estimation and 
Figure 6 plots these estimates, where the reference period is Q1 of 2012. The point 
estimates for the interaction terms in 2012 and 2013 are indeed quite small in magnitude 
(and not statistically significant) relative to the difference-in-difference estimate in Table 
8, indicating that no significant differential trends appear in the pre-expansion period that 
would otherwise threaten the DD identification strategy. The statistically significant 
estimates starting in Q3 of 2014 demonstrate that utilization of overall Medicaid 
prescription contraceptives increased significantly within a few months from the policy 
implementation and the magnitude of the policy impact increased over time through 2015, 
as more states implemented expansions in a staggered timeline, and finally levelling off in 
2016. These results also demonstrate that the policy impact on Medicaid prescription birth 
control grew over time which is broadly accords with the fact that prior to consuming 
contraceptives, new beneficiaries must sign up for Medicaid coverage and schedule a visit 
to a medical provider to obtain a prescription.  
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To address this issue of pre-treatment differences in trends across states that 
expanded Medicaid eligibility and states that did not, I use synthetic control method to 
examine the policy impact on aggregate Medicaid prescriptions. For this analysis, from the 
pool of states that did not expand Medicaid, I construct a synthetic control unit that closely 
matches trends in the expansions states in the pre-treatment period. For each outcome, I 
estimate a set of weights by matching the pre-treatment values of the outcome variable 
averaged over each year, and covariates averaged over the entire pre-treatment period.   
Figure 1-7 plots trends in aggregate Medicaid contraceptives in expansion states 
and the synthetic control states. The difference between the solid blue line (outcome in 
expansion states) and the dashed line (outcome in synthetic control unit) before the 
treatment period indicates the quality of the fit. The graph demonstrates that aggregate 
Medicaid prescription utilization in the expansion and synthetic control states followed a 
similar trend in the pre-policy period, and there is a sharp divergence in trends following 
the policy change, as one would expect. 
The estimated treatment effect on Medicaid contraceptives and the corresponding 
p-value from this analysis are displayed in column (2) of Table 1-8. There is a statistically 
significant 30% increase in utilization of birth control financed by Medicaid. This supports 
the estimates from the main DD analysis. The similarity of the effect size and statistical 
significance of the estimates obtained through DD analysis and synthetic control method 
provides additional confirmation that the quasi-experimental identification strategy allows 
me to derive causal impacts of the effect of Medicaid expansion on contraceptive 
utilization. 
 Heterogeneous Effects on Contraceptive Utilization 
While one would expect the Medicaid expansions to increased access to 
contraception in all states implementing the policy, the existence of pre-ACA Medicaid 
family planning programs for the near-poor may attenuate the such effects, relative to states 
without waivers. The results in the previous section provide suggestive evidence of 
heterogeneous impact of the expansions on fertility responses across states with and 
without Medicaid family planning programs. One potential explanation for this 
heterogeneity is that the impact of expanded Medicaid on use of birth control may have 
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been higher in states without pre-existing programs that provided family planning services 
to the near-poor compared to states with relatively higher access. To test whether 
contraceptive utilization patterns evolved similarly, I use an estimating equation similar to 
equation (1-3), which is of the following form:  ln(E*+) = 	/0 +	/234)'+ ∗ HF9IJ* +	/;34)'+ ∗ K4LF&9'F* +	/<34)'+ ∗M%Nℎ'* +	/=	HF9IJ* + /?K4LF&9'F* +	/OM%Nℎ'* +	/P34)'+ + /Q	>*+ + q* + µ+ + @*+     
(1-6) 
Table 1-9 presents results from the estimation of equation (1-6).  The main 
estimates suggest that a significant increase in contraceptive utilization is present in all 
three categories of treatment intensity, namely HF9IJ*, K4LF&9'F* and M%Nℎ'*. While 
the corresponding estimates for each of these categories is positive, the effect is statistically 
significant for only the heavy and moderate expansion groups, with the heavy treatment 
states experiencing the greatest increase in aggregate Medicaid contraceptives. The policy 
effect somewhat smaller for moderate treatment states, while the corresponding estimate 
for light treatment states is positive but smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
Specifically, having an expansion in effect in a state along with no previous family 
planning services’ coverage increased contraceptive usage by 35% and this estimate is 
statistically significant. In expansion states with these programs, contraception increased 
significantly by 26%. Although there is a 24% rise in contraceptives in states classified as 
light states, it is statistically insignificant.  This positive effect on contraceptive utilization 
in light treatment states is consistent with the “woodwork effect” of increased Medicaid 
coverage following the expansions in 2014, even in states that did not expand Medicaid 
(Frean et al., 2017).  
  Overall, these results demonstrate that the effect of the Medicaid expansions on 
contraceptives is the strongest for the heavy treatment states – those with ACA Medicaid 
expansions but no Medicaid family planning programs. The results also show that rise on 
contraceptive utilization is correlated with the treatment intensity of the expanded 
coverage. In other words, the policy effect on use of contraceptives was larger in expansion 
states where pre-ACA access to subsidized family planning services was relatively lower. 
The fact that I detect significant increases even in expansion states where prior to 2014 
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Medicaid-financed family planning services were available for low-income populations, 
suggests that the ACA expansions are closing gaps in access to family planning services, 
and that there may be unmet preconception care needs in non-expansion states despite the 
presence of these programs for low-income populations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study exploits policy-driven variation in Medicaid expansion across states to 
identify the causal effect of expanded coverage on fertility and contraceptive use. The 
contribution of this paper rests in not only examining the linkage between insurance access 
and fertility for a disadvantaged population that has not been studied previously, but more 
importantly, it departs from previous literature by providing evidence from a nationwide 
analysis that extending comprehensive Medicaid coverage, that includes preconception 
care in addition to pregnancy-related care, reduces childbirths through an increase in 
contraceptive utilization. I find that the ACA Medicaid expansions led to reductions in 
fertility among less-educated and younger women. Specifically, for first-time mothers 
without a high school diploma, a group that is most likely to be affected by the Medicaid 
eligibility extensions, fertility decreased 4.5 to 6.6 %. For unmarried women in this 
subgroup, fertility fell by 4.1 to 5.7. I also document a similar pattern of decline in 
childbirths for younger mothers. Overall fertility decreased by 2.2 – 3.3% for women 
between ages 18-24. The policy impact was generally stronger for those giving birth for 
the first time (3.1 - 3.3%), and for unmarried first-time mothers (3.9 - 6.1%) within this 
subgroup. These findings for first-time births to unmarried mothers suggest that unintended 
births fell following the expansions. In a falsification test, I show that there is no evidence 
of change in fertility among highly educated mothers, as Medicaid participation is known 
to be negatively correlated with educational attainment,  
Health insurance may reduce childbirths through increased utilization of 
contraception, which would be otherwise unaffordable. Considering this potential 
mechanism, using administrative Medicaid prescription drugs data, I show that a 
contemporaneous 24% increase in Medicaid-financed contraceptive utilization indicating 
greater access to subsidized contraception. I also document suggestive evidence of 
heterogeneity in the policy impact on fertility and contraceptive use. Specifically, the effect 
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on these outcomes differed across states based on availability of Medicaid-funded family 
planning services through state programs, which suggests that the expansions increased 
access to contraceptives in areas with lesser pre-ACA access to subsidized contraceptives. 
An important policy implication of my finding is that, in contrast to previous Medicaid 
expansions for pregnant women and children led fertility to increase among a few 
subgroups, Medicaid coverage that includes preconception care can reduce unplanned 
births, which is an intended policy effect. Also, in the short-run, preconception coverage 
shifts utilization from more intensive child birth related care to less expensive pregnancy 
prevention care.  
Apart from the public health insurance expansions, under the ACA, private health 
insurance plans were mandated to provide all FDA-approved prescription contraceptives 
without cost-sharing beginning August 1, 2012. One concern is that this policy change 
overlaps with the period of analysis in this study. However, there is a key difference 
between the contraceptive mandate and the Medicaid expansions I study in this paper. In 
contrast to the spatial and temporal variation in state Medicaid expansion decisions, the 
contraceptive mandate was implemented simultaneously in all the states starting August 
2012. These policies may also have different effects as the populations eligible for 
Medicaid and those that are commercially insured exhibit different health and fertility 
preferences. Subject to the caveat that while information on insurance status at the time of 
conception is unavailable, future work with more comprehensive individual-level surveys 
may address whether other features of the ACA could have affected contraception and 
fertility, in addition to the Medicaid expansions. Nevertheless, the results from this study 
are informative about the potential mechanism behind the decline in childbirths due to the 
law. 
There is high interest in understanding the extent to which coverage gains have 
affected health and well-being among low-income and vulnerable populations. This study 
contributes to the growing body of evidence on the recent healthcare reforms. While the 
results of this paper show that the expansions reduced fertility, it is also possible that higher 
contraceptive access does not affect total births over the lifetime of a woman and that the 
policy change simply delayed births. However, studies show that allowing more control 
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over fertility decisions have a positive effect on women’s labor market outcomes (Bailey, 
2006; Goldin and Katz, 2002). Hence, there might be downstream non-health effects 
associated with the reduction in unintended births in the long-run among cohorts exposed 
to this policy change. 
Improving access to contraception and reducing unplanned births was a stated 
policy goal for the recent healthcare reforms. The results from this study provide evidence 
that comprehensive Medicaid coverage which includes preconception care reduces 
unintended births through improvements in prescription-based contraception. Yet, current 
debates surrounding health policy have increasingly focused attention on reducing 
insurance coverage, both public and private, for family planning services. As states 
continue to debate the merits of the expansions to the Medicaid program under the ACA 
and terms of coverage for beneficiaries, it is also important to consider the implications of 
these changes in childbearing and timing of birth for infant health outcomes.  
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 Tables and Figures 
Table 1-1: DD estimates of the effect of 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions on fertility 
among low educated women  
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births)       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births High parity First births, Single 
     
Panel A: High school dropout 
     
Post x Expansion -0.034** -0.066** -0.023* -0.057** 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.013) (0.028)      
Observations 624 624 624 624 
     
Panel B: Less than college degree 
     
Post x Expansion -0.015 -0.004 -0.020** -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012)      
Observations 624 624 624 624 
 
Notes: Each column is from a separate difference-in-difference regression using NCHS 2012-2015, 
with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. Observations are at the at state/conception 
year-quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women aged 18-44. All models include state fixed 
effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the data, poverty rate and unemployment rate. Standard 
errors are clustered at state and presented in parentheses. Estimates are weighted using state by year 
population of women aged 18-44. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-
percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 1-2: DD estimates of the effect of 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions on fertility 
among highly educated women (Placebo) 
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births High parity First births, Single 
     
Post x Expansion -0.019 -0.006 -0.027 -0.011 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.039)      
Observations 624 624 624 624 
 
Notes: Each column is from a separate difference-in-difference regression using NCHS 2012-2015, 
with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. Observations are at the at state/conception 
year-quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women aged 18-44. All models include state fixed 
effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the data, poverty rate and unemployment rate. Standard 
errors are clustered at state and presented in parentheses. Estimates are weighted using state by year 
population of women aged 18-44. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-
percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 1-3: DD estimates of the effect of 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions on fertility, 
by age 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births High parity First births, Single 
     
Panel A: Age 18-24      
Post x Expansion -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.039*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) 
Observations 816 816 816 816 
     
Panel B: Age 25-30 
     
Post x Expansion -0.037*** -0.026** -0.043*** -0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) 
Observations 816 816 816 816 
     
Panel C: Age 31-35 
     
Post x Expansion -0.030*** -0.021 -0.035*** -0.014 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.020) 
Observations 816 816 816 816 
     
Panel D: Age 36-44 
     
Post x Expansion -0.017*** -0.009 -0.019** -0.023 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.007) (0.023) 
Observations 816 816 816 816 
  
Notes: Each column is from a separate difference-in-difference regression using NCHS 2012-2015, 
with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. Observations are at the at state/conception 
year-quarter/cell level. All models include state fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the 
data, poverty rate and unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered at state and presented in 
parentheses. Estimates are weighted using state by year population of women in the corresponding 
age group for each panel. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 1-4: Fertility by educational attainment (Expansion states versus synthetic 
control states) 
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births)       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births High parity First births, Single 
     
Panel A: High school dropout 
     
Treatment effect -0.007 -0.045* 0.003 -0.041* 
P-value [0.456] [0.065] [0.929] [0.085] 
     
Observations 624 624 624 624 
     
Panel B: Less than college degree 
     
Treatment effect 0.0004 -0.006 0.002 -0.022 
P-value [0.571] [0.530] [0.847] [0.341] 
     
Observations 624 624 624 624 
 
Panel C: Highly educated women 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births High parity 
First births, 
Single 
     
Treatment effect -0.018 0.019 -0.035 0.259 
P-value [0.817] [0.964] [0.708] [0.845] 
     
Observations 624 624 624 624 
 
Notes: Data from NCHS 2012-2015, with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the at state/conception year-quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women 
aged 18-44.  Synthetic controls are constructed as the weighted average of control states that most 
closely resemble characteristics of the Medicaid expansion states in the pre-policy change period. 
The pool of control states comprises of those that did not expand Medicaid during our study period. 
For the synthetic control estimates, p-values are computed through Fisher permutation tests and 
presented in brackets. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 1-5: Fertility by age group (Expansion states versus synthetic control states) 
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births High parity First births, Single 
     
Panel A: Age 18-24      
Treatment effect -0.022** -0.033** -0.020 -0.061** 
P-value [0.042] [0.028] [0.051] [0.028] 
     
Observations 816 816 816 816 
     
Panel B: Age 25-30 
     
Treatment effect -0.013 -0.002 -0.030 0.090 
P-value [0.488] [0.994] [0.128] [0.441] 
     
Observations 816 816 816 816 
     
Panel C: Age 31-35 
     
Treatment effect 0.004 0.042 -0.019 0.341 
P-value [0.805] [0.532] [0.175] [0.463] 
     
Observations 816 816 816 816 
     
Panel D: Age 36-44 
     
Treatment effect 0.013 0.163 -0.008 0.348 
P-value [0.901] [0.475] [0.707] [0.721] 
     
Observations 816 816 816 816 
 
Notes: Data from NCHS 2012-2015, with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the at state/conception year-quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women 
aged 18-44.  Synthetic controls are constructed as the weighted average of control states that most 
closely resemble characteristics of the Medicaid expansion states in the pre-policy change period. 
The pool of control states comprises of those that did not expand Medicaid during our study period. 
For the synthetic control estimates, p-values are computed through Fisher permutation tests and 
presented in brackets. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 1-6: Heterogeneous effects of 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions on fertility, by 
state Medicaid family planning waiver/SPA status 
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births High parity First births, Single 
     
Panel A: High school dropout      
Post x Heavy -0.027 -0.073** -0.009 -0.049 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.019) (0.038) 
Post x Moderate -0.057*** -0.108*** -0.043** -0.098*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.027) 
Post x Light -0.034** -0.087*** -0.020* -0.094** 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.011) (0.039)      
Panel B: Less than college      
Post x Heavy -0.026** -0.018 -0.030*** -0.018 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.007) (0.019) 
Post x Moderate -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.046*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013) 
Post x Light -0.044** -0.051*** -0.041* -0.061*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) 
          
 
Notes: Each column is from a separate difference-in-difference regression using NCHS 2012-2015, 
with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. Sample includes births to women aged 
18-44.   Observations are at the at state/conception year-quarter/cell level. All models include state 
fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the data, poverty rate and unemployment rate. 
Standard errors are clustered at state and presented in parentheses. Estimates are weighted using 
state by year population of women aged 18-44. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant 
at the 5-percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 1-7: Heterogeneous effects of 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions on fertility, by 
state Medicaid family planning waiver/SPA status  
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births High parity First births, Single 
     
Panel A: Age 18-24      
Post x Heavy -0.030*** -0.034** -0.027** -0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) 
Post x Moderate -0.043*** -0.054*** -0.030*** -0.065*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) 
Post x Light -0.020 -0.039** 0.004 -0.048** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018)      
Panel B: Age 25-30      
Post x Heavy -0.034*** -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.050*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) 
Post x Moderate -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.061*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
Post x Light -0.022 -0.011 -0.027 -0.031* 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016)      
Panel C: Age 31-35      
Post x Heavy -0.030*** -0.005 -0.040*** 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.026) 
Post x Moderate -0.039*** -0.027* -0.044*** -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020) 
Post x Light -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 -0.032 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.029)      
Panel D: Age 36-44      
Post x Heavy -0.034*** -0.023 -0.037*** -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.007) (0.030) 
Post x Moderate -0.026** -0.009 -0.030** 0.023 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.030) 
Post x Light -0.008 -0.015 -0.005 0.004 
  (0.012) (0.025) (0.015) (0.053) 
 
Notes: Each column is from a separate difference-in-difference regression using NCHS 2012-2015, 
with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. Observations are at the at state/conception 
year-quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women aged 18-44. All models include state fixed 
effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the data, poverty rate and unemployment rate. Standard 
errors are clustered at state and presented in parentheses. Estimates are weighted using state by year 
population of women in the corresponding age group for each panel. * Significant at the 10-percent 
level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 1-8: DD estimates of the effect of 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions on Medicaid 
contraceptives 
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Medicaid prescriptions per 100 population) 
 (1) (2) 
  DD Synthetic control matching 
   
Estimate 0.24*** 0.30*** 
 (0.07) [0.001] 
   
Observations 960 960 
 
Note: Column (1) is from a separate difference-in-difference regression using SDUD 2012-2016, 
with natural log of total Medicaid contraceptives per 100 population as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the at state/year/quarter level. Model includes state fixed effects, fixed effects 
for each quarter in the data, poverty rate and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered 
by state are reported in parentheses. 
Column (2) presents synthetic control matching results. Synthetic controls are constructed as the 
weighted average of control states that most closely resemble characteristics of the Medicaid 
expansion states in the pre-policy change period. The pool of control states comprises of those that 
did not expand Medicaid during our study period. For the synthetic control estimates, p-values are 
computed through Fisher permutation tests and presented in brackets.   * Significant at the 10-
percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 1-9: DD estimates of effect of the 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions on Medicaid 
contraceptives, by state Medicaid family planning waiver/SPA status 
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Medicaid prescriptions per 100 population)   
Post x Heavy 0.35*** 
 (0.09)   
Post x Moderate 0.26*** 
 (0.07)   
Post x Light 0.24 
 (0.18)   
Observations 960 
 
Note: Reported estimates come from a difference-in-difference regression using SDUD 2012-2016, 
with natural log of total Medicaid contraceptives per 100 population as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the at state/year/quarter level. All models include state fixed effects, fixed 
effects for each quarter in the data, poverty rate and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors 
clustered by state are reported in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant 
at the 5-percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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 Figure 1-1: Descriptive trends in Medicaid contraceptive utilization, 2012-2016 
 
 
 
Notes:  
1. Each figure plots unadjusted trends in Medicaid prescription contraceptives. Data is 
aggregated to treatment/year/quarter level. 
2. January 2014 expansion states include: AK, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, IN, HI, IL, 
IA, IL, KY, LA, MA, MD, MI, MN, NH, NV, NY, NJ, NM, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, VT, 
WA, WV.  
3. Non-expansion states include: AL, AK, FL, GA, ID, KS, LA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NE, 
NC, OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY. 
4. The red vertical line is drawn at the 1st quarter of 2014, indicating implementation of the 
2014 ACA Medicaid expansions. 
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Figure 1-2: Event study estimates of the effect of the ACA Medicaid expansions on 
fertility among women without a high school diploma 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each figure plots estimates from an event study analysis using NCHS 2012-2015, with 
natural log of total births as the dependent variable. Observations are at the at state/conception year-
quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women aged 18-44. Model includes state 
unemployment rate and poverty rate, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each quarter in the 
data. Standard errors are clustered at state and presented in parentheses. Estimates are weighted 
using the state by year population of women aged 18-44. For each period, the red circle represents 
the coefficient estimate on the interaction term of expansion indicator and an indicator for the year-
quarter of conception. The solid black vertical line represents the 95 percent confidence interval. 
The vertical dashed line in blue is drawn at the 1st quarter of 2014, with 2012Q1 being the reference 
period. See Appendix Table 3, columns 1-4, for corresponding estimates.  
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Figure 1-3: Event study estimates of the effect of the ACA Medicaid expansions on 
fertility among women without a college degree 
 
 
 
Notes: Each figure plots estimates from an event study analysis using NCHS 2012-2015, with 
natural log of total births as the dependent variable. Observations are at the at state/conception year-
quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women aged 18-44. Model includes state 
unemployment rate and poverty rate, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each quarter in the 
data. Standard errors are clustered at state and presented in parentheses. Estimates are weighted 
using the state by year population of women aged 18-44. For each period, the red circle represents 
the coefficient estimate on the interaction term of expansion indicator and an indicator for the year-
quarter of conception. The solid black vertical line represents the 95 percent confidence interval. 
The vertical dashed line in blue is drawn at the 1st quarter of 2014, with 2012Q1 being the reference 
period. See Appendix Table 3, columns 1-4, for corresponding estimates.  
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Figure 1-4: Fertility among women without a high school diploma (Expansion states 
versus synthetic control states) 
 
 
Notes: Data from NCHS 2012-2015, with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the at state/conception year-quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women 
aged 18-44.  Synthetic controls are constructed as the weighted average of control states that most 
closely resemble characteristics of the Medicaid expansion states in the pre-policy change period. 
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Figure 1-5: Fertility among women without a college degree (Expansion states versus 
synthetic control states)  
 
 
Notes: Data from NCHS 2012-2015, with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the at state/conception year-quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to 
women aged 18-44.  Synthetic controls are constructed as the weighted average of control states 
that most closely resemble characteristics of the Medicaid expansion states in the pre-policy 
change period. 
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Figure 1-6: Event study estimates of the effect of the ACA Medicaid expansions on 
aggregate contraceptive utilization 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each figure plots estimates from an event study analysis using SDUD 2012-2016, with 
natural log of total Medicaid contraceptives per 100 population as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the state/year/quarter level. Model includes state unemployment rate and 
poverty rate, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each quarter in the data. Standard errors are 
clustered at state and presented in parentheses. For each period, the red circle represents the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term of expansion indicator and an indicator for the year-
quarter in the data. The solid black vertical line represents the 95 percent confidence interval. The 
vertical dashed line in blue is drawn at the 1st quarter of 2014, with 2012Q1 being the reference 
period. See Appendix Table 4, columns 1-3, for corresponding estimates. 
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Figure 1-7: Medicaid contraceptive utilization: Expansion states versus synthetic 
control states 
 
 
 
Notes: Data from SDUD 2012-2016, with natural log of total Medicaid contraceptives per 100 
population as the dependent variable. Observations are at the at state/year/quarter level.  Synthetic 
controls are constructed as the weighted average of control states that most closely resemble 
characteristics of the Medicaid expansion states in the pre-policy change period. 
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Figure 1-8: Medicaid coverage rates among women, by educational attainment 
 
 
 
Notes: Sample drawn from ACS 2012-2015, and is based on women aged 18-44. 
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Figure 1-9: Unadjusted trends in Medicaid contraceptive utilization 
 
Notes:  
1. Each figure plots unadjusted trends in Medicaid prescription contraceptives. Data is aggregated 
to treatment/year level. 
2. January 2014 expansion states include: AK, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, IN, HI, IL, IA, IL, 
KY, LA, MA, MD, MI, MN, NH, NV, NY, NJ, NM, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, VT, WA, WV.  
3. Non-expansion states include: AL, AK, FL, GA, ID, KS, LA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NE, NC, 
OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY. 
4. The red vertical line is drawn at the 1st quarter of 2014, indicating implementation of the 2014 
ACA Medicaid expansions 
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2 The Effect of Public Subsidies on Prescription Drug Use: Evidence from Recent 
Medicaid Expansions 
 Introduction 
Prescription drugs represent one of the fastest-growing areas of healthcare spending 
(Martin et al., 2016) and remain a mainstay of effective treatment for costly chronic 
conditions. Numerous studies have examined the effects of health insurance coverage on 
drug utilization among the elderly, particularly around the creation of the Medicare Part D 
program (Kaestner and Khan, 2012; Ketcham and Simon, 2008; Lichtenberg and Sun, 
2007; Yin et al., 2008).  However, much less is known about the effects of health insurance 
on prescription drug use among low-income adults, who are primarily insured through 
Medicaid or lack health insurance entirely.   The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
in 2010 and the subsequent Supreme Court ruling making Medicaid expansion optional 
provided a valuable opportunity for evaluating the responsiveness of low-income 
individuals to insurance expansions in terms of prescription drug usage.  Thus far, 31 states 
plus the District of Columbia have adopted the expansions.  We leverage this natural 
experiment to examine changes in utilization across drug classes, as well as brand and 
generic forms of prescriptions; in addition, we use state-level variation in Medicaid drug 
copayments to estimate the price elasticity of demand in this population. 
An extensive literature using experimental and quasi-experimental research designs 
establishes that the demand for prescription drugs is responsive to out-of-pocket prices 
(Chandra et al., 2010; Goldman et al., 2007; Newhouse, 1993), and the complete lack of 
insurance is in essence an extreme version of price variation.  In all 50 states, Medicaid 
covers most major categories of medical intervention, including pharmacological therapy.  
Meanwhile, non-elderly adults without health insurance are four times more likely than 
their insured counterparts to report foregoing needed prescription drugs due to cost, and 
most of the uninsured are non-elderly adults (National Center for Health Statistics, 2016). 
The extent to which expanded Medicaid coverage induces greater use of prescription drugs 
in this population is a worthwhile question. Utilization of prescription medications can 
provide indirect evidence of how insurance expansions affect access to providers, because 
prescriptions can only be obtained through consultation with a medical practitioner with 
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prescriptive authority. In turn, studying the effect of insurance coverage on healthcare 
utilization may also be important for understanding potential changes in health outcomes. 
Much of what is known about the coverage impacts on prescription drugs comes 
from studying the elderly population, but there has been far less research on the 
responsiveness of prescription medication use to insurance coverage among non-elderly 
adults. There are several reasons why the ACA Medicaid-eligible younger population may 
not respond in the same way as the well-studied elderly population affected by Medicare 
Part D.  Common health conditions and available therapies are likely to be different at 
younger ages.  The low-income population in Medicaid may also be particularly affected 
by cost-sharing requirements, which vary by state.  Another key difference is that the 
population gaining Part D coverage was already insured for other types of care beforehand 
– Medicare Part D added prescription drug benefit to existing otherwise comprehensive 
coverage.  The response may differ when a population is gaining access to subsidized 
pharmaceuticals at the same time as insurance for provider visits.  Opposing 
complementarity and substitutability between provider visits and medications imply that 
the net effect of coverage on prescription drug utilization in the case of the ACA is 
theoretically ambiguous, and in any event likely differs from the experience in Medicare 
Part D. 
The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (OHIE) represents the only other study 
we are aware of that assesses changes in prescription drug utilization among low-income 
non-elderly adults gaining health insurance. Evidence from Oregon showed that acquiring 
Medicaid led to significant increases in the likelihood of using any medication (Finkelstein 
et al., 2012b) and in diabetes medications utilization (Baicker et al., 2013). However, the 
subsidized public health insurance in the OHIE did not include any cost-sharing for 
prescription drugs. In contrast, of the 28 states that expanded Medicaid under the ACA 
within our study period, 20 states have prescription drug co-pays for the expansion 
population (Brooks et al., 2015). This variation allows us to estimate a price elasticity for 
drugs among Medicaid beneficiaries, which is an economically important consideration as 
states increasingly propose more cost-sharing for this population. More broadly, using 
national data, we extend the scope of previous research to provide the first natural-
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experimental evidence on how subsidized public health insurance coverage impacts 
prescription utilization on the Medicaid population.  Taking advantage of a rich claims-
based data source that is nationwide in coverage, we also assess the relative effects of 
insurance coverage on utilization across therapeutic classes and drug types (generic or 
branded), adding rich detail to our understanding of consumer demand for pharmaceuticals.  
Our work also fits into the broader emerging literature on the effects of the 
Affordable Care Act. Multiple studies have found that uninsurance rates have declined 
substantially since early 2014 (Courtemanche et al., 2017; Frean et al., 2017; Kaestner et 
al., 2017; Sommers et al., 2015); others have found improvements in self-reported access 
to primary care and prescription medications, particularly in Medicaid-expansion states 
(Sommers et al., 2016b; Sommers et al., 2015).  Although changes in insurance coverage 
resulting from the ACA Medicaid expansions have already received substantial attention 
from researchers and policy makers, far less is known about its impact on the use of specific 
types of medical services including prescription drugs. 
Our study design focuses on the 2014 state Medicaid expansions under the ACA to 
examine the impact of expanded coverage on prescription drug use.   We employ a 
difference-in-difference approach similar to that used in recent studies assessing the impact 
of expanded health insurance on uncompensated hospital-care costs (Dranove et al., 2016; 
Nikpay et al., 2015; Nikpay et al., 2016) and on coverage, access to care, and labor market 
outcomes (Gooptu et al., 2016; Kaestner et al., 2017). We assess aggregate effects on 
overall Medicaid pharmaceutical utilization rates, examine usage patterns across specific 
therapeutic classes and branded vs. generic drugs, and test for heterogeneity of effects in 
areas of the country that have high rates of baseline poverty, uninsurance, and 
concentration of racial/ethnic minority populations. In addition, we explore the differential 
effect of Medicaid drug cost-sharing in order to assess price elasticity of prescription 
medications for low-income non-elderly adults. Our research also provides an analysis of 
whether public coverage expansion simply substitutes away from utilization under 
uninsured or private payment sources. This helps in gauging the extent of new drug use, as 
opposed to a simple substitution of payment source; the issue of Medicaid ‘crowd out’ of 
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private insurance has been a substantial concern in prior literature (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2007; New York Times, 2015b).  
 Our key findings are as follows. We find a significant increase in prescription drug 
utilization in response to insurance expansions aimed at low-income adults. Medicaid 
prescriptions increased by 19 percent in states that expanded program eligibility in the first 
15 months following the 2014 policy change, relative to states that did not adopt Medicaid 
expansion. Moreover, we observe heterogeneity in utilization by therapeutic category, with 
a general pattern of larger increases for maintenance drugs used for chronic conditions and 
smaller increases for acute condition medications. The largest increase of 24 percent 
occurred among drugs associated with treating diabetes; the next largest were a 22 percent 
increase for contraception, and a 21 percent increase for drugs associated with 
cardiovascular disease. Increases in respiratory/allergy medications and antibiotics were 
significantly smaller.  
We observe no significant effect of Medicaid expansion on Medicare, privately 
insured prescription utilization, or on uninsured prescriptions paid by cash or assistance 
programs. These coefficients are not statistically significant and are small in magnitude, 
suggesting a lack of substantial crowd out of private prescriptions following Medicaid 
expansion.  In other words, the increased Medicaid drug utilization appears to represent a 
net increase in utilization among low-income adults.  
 We find evidence that the rise in Medicaid prescriptions was driven by a relative 
increase in generic drug usage that was nearly twice as large as that for branded drugs, 
which suggests that the Medicaid expansions steered patients towards lower-cost 
prescription drugs and may have therefore helped control program costs. This has 
important implications for states concerned with the budget implications of drug spending 
in the Medicaid program, as well as for the efficiency of health insurance expansions.  This 
pattern of utilization also matters for the pharmaceutical industry’s assessments of the 
impacts of ACA policies on future revenues.   
Unlike the Oregon Medicaid expansion studied in the past, most of the states that 
expanded Medicaid in our study required some cost-sharing for prescription drugs. Our 
results reveal smaller increases in utilization in expansion states imposing higher cost-
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sharing for prescription drugs, than in expansion states with low or no cost-sharing. We 
use these estimates to derive an implied price elasticity of -0.06, in the case of medications 
for respiratory illnesses, which is the only therapeutic class where we detect a statistically 
significant effect in the continuous copay specification. While this estimate is smaller than 
the -0.23 found by Chandra et al. (2014) in their regression discontinuity study of demand 
elasticities for prescription medications among low-income non-elderly adults with 
subsidized public insurance in Massachusetts, it is closer to the estimate of -0.098 for those 
with chronic illnesses in their analysis sample. Also, our use of aggregate data and 
weighted-average statewide copay likely introduces some measurement error, which would 
presumably bias our estimated elasticity towards zero. 
 To investigate the robustness of our results and to understand the heterogeneity of 
policy effects, we test whether effects are larger in areas we would expect the insurance 
expansions to have had more substantial reach. Within expansion states, we find that 
increases in prescription drug utilization were larger in geographical areas with higher 
baseline uninsured rates in 2013, where the ACA likely produced the largest coverage 
changes.  We also document suggestive evidence that increases in Medicaid prescriptions 
were greater in markets with higher pre-2014 rates of poverty and rates of minority 
(Hispanic and black) populations, indicating that Medicaid expansion under the ACA may 
have reduced ethnic/racial disparities in access to medications.  Our findings are robust to 
various alternative specifications, comparison of pre-policy trends and event study 
specifications, as well as placebo testing, suggesting the results can be causally attributed 
to the impact of expanded public health insurance to low-income populations. 
 Background 
Multiple experimental and natural-experimental studies have demonstrated that 
health insurance increases the use of medical care, including prescription drug use. The 
vast quasi-experimental evidence from Medicare Part D implementation suggests that 
among the elderly, health insurance drug coverage reduced out-of-pocket (OOP) spending 
and led to higher use of pharmaceuticals among the elderly (Kaestner and Khan, 2012; 
Ketcham and Simon, 2008; Lichtenberg and Sun, 2007) and improved health status 
(Afendulis et al., 2011; Ayyagari and Shane, 2015; Kaestner et al., 2014a). There is also 
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evidence that prescription medications for chronic conditions such as high cholesterol and 
diabetes can reduce the use of more expensive forms of healthcare among the near-elderly 
(Borrescio-Higa, 2015). 
Yet, this previous literature on the elderly and the near-elderly does not provide 
direct evidence from which to draw inferences about the non-elderly adult population, 
particularly lower-income adults targeted for insurance expansion under the ACA. The 
ACA provides additional federal financing to states for extending Medicaid coverage to 
non-elderly adults earning less than 138 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL).  The 
expansion decision was later delegated by the Supreme Court to states, and as of January 
1, 2017, 31 states plus Washington DC had implemented the ACA Medicaid expansion, 
while the remaining 19 states had not. Medicaid is a means-tested health insurance program 
for low-income populations that is jointly administered by the federal and state 
governments. Since the creation of the Medicaid program in 1965, states have had broad 
discretion over a range of eligibility rules, program benefits, and provider reimbursement, 
subject to compliance with federal minimum standards. As a result, there has long been 
considerable variation in Medicaid eligibility standards and program generosity across 
states. Even though prescription drug coverage was a state option, all states covered 
pharmacological treatments prior to the ACA; following the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, 
new enrollees must be offered so-called “benchmark” benefits, including prescription drug 
coverage.  
Thus, the ACA’s Medicaid expansion offers a unique large-scale policy experiment 
through which the effects of health insurance on healthcare utilization, including 
prescription drugs, can be studied. Only a few prior studies estimate the impact of Medicaid 
on prescribed medications. The OHIE found that in the first year, Medicaid coverage 
increased the likelihood of using prescription medications by 15 percent among previously-
uninsured low-income adults (Finkelstein et al., 2012b). Using a difference-in-difference 
study design, Sommers et al. (2016b) estimated a 10 percentage-point reduction in low-
income adults reporting skipping prescribed medication in Kentucky and Arkansas 
following Medicaid expansions under the ACA, relative to non-expansion Texas.  
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Two recent studies have explored the pharmaceutical utilization implications of the 
ACA Medicaid expansions in particular. Mulcahy et al. (2016) used prescription 
transaction data to longitudinally follow a sample of non-elderly adults who reported any 
prescription drug use during January 2012. They find that adults who gained Medicaid in 
2014 increased their prescription drug use by 79 percent. However, their sample was 
limited to those already using medications, nearly two-thirds of whom reported chronic 
health conditions such as diabetes, asthma and breast cancer.  Thus, their study population 
had a much higher prevalence of chronic disease than the overall population, such as adults 
newly eligible for coverage through the ACA Medicaid expansions (Decker et al., 2014). 
More importantly, their sampling design did not allow them to consider the effects on those 
who did not use prescription medications prior to the expansions.  The second study, by 
Wen and colleagues (2016), examines aggregate Medicaid medication use as reported in 
the CMS State Drug Utilization Database (SDUD) through 2014.  They find a significant 
increase in the number of prescriptions per enrollee following expansion, but no significant 
change in total spending.  Notably, none of these aforementioned studies examine 
heterogeneity in effects by therapeutic class, state cost-sharing requirements, across payer 
types other than Medicaid or by sub-state geography.  
Price elasticity of demand for pharmaceutical services among low-income non-
elderly adults has received relatively less attention in the literature, even though the extant 
literature from other insurance settings suggests that higher consumer cost-sharing reduces 
utilization of medical services. Several studies have estimated the responsiveness of 
demand for prescription medications to out-of-pocket costs, with one meta-analysis across 
all payer types and populations finding that for each 10 percent increase in out-of-pocket 
costs, total drug spending fell by 2-6 percent (Goldman et al., 2007). To the best of our 
knowledge, low-income non-elderly adult population-specific elasticities have not been 
assessed at the national level. Chandra et al. (2014) examine the elasticity of different types 
of medical spending to cost-sharing among low-income non-elderly adult beneficiaries of 
subsidized public health insurance in Massachusetts through a regression discontinuity 
design. Using discontinuous changes in patient cost-sharing around the 100 and 200 
percent FPL income thresholds, they estimate a price elasticity of expenditure on 
prescription drugs to be -0.23, with a lower price elasticity (-0.098) for those with chronic 
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diseases. We add to this literature by exploring this question in a national setting, in the 
context of a large-scale public insurance expansion, and by providing an analysis of 
therapeutic class-specific price elasticities by taking advantage of our rich data source. 
 Data 
The database provides a combined view of U.S. pharmaceutical distribution sales 
to U.S. retail brick-and-mortar and mail-order pharmacy prescription activity, including 
large pharmacy chains, independent pharmacies and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). 
The data we use in our empirical specifications are aggregated to the level at which 
variation occurs (for example, state/year/therapeutic class/payer type), but here we describe 
the micro data from which we aggregate.  The micro database contains slightly more than 
80% of all U.S. retail prescriptions and 60% of all U.S. mail order prescriptions, including 
all data from more than 40,000 retail pharmacies.  The data are then projected to the 
national level using weights to adjust for any systematic differences in the sample 
composition. There were no changes to the reporting frame during the years of our sample 
(i.e. no substantial changes in which pharmacies contributed data each year, although every 
year some pharmacies will move in and out of the sample); the analysis weights provided 
in the database are adjusted to produce nationally and sub-nationally reflective totals. 
Together these data files offer a rich set of information on every drug claim including the 
month of each transaction, the core-based statistical area (CBSA) of the pharmacy or 
facility, Uniform System of Classification (USC) product code for the drug, a quantity 
measure of package size, and payment type (including commercial plans, Medicare, cash, 
assistance programs, and Medicaid). The Medicaid category includes both fee-for-service 
Medicaid and Medicaid managed-care claims and covers all fifty states and DC. 
We obtained prescription counts aggregated by unit of geography (all states and 
DC, as well as data from the 917 Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA) in the US),3 time 
                                               
3 We use Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) as our market definition because this is the smallest 
geographic unit available to us. CBSAs are geographic aggregations produced by the US Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB); they consist of groupings of geographic areas with a population 
of at least 10,000 and associated with an urban core. These areas are clusters of adjacent counties 
with social and economic integration. Approximately 94 percent of the total US population lives 
within CBSAs. An example of a CBSA is Mobile, Alabama.  
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(quarterly, from Q1 2013 through Q1 2015), drug class (total, as well as by 9 therapeutic 
classes), and payer type.  
Key advantages of this dataset include its large and nationally-representative 
sample – far larger than any of the government surveys that examine healthcare utilization, 
which enables us to conduct state and sub-state analyses; information not only on 
Medicaid-covered prescriptions but also all other major payer types including uninsured 
patients; quarterly-level information, rather than just annual data, which bolsters our 
identification strategy; and rich drug information on therapeutic categories and other 
factors such as brand-name or generic status. Other rich data sources such as the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) Household Component have very small sample sizes in 
comparison and lack the geographic detail of our claims data.  Meanwhile, other 
administrative data sources on drug spending –such as the State Drug Utilization Database 
(SDUD) collected by the federal government lack information on non-Medicaid sources of 
payment and lack sub-state data for investigating heterogeneity across areas.  
Our data set also has important disadvantages. One is that it does not contain the 
patient-level information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that would 
allow us to estimate specifications separately by age, gender, income, or other important 
subgroupings of individuals who may differ in their demand for drugs or response to 
coverage.  To control for changes in the economic climate that may independently affect 
state Medicaid rolls, we merge the pharmaceutical claims data with state and CBSA-level 
unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics (LAUS).4  We control for possible changes in population by dividing total counts 
of prescriptions by Census Bureau state and county annual non-elderly adult population 
estimates.5 We also incorporate information on uninsurance rates, poverty rates and 
racial/ethnic composition of the local markets using estimates produced by the Census 
                                               
4 To obtain the unemployment rate in a CBSA, we take the average of the unemployment rates for 
all the counties within a CBSA. County-level unemployment rates come from BLS LAUS, and the 
listings of counties within CBSAs come from the Mable Geographic Correspondence Engine 
(http://mcdc.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr12.html).  
5 We obtain these annual county resident population estimates by year from 
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2015/demo/popest/counties-total.html. 
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Bureau.6  The resulting dataset is a balanced panel of 51 states (including Washington, DC) 
observed for a total of 9 quarters (459 =51*9 total cells), and a balanced panel of 781 
CBSAs that do not cross state lines (we drop 143 that do) for a total of 7,029 (=781*9) 
cells. 
 Empirical Framework 
Our main empirical strategy uses a state-level difference-in-difference model to 
compare pharmaceutical utilization in all expansion states to that in non-expansion states 
(first difference) before and after the expansions (second difference). In a specification 
check, following Wherry and Miller (2016), we drop from our expansion group the five 
states (DC, DE, MA, NY and VT) that had large expansions of public coverage to 
nonelderly adults prior to 2014.  
Our main outcome of interest is medication utilization under Medicaid, defined as 
the total number of Medicaid prescription drugs dispensed (new and refills, all therapeutic 
classes) where Medicaid (including both fee-for-service and managed care) is recorded as 
the payer. We also examine total prescriptions dispensed for other payer categories. Our 
data are aggregated, by quarter, to state and CBSA levels. We generate per-100 population 
utilization rates by dividing the total number of prescriptions by Census Bureau estimates 
of the non-elderly adult population. The identifying variation in our main analysis comes 
from cross-state differences in expansion decisions. Our baseline model for the effect of 
the ACA Medicaid expansions is specified as: E*+ = T + /34)'+76789:)%4:* + UV6*+ + W+ + X* + F*+                   (2-1) 
The dependent variable is the logged prescriptions per 100 non-elderly adult 
population in the state, with ) indexing state and ' indexing each quarter in the data, 
respectively. The difference-in-difference coefficient, β, measures the change in Medicaid 
scripts in expansion states net of the change in non-expansion states. While most states 
                                               
6  We obtain county-level 2013 uninsured rates for non-elderly adults at or below 138 percent FPL 
from the Census Bureau’s Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) program, racial/ethnic 
composition data from the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF) and poverty rates from the Census 
Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). 
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implemented the Medicaid eligibility changes beginning January 2014, Indiana, Michigan, 
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania expanded later in 2014 or 2015. To account for this 
staggered implementation timeline, the difference-in-difference interaction term, 34)'+76789:)%4:*, indicates whether a state has expanded Medicaid at time '. The model 
includes state fixed effects to account for time-invariant state-specific differences in 
prescription drug use and time dummies for each quarter and year in the data to capture 
national time trends. We use state quarterly unemployment rates (UE) to control for 
changes in economic conditions that may independently influence drug utilization 
patterns.7 The model is estimated using ordinary least squares, and throughout we report 
standard errors clustered at the state level to account for correlated error terms across states 
over time (Bertrand et al., 2004b).  
Identification in the difference-in-differences model is based on the assumption of 
parallel trends – that absent the 2014 Medicaid expansion, trends in outcomes would not 
have differed significantly across expansion and non-expansion states. While this 
assumption is not directly testable, we compare trends in Medicaid prescriptions across the 
treatment and comparison states prior to the policy change; this comparison offers support 
for our identifying approach. Because we have a limited number of quarters of data prior 
to the policy change, we also examine Medicare prescription counts as a placebo test; 
again, the results (presented below) support our identification strategy.  
 Results 
 Descriptive Trends 
In Figure 2-1, we plot unadjusted time trends for total per-capita (normalized by 
the number of non-elderly adults in the state) prescriptions paid at the state level by 
Medicaid, Medicare, private insurance plans, or through cash and assistance programs 
available to the uninsured during the study period; we plot these trends separately for the 
expansion and non-expansion states. The blue and grey lines represent ACA Medicaid-
expansion states and non-expansion states, respectively.8 The first vertical line in red 
                                               
7 We also estimate our models without including the unemployment rate as a covariate and find 
they do not materially alter our results. 
8 Four states (i.e., IN, MI, NH and PA) are omitted from the graphs because they expanded after 
January 2014. They are, however, included in the regressions that allow for more flexibility in 
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denotes the beginning of the ACA’s first open enrollment period in the fourth quarter of 
2013; the second denotes the implementation of the ACA Medicaid expansions in the first 
quarter of 2014.  
Figure 2-1 demonstrates that prior to the expansions in early 2014, Medicaid 
prescriptions followed similar trends across the two groups of states. There is a clear 
divergence in trends after the first quarter of 2014, when the expansion states experience a 
very noticeable increase in Medicaid within 6 months of the policy change, relative to the 
non-expansion states. The remaining panels in Figure 2-1 display trends in pharmaceuticals 
that were paid by Medicare, private insurance, and were uninsured (cash and assistance 
programs). These panels demonstrate that trends in aggregate prescriptions did not differ 
appreciably across the two groups of states for the non-Medicaid payment categories.  
 Effect on Medicaid Prescription Drug Utilization 
Table 2-1 displays results from our main difference-in-differences analysis of 
equation (2-1) and unadjusted sample means of the dependent variable. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of Medicaid prescriptions per 100 population. The pattern 
in the first panel of Figure 2-1 is reflected in the difference-in-difference estimate for 
Medicaid prescriptions in column (1) of Table 2-1. The estimate demonstrates that 
Medicaid expansions in 2014 led to sizable and statistically significant increases in 
Medicaid prescription drug use. The coefficient represents a 19-percent increase in 
Medicaid prescription utilization relative to non-expansion states for all therapeutic 
classes.  Column (2) demonstrates that the estimate increases to 23 percent when we drop 
the five states that provided publicly subsidized coverage to adults at or below 100 percent 
of the FPL prior to 2014 (the District of Columbia, Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, 
and Vermont).  
 
                                               
specifying the Medicaid expansion date. The graphs do not change in any meaningful manner when 
these states are included in the expansion category. 
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 Effect on Aggregate Prescription Drug Utilization by Payment Source 
One mechanism through which Medicaid prescriptions may increase following 
expansions is private insurance crowd-out. Indeed, much attention in health economics 
devoted to this question (Cutler and Gruber, 1996; Gruber and Simon, 2008). Another 
possibility is that increased Medicaid drug claims simply reflects a substitution of Medicaid 
coverage for drug claims that were previously purchased in cash by uninsured patients.  To 
explore these mechanisms, we investigate the impact of the expansions on prescriptions 
from private insurance, as well as cash and other assistance programs available to the 
uninsured. This analysis allows us to consider whether Medicaid prescriptions increased 
simply through a substitution of payment source or due to a net increase in utilization.  
Table 2-2 below contains these results for other payer sources. Changes in 
cash/assistance programs (likely representing uninsured individuals) had a statistically 
insignificant and small point estimate of -0.02 in column (1). Similarly, in the case of 
private insurance, the statistically insignificant estimated coefficient in column (2) was -
0.01. Thus, the point estimates for privately insured and uninsured prescriptions are 
negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero indicating little to no crowd-out of 
prescription drug use from payment sources other than Medicaid. This suggests that in the 
aggregate, the policy impact on use of Medicaid prescription drugs primarily reflects new 
prescriptions rather than simply a shift in payer-mix from cash to insurance or from private 
insurance to public insurance. 
As a falsification test, we next consider changes in Medicare prescription 
utilization.  We hypothesize that extended Medicaid eligibility for the non-elderly adult 
population under the ACA is unlikely to affect prescription drug use in the Medicare 
program. Consistent with our hypothesis, the result from this analysis, which we report in 
column (3) of Table 2-2, show that there is little evidence that Medicare is affected. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of uninsured, privately insured, or Medicare 
prescriptions per 100 population. In Appendix Table B-2, we present event history 
estimates for aggregate prescriptions paid by non-Medicaid sources. Taken together, these 
regression estimates indicate that prescriptions from non-Medicaid payment sources did 
not respond significantly to the policy expanding public health insurance.  
 63 
 Heterogeneity in Medicaid Prescription Utilization by Drug Class 
We next study whether specific therapeutic classes were differentially affected by 
the expansion. Prescription medications that treat acute medical conditions may respond 
differently to coverage expansion than maintenance drugs associated with chronic 
illnesses, but prior literature has not examined this among low-income populations. It is 
possible that demand for some short-term medications (e.g. allergy relief) would be more 
elastic, if those medications are viewed as more discretionary and less critical for health 
than those associated with chronic illnesses (e.g. diabetes or heart disease).  Alternatively, 
some acute medications may treat conditions requiring immediate treatment (e.g. 
antibiotics for infection) and might therefore be less price sensitive and less responsive to 
changes in coverage. Another reason to examine heterogeneity across therapeutic classes 
is that the newly insured population’s healthcare needs may differ from those of the nation 
as a whole; in particular, chronic conditions are likely to be more common among low-
income individuals qualifying for Medicaid than among those with private insurance 
(Decker et al., 2014) . 
Table 2-3 describes the impact on utilization of a range of medication classes.  Our 
results indicate that there were statistically significant increases in utilization across all 
therapeutic classes, but relatively larger effects for certain classes, particularly those 
relevant to common chronic medical conditions. Diabetes medications increased 24 
percent; accounting for the largest growth among all therapeutic classes. This effect was 
statistically different from the mean effect on all the remaining classes.  The use of 
cardiovascular medications (those for high blood pressure, high cholesterol and heart 
disease) increased by 21 percent, while the use of contraceptives increased by 22 percent. 
Meanwhile, the use of respiratory/allergy medications, antibiotics, and gastrointestinal 
medications, which are more commonly taken for shorter-term conditions than the other 
therapeutic classes, increased less than overall drug spending, with growth rates ranging 
from 15 to 17 percent.   
The larger increases in use of medications for chronic conditions such as diabetes 
detected in our data accord with recent research that finds diagnoses of chronic health 
conditions to have increased among low-income adults in states that have broadened 
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Medicaid eligibility under the ACA (Kaufman et al., 2015; Wherry and Miller, 2016) and 
that hospitalizations for diabetes has decreased (Freedman et al., 2017). Overall, this 
pattern of results suggests that health insurance expansion was particularly effective at 
increasing prescription drug utilization for common and potentially costly chronic medical 
conditions. Our results also indicate that even though state Medicaid family planning 
waivers existed prior to the ACA expansions, the recent expansions in coverage lead to 
meaningful effect on access to contraceptive treatments.  
In recent years, high prices of life-saving hepatitis C and HIV medications have 
fueled debate about the role of public policy in providing access to costly but effective 
pharmacological treatments for vulnerable populations. Our finding of a more modest 
effect for HIV and Hepatitis C medications is likely due to two factors. First, the existence 
of federally funded programs such as the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program (RWP) and the 
AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP) already facilitated the use of these medications 
for many patients prior to the expansion of Medicaid in 2014. Second, growth in use of 
Hepatitis C medications may have been attenuated by limited access in several state 
Medicaid programs (such as Indiana and Washington) due to cost concerns (New York 
Times, 2015a; Pear, 2015). 
 Differentiating Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Utilization 
Several facts suggest that we should expect the use of generic medications in 
Medicaid to rise compared to brand-name drugs. First, patent expirations of several 
branded prescription drugs such as atorvastatin (Lipitor) (Jackevicius et al., 2012) and the 
SSRI-class of antidepressants (Huskamp et al., 2008) in recent years have increased the 
number of prominent generics in the market (Frank, 2007). Second, in response to 
budgetary constraints, many state Medicaid programs use several policy levers for 
utilization management – such as higher copayments for brand-name drugs, mandatory 
generic substitution, and lower reimbursements to pharmacies for brand-names relative to 
generic – that encourage utilization of generic medications (Simon et al., 2009). A recent 
study finds that there was a significant increase in Medicaid prescriptions following the 
ACA Medicaid expansions, with no detectable increase in the program’s drug spending 
(Wen et al., 2016), which supports the notion that most new prescriptions were likely low-
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cost. These features of the policy environment may impact utilization of medications in 
ways that can potentially improve health and manage program spending growth. 
In Table 2-4, we decompose total Medicaid prescriptions filled into brand-name, 
generic and other (includes prescription products recorded as medical supplies and bulk 
chemicals) components. To obtain estimates of the impact of the 2014 Medicaid 
expansions on composition of Medicaid prescriptions, we estimate equation (1) for each 
group.9  While Medicaid prescriptions increased significantly in all three categories, the 
magnitude of the impact was the largest for generic drugs.  Generic drug claims in Medicaid 
increased by 24 percent, compared to 14 percent for brand drugs.  At baseline, generic 
drugs represented nearly 79 percent of Medicaid claims in our sample, “other” less than 1 
percent, and brand-name drugs the remaining 21 percent, based on total prescription counts 
in 2013.  Taken together, this provides suggestive evidence that the Medicaid expansions 
guided patients towards lower-cost prescription drugs, which may help control program 
costs. 
 Price Elasticity of Medicaid Prescription Drug Utilization  
Our work thus far studies the effect of coverage expansions on prescription drug 
utilization, capturing the full effect of health insurance, which could operate through 
reductions in the cost of seeing a prescribing clinician as well as paying for the prescription 
drug itself.  Since expansion states differ in the amount of cost-sharing required for 
prescription drugs, spatial variation in drug copayments provides us an opportunity to 
better understand the price elasticity of demand for medications among low-income adults.  
We match our data with state level Medicaid drug copayments specific to the 
expansion population from the Kaiser Family Foundation (Brooks et al., 2015). As of 
January 2015, of the 28 states that extended Medicaid eligibility under the ACA guidelines, 
12 states have $0 copay for generics, 7 states have a $1 generic copay, and the remaining 
                                               
9 For this analysis, we use CBSA-aggregates, as product information on brand/ generic status is 
only available at the sub-state level. One concern in examining this specification is whether CBSAs 
in the sample differ in ways that introduce bias in our estimates. We re-estimate our baseline 
difference-in-difference model (equation 1) using this sample, comparing CBSAs in expansion 
states to a group of comparison CBSAs in non-expansion states. The results from this analysis are 
displayed in Appendix Table 6. These estimates are closely comparable in magnitude, direction 
and precision, confirming our findings from the main specification. 
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have average copayments between $1.50 and $4. Brand-name drug copayments track 
generic copayments closely, with $0 being the copay in 9 of these states, and varying 
between $1-$6 in the rest.10  
We conducted two analyses to assess the effects of copays on prescriptive drug 
utilization after health insurance expansions to low-income adults.  First, we split 
expansion states into those with copays above and below the median,11 and estimated two 
difference-in-difference models akin to equation (2-1): one model compares high-copay 
expansion states to all non-expansion states, and the other compares low-copay expansion 
states to all non-expansion states.   
Table 2-5 reports the results of this exercise. As expected, the policy impact on 
prescription drug utilization was larger in expansion states with low cost-sharing 
requirements than high cost-sharing. These results show that increased Medicaid drug 
utilization was 22 percent in states with lower copays and 17 percent in states with higher 
copays, both compared to non-expansion states.  The coefficients are both statistically 
significant, providing evidence consistent with basic consumer theory.  However, the two 
estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other, thus we interpret this 
evidence as suggestive rather than definitive regarding a response to cost-sharing 
We next explore the effect of prescription drug copays on aggregate Medicaid 
prescriptions and provide a parameterized estimate of the price elasticity related to 
Medicaid copays through the following specification: E*+ = T0 + T234)'+76789:)%4:*7	Y'L	Z489J* +		T;34)'+7	Y'L	Z489J* +	T<34)'+76789:)%4:* + T=6789:)%4:*7	Y'L	Z489J* + d	V6[*+ +	W+ + X* + @*+     (2-2)                                                          
In the above equation, Y'L	Z489J*	represents a weighted average of Medicaid 
generic and brand-name drug copayments in each expansion state, with the state’s 
respective pre-period share of total prescriptions that are generic vs brand name used as 
                                               
10 In cases where the dollar amount of cost-sharing is reported as a range, we use the midpoint of 
the range. 
11 We used a weighted average of the generic and brand-name drug copay facing new enrollees in 
each expansion state, using the state’s respective pre-period share of total prescriptions that are 
generic vs brand name as the weights. This is similar to the approach used by Chandra et al. (2014) 
for computing weighted copayments. 
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weights.12 Here, the effect of consumer cost-sharing is identified by T2, which allows us to 
isolate differential policy impact by state drug copayments. The terms 6789:)%4:*,Y'L	Z489J*,	and 6789:)%4:*7	Y'L	Z489J* are perfectly collinear with 
state fixed effects; hence these terms all drop out of the equation.  
Table 2-6 displays results from the estimation of the above equation.  The point 
estimate of -0.038 in column (1) indicates that the increase in post-expansion utilization 
was 3.8 percent lower for each added dollar in Medicaid copays per prescription (compared 
to a mean weighted cost-sharing of $1.24 in expansion states), though this estimate was 
not statistically significant. 
Next, we test for heterogeneous response of utilization to copayments by 
therapeutic class.  Theoretically, cost-sharing may differently affect drug use across 
therapeutic classes due to factors such as the availability of alternative over-the-counter 
(OTC) treatments and severity of the medical condition.  
The results in columns (2) through (9) of Table 2-6 suggest that utilization in the 
remaining therapeutic classes appears to respond negatively to greater cost-sharing as 
expected, with price responsiveness varying appreciably across the classes, though the key 34)'+7	6789:)%4:*7	Y'L	Z489J* interaction term was not statistically significant for 
most drug classes.  We did detect a statistically significant point estimate for respiratory 
medications in column (8) which indicates that each $1 increase in the average drug 
copayment was associated with a 4.9 percent relative decline in use of medications for 
respiratory illnesses and allergies after Medicaid expansion (compared to an overall 
increase of 18.8 percent in utilization for expansion states with $0 copays, indicated in the 
2nd row of the table).  In contrast to these drug classes, demand for potentially life-saving 
medications such as cardiovascular and HIV/Hepatitis C drugs were the least price-
responsive.13 Overall, this pattern is consistent with prior research showing that 
                                               
12 In 2013, the average OOP cost per prescription for a low income non-elderly adult was $78.40 
(authors’ calculations from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey NET tool at 
https://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/MEPSnetHC/datasource). We assign copayments for 
non-expansion states a value of $78.40. The estimates presented in Table 6 are robust to the choice 
of alternative cost-sharing amounts such as $20 or $100. 
13 Note that under federal rules, state Medicaid programs must provide prescription birth control 
without cost-sharing. Hence, we exclude contraceptives from this analysis. 
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medications used to treat acute symptomatic conditions such as asthma are relatively more 
price-sensitive than chronic treatments for cardiovascular conditions (Goldman et al., 
2004; Landsman et al., 2005).    
 Overall, taking the point estimate from column (1) in Table 2-6, we 
calculate that each $1 increase in cost-sharing (amounting to an 81 percent increase from 
the mean copay of $1.24) led to a 3.8 percent relative decline in utilization, yielding a price 
elasticity of roughly -.05. Using this approach, the copay elasticity for allergy and 
respiratory medications is -0.06, and is statistically significant. This degree of price 
elasticity is similar in direction but substantially smaller the -0.23 found by Chandra et al. 
(2014) for prescription medications among low-income non-elderly adults with subsidized 
public insurance in Massachusetts. It is worth noting that their elasticity estimate is based 
on variation in copayments at income thresholds alone. In contrast, we study the effect of 
higher copayments along with contemporaneous policy-induced gains in insurance 
coverage, which may bring into treatment a population with relatively inelastic pent-up 
demand for healthcare services.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Chandra et al. (2014) find that 
patients with chronic illnesses such as hypertension, high cholesterol, diabetes, asthma, 
arthritis or gastritis in their analysis sample, are less price sensitive, with an elasticity 
estimate of -0.098, which is much closer to our price elasticity estimate of -0.06.  Our 
estimated elasticity could presumably be biased downward as aggregate data and weighted-
average statewide copay likely introduces some measurement error. Notably, while we find 
price elasticities to be higher for respiratory and allergy medications and lowest for 
cardiovascular, diabetes, and other serious illness, this is largely the opposite pattern as 
what we detected in Table 2-3, where we found that overall coverage gains from Medicaid 
expansion led to the largest increases in utilization for the latter conditions.  One way to 
reconcile this apparent contradiction is that Table 2-3 reflects both the reduction in out-of-
pocket price for medications and the reduction in cost for seeing a physician.  It is likely 
that better access to clinicians - and thus higher rates of diagnosis and then treatment of 
chronic conditions like diabetes - is just as important in increasing medication use as the 
reduction in drug-related out-of-pocket costs.  This pattern again points to the value in 
assessing the economic effects of a comprehensive coverage expansion like Medicaid, 
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distinct from just adding drug coverage to existing insurance as in the case of Medicare 
Part D. 
 Robustness Checks  
To investigate the basis of support for the natural-experimental study design, we 
examine whether there were differential pre-trends in Medicaid prescription drug 
utilization across states based on treatment status.  We do this by using four quarters of 
data from 2013Q1-2013Q4 and the following empirical specification: E*+ = T + \]&F:L+ + ^6789:)%4:*7]&F:L+ + /V6*+ + W+ + X* + @*+           (2-3) 
In the above equation, ]&F:L	stands for a quarterly linear time trend, 6789:)%4:*	indicates the states that expanded after 2014 Q1, and the interaction term 6789:)%4:*7]&F:L+ identifies differential trends between expansion and non-expansion 
states during the pre-expansion period. Also included in the regression are the trend main 
term, the unemployment rate, and state and month-by-year fixed effects.  
To further evaluate the parallel trends assumption, we use an event study approach 
by interacting the expansion dummy with each year-quarter in the data from 2013-2015. 
For the parallel trends assumption to be valid, we expect the interaction terms in 2013 to 
be statistically indistinguishable from 0.  The point estimates in column (1) of Table 2-7 
are indeed quite small in magnitude (and not statistically significant) relative to the 
difference-in-difference estimate in Table 2-2, indicating that no significant differential 
trends appear in the pre-expansion period that would otherwise threaten our identification 
strategy. Column (2) displays the event history estimates. Consistent with the graphical 
results, we find no evidence of differential trends across the states that expanded and those 
that did not, prior to the policy change.  Starting with 2014 Q2, the estimates are positive 
and statistically significant as we would expect given the timing of state expansion 
decisions. The estimates are higher in magnitude every consecutive quarter, which implies 
that the impact of coverage has amplified over time, consistent with other recent evidence 
on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion (Sommers et al., 2016a). This dynamic pattern in the 
data also mirrors the staggered timeline of state expansion decisions. In every successive 
quarter after the first six months of the policy change, the effect on aggregate Medicaid 
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prescriptions exceeds the mean effect of 19 percent (shown in Table 2-2). The evolution of 
the ACA’s impact on prescription drug utilization during this 15-month period suggests 
some longer-term effects on coverage, access, and utilization occur through diffusion of 
information about policy changes, as well as potential lags in obtaining care after acquiring 
coverage. 
We test the sensitivity of our results to the addition of group-specific linear time 
trends. These results are presented in column (3) of Table 2-7. This specification addresses 
the possibility that expansion and non-expansion states may follow different, unobserved 
time trends correlated with Medicaid expansion decisions. We detect no difference in the 
estimates in column (3) compared to the baseline model, emphasizing that underlying 
group-specific trends are not responsible for the observed effect on Medicaid prescriptions.  
 Heterogeneous Effects at the Market Level 
The analysis with aggregated state data presented so far indicates that Medicaid 
prescription drug utilization increased significantly in response to the ACA Medicaid 
expansions. We next expand on this reduced-form analysis to probe whether these results 
are concentrated in geographical areas with higher treatment intensity. Geographic 
variation in factors that affect demand for healthcare services, such as rates of insurance 
coverage, level of income, and demographic characteristics of the population that pre-dates 
policy change, may affect prescription drug utilization differently across markets.  Here we 
consider three key pre-expansion characteristics – uninsurance rate, poverty rate, and share 
of minority population – to test whether the observed effects on utilization are concentrated 
among particular markets.  
First, we examine the dose-response relationship between prescriptions paid by 
Medicaid and reductions in uninsurance that occurred after 2014. Using data aggregated to 
the CBSA level, we explore whether the effects of Medicaid expansion on prescription 
drugs is larger in CBSAs with higher pre-reform uninsurance levels (where we expect 
larger gains in coverage), relative both to CBSAs with lower baseline (2013) uninsurance 
in expansion states and to CBSAs with higher baseline uninsurance rates in non-expansion 
states.  The estimating equation is specified below: 
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E[*+ = T234)'+76789:)%4:*7	3_'	V:%:)`&FL	2013[ +	T;34)'+7	3_'	V:%:)`&FL	2013[ +	T<34)'76789:)%4:*+ +T=6789:)%4:*7	3_'	V:%:)`&FL	2013[ + d	V6[*+ +	W+ + X[* + @[*+                  (2-4)                                                                                                                                   
The main coefficient of interest in the above equation is 	T2, which represents the 
differential change in Medicaid prescription use in CBSAs with high 2013 uninsurance 
rates compared to those with low rates in expansion states, with non-expansion states as 
the difference-in-difference control group. We expect that there would be a greater increase 
in Medicaid prescription drugs in CBSAs where the baseline fraction of uninsured 
population was larger (i.e., T2>0). The coefficient of interest in this regression appears in 
panel A of Table 8, along with summary statistics of 2013 uninsurance rates. The point 
estimate in column (1) indicates that a 10 percentage-point increase in exposure to the 
expansions was associated with a 0.1 percent increase in Medicaid utilization. This implies 
that, on average, areas with 2013 uninsurance rate of 33.7 percent, experienced a 0.3 
percent increase in Medicaid prescription drug utilization, due to the policy change.  
Column (2) displays results from a model which excludes states that partially expanded 
Medicaid to low-income non-elderly adults before 2014. The similarity of these results 
with those in column (1) demonstrate that our main results are not sensitive to this 
exclusion. 
We next consider an alternative economic measure to understand heterogeneous 
treatment impact at the market level.  This analysis is motivated by the nature of the 
Medicaid program. Under the ACA, states expanded coverage for non-elderly adults at or 
below 138 percent FPL. Thus, impact on utilization is likely to be of a greater magnitude 
in markets with relatively higher rates of poverty. The estimating equation is described 
below: E[*+ = T234)'+76789:)%4:*7	3_'	34IF&'J	2013[ +		T;34)'+7	3_'	34IF&'J	2013[ +	T<34)'+76789:)%4:* +T=6789:)%4:*7	3_'	34IF&'J	2013[ + d	V6[*+ +	W+ + X[* + @[*+	     (2-5) 
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The regression estimates in Panel B suggest that policy impact on utilization is 
larger in high poverty areas, potentially driven by higher Medicaid coverage gains among 
the low-income population, though these results are fairly imprecise.  
The ACA Medicaid expansions are also expected to reduce absolute differences in 
insurance coverage related to race and ethnicity. Using the American Community Survey, 
Nikpay et al. (2016) document that in 2014, the largest declines in uninsurance occurred 
among Hispanics (7.1 percentage points) and blacks (5.1 percentage points), relative to 
whites (3 percentage points). We exploit geographic variation in racial composition to 
examine whether the impact on Medicaid prescriptions was comparatively larger in areas 
with greater Hispanic and black populations. The estimating equation is: E[*+ = T234)'+76789:)%4:*7	3_'	K%:4&%'J	2013[ +		T;34)'+7	3_'	K%:4&%'J	2013[ +	T<34)'+76789:)%4:* +T=6789:)%4:*7	3_'	K%:4&%'J	2013[ + d	V6[*+ +	W+ + X[* + @[*+          (2-6) 
We report this result in panel C. The coefficient on the interaction term 34)'+73_'	K%:4&%'J	2013[76789:)%4:* of 0.003 indicates that the effect of the 
Medicaid expansion on Medicaid prescription drug utilization was significantly higher in 
areas of expansion states with a greater share of Hispanic and Black populations, indicating 
that the Medicaid expansions reduced racial disparities in access to medications.  
Appendix Tables B-3 through B-5 present results from a specification where we 
replace the post-2014 indicator with a dummy for each quarter to investigate pre-policy 
trends for these heterogeneity analyses in an event history framework. Appendix Table B-
3 shows small and statistically insignificant coefficients for the time periods before 
Medicaid expansion, which is reassuring. The post expansion effects appear strongest in 
the 3rd quarter of 2014, although statistically significant and positive effects also appear 
later in column 2. The results of Appendix Table B-4 & B-5 are less convincing; although 
most coefficients are statistically insignificant in this table, they are all positive and larger 
in magnitude after the expansion. 
The results from Table 2-8 and Appendix Tables B-3 through B-5 together are 
suggestive that the growth in utilization of Medicaid prescription medications was more 
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pronounced in geographical areas where the “bite” of expansions was larger because 
baseline uninsurance and poverty were higher, and in areas where minority populations 
were more concentrated. While the results from the event history specification in Appendix 
Table B-4 are broadly consistent with the results from the triple-difference approach in 
Table 2-7 for baseline uninsurance rates, the corresponding story for is not as strong for 
the percent poverty and minority analyses.  
 Conclusion 
This paper provides rich and nuanced evidence on the effects of health insurance 
coverage for low-income adults on patterns of prescription drug use. Using a national 
administrative dataset of prescription drug utilization, together with an identification 
strategy that has been used to look at other healthcare outcomes, we find that non-elderly 
adult Medicaid prescriptions per capita increased by 19 percent following the ACA 
Medicaid expansion. When restricting the set of expansion states to the ones without any 
Medicaid eligibility changes for non-elderly adults pre-dating 2014, we detect a larger 
effect on Medicaid utilization (23 percent). This pattern is consistent with the likelihood 
that states with larger potential gains in coverage after Medicaid expansion experienced 
larger increases in prescription drug use.  
We next consider a back-of-the-envelope calculation to gauge the implications of 
our findings for the use of prescription medications among the newly enrolled population 
in the extensive margin. Multiplying the quarterly average of 59.15 Medicaid prescriptions 
per 100 non-elderly adult population in our data (from taking the inverse natural log of 
4.08 in Table 2-1) by the total pre-ACA non-elderly adult population in the expansion states 
(114 million, based on the 2013 American Community Survey) translates the 19 percent 
increase to 12.8 million additional prescription fills (0.19 *59.15* 114 million/100). This 
is an estimate of the ACA Medicaid expansion induced increase in prescription fills per 
quarter, assuming no population growth.14 In order to back out how many new prescription 
fills this represents per newly eligible beneficiary, we divide this 12.8 million by an 
                                               
14 This estimate is expected to be smaller than the total realized increase in prescriptions under 
Medicaid from 2013 to 2014, as this estimate does not capture the “welcome mat” effect and 
changes in prescription use among other Medicaid populations that may be co-occurring. 
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estimate of the number of individuals who gained Medicaid coverage through ACA, which 
comes from a difference-in-difference research design that compares expansion to non-
expansion states. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) official enrollment 
reports through the end of March 2015 indicate that the net enrollment in Medicaid/CHIP 
in expansion states was 10.5 million more compared to 2013 (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2016), while the similar figure for non-expansion states was 1.8 
million, yielding an unadjusted difference-in-differences estimate of 8.7 million newly-
enrolled individuals by the end of our study period, though this number may include as 
many as 1 million children (Frean et al., 2017).  Subtracting out children yields 7.7 million 
newly-enrolled adults. Therefore, the “treatment on the treated” estimate of the effect of 
Medicaid expansion on prescription drug use equates to 1.7 (12.8 million/7.7 million) 
prescriptions per enrollee per quarter or 6.6 prescription fills per enrollee per year.  Related 
to this, a recent study examining the 2014 policy change, Mulcahy et al. (2016) find that 
previously uninsured adults who gained Medicaid had 13.3 more prescription fills in 2014 
compared to 2013. This was higher (17.8 more prescriptions) for those with chronic 
conditions, and lower (10.9 additional fills) among the healthier Medicaid enrollees in their 
sample (aged 20-61). Our results imply a somewhat smaller effect but a similar order of 
magnitude as their healthier-population estimate. 
Our sub-group analysis by drug-class suggests that the increase in utilization was 
higher for medications used in treating chronic conditions such as diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease, and for psychotherapeutic medications.  Given that lack of 
appropriate management of chronic diseases through medications is one of the plausible 
mechanisms for coverage affecting long-term health, and that survey-based analyses of the 
Medicaid expansion have shown increased rates of care for chronic conditions (Sommers 
et al., 2016b), these findings are encouraging in terms of their significance for potentially 
improving health outcomes.  Conversely, we find that copays within Medicaid expansion 
states had a smaller effect on dissuading drug utilization for serious illness like heart 
disease and HIV, with larger effects on utilization of contraception and allergy/respiratory 
medications.  However, our overall estimates indicate fairly inelastic demand for drugs in 
this population as a whole, at least at the very small copay levels typically used in Medicaid 
(average weighted copay of $1.24 per prescription).  Whether substantially larger copays 
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would lead to larger proportional changes is not clear and is an important subject for future 
research, as states experiment with more cost-sharing in Medicaid, including approaches 
such as health savings accounts.  
One of the limitations of this study is that our dataset does not observe individuals 
longitudinally, so it cannot capture the effect of the expansions on those who were 
previously uninsured. However, in additional analysis using pre-expansion uninsurance 
rates at the sub-state level, we examine the effect of change in insurance coverage on 
utilization. The lack of individual-level data also precludes us from estimating directly the 
per-person changes in utilization, though our back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate 
that our estimates correspond to a little more than one additional monthly prescription fill 
per newly enrolled Medicaid beneficiary.  
This study contributes to the set of studies that informs the literature on health 
economics of insurance coverage, using variation provided by the large recent expansions 
as part of the ACA. Our findings also provide important new evidence to the literature on 
Medicaid expansions’ effects on the healthcare safety net and improvements in access to 
and utilization in states that expanded Medicaid. Care management through 
pharmaceuticals may potentially reduce the use of more resource-intensive medical care 
such as emergency department visits or other non-drug medical spending (Goldman et al., 
2007; Lavetti and Simon, 2016; Roebuck et al., 2015; Stuart et al., 2009). In part, reflecting 
previous research findings, the ACA classifies prescription drugs as one of the ten 
categories of “essential health benefits” that all commercial private insurance plans must 
provide. Future research should consider whether this policy-induced boost in prescription 
drug utilization is reflected in subsequent health impacts and downstream effects on use of 
other types of medical care.  
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 Tables and Figures 
Table 2-1: Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansions on Medicaid Prescription Utilization 
Dependent variable: Ln (Medicaid prescriptions per 100 population) 
 (1) (2) 
  All States Excl. DC, DE, MA, NY, VT 
   
Post x Expansion 0.19*** 0.23*** 
 (0.06) (0.06)    
Year and quarter fixed effects Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y 
Observations 459 414 
   
Dependent variable means   
Expansion, Before 4.08 3.97 
Non-expansion, Before 3.94 3.94 
Expansion, After 4.35 4.29 
Non-expansion, After 4.04 4.04 
Notes:  
1. Difference-in-differences (DD) estimates are based on aggregated state-quarter data covering 
2013Q1 to 2015Q1. The pre-expansion period includes 2013Q1-2013Q4, while 2014Q1-
2015Q1 represents the post-expansion period. All models include state fixed effects, fixed 
effects for each quarter in the data, and state quarterly unemployment rate. Robust standard 
errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** 
Significant at the 5-percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level.  
2. In column (1), specification includes all states being categorized into expansion vs non-
expansion states.  
a. Expansion states: AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, IN, IA, IL, KY, MD, MA, 
MI, MN, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, VT, WA, WV.  
b. Non-expansion states: AL, AK, FL, GA, ID, KS, LA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NE, NC, 
OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY.  
3. For the analysis corresponding to column (2), DC, DE, MA, NY, and VT were dropped from 
the sample; the analysis is otherwise the same as in the first column. 
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Table 2-2: Effect on Aggregate Prescription Drug Use by Payer  
Dependent variable: Log (per capita prescriptions)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Other (Cash and 
assistance programs) Private Medicare Medicaid 
     
Post x Expansion -0.02 -0.01 0.003 0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.012) (0.06)      
Year and quarter fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 459 459 459 459 
     
Dependent variable means    
Expansion, Before 3.96 5.66 4.92 4.08 
Non-expansion, Before 4.22 5.70 4.96 3.94 
Expansion, After 4.02 5.60 4.94 4.35 
Non-expansion, After 4.31 5.65 4.98 4.04 
 
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a separate difference-in-difference regression. Analyses are 
based on aggregated state-quarter prescription data by payer type and include all states. Data covers 
the period 2013Q1 to 2015Q1. All models include state fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter 
in the data, and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported in 
parentheses.  * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. *** 
Significant at the 1-percent level. 
  
 78 
Table 2-3: Heterogeneity by Drug Class 
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Medicaid prescriptions per 100 population)   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Drug Class DD coefficient 
Is the effect 
statistically 
different from 
the effect on the 
remaining 
classes? 
Share among 
all Medicaid 
prescriptions 
    
All classes 0.19***   
 (0.06)       
Antibiotics 0.17*** § 0.101 
 (0.06)    
Birth Control 0.22***  0.019 
 (0.06)    
Cardiovascular medications 0.21***  0.140 
 (0.07)    
Diabetes medications 0.24*** # 0.037 
 (0.06)    
GI medications 0.17*** # 0.066 
 (0.05)    
HIV/ Hepatitis 0.15**  0.011 
 (0.07)       
Mental health medications 0.19***  0.149 
 (0.07)    
Respiratory and Allergy medications 0.15*** # 0.118 
 (0.05)    
Other 0.19***  0.359 
 (0.05)   
        
 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate difference-in-difference regression. Regressions are 
based on aggregated state-quarter Medicaid prescription data covering 2013Q1 to 2015Q1 by 
therapeutic class. The pre-expansion period includes 2013Q1-2013Q4, while 2014Q1-2015Q1 
represents the post-expansion period. All models include state fixed effects, fixed effects for each 
quarter in the data, and unemployment rate.  Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported 
in parentheses. This analysis includes all states.  
* Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. *** Significant at the 1-
percent level.  
# Significant at the 5-percent level. § Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 2-4: Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansions on Medicaid Prescription Utilization, 
by Product Type 
 
Dependent variable: Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Brand Generic Other     
Post x Expansion 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)     
Year and quarter fixed effects Y Y Y 
CBSA fixed effects Y Y Y 
Observations 7,028 7,029 6,707     
Dependent variable means      
Expansion, Before 2.63 4.11 -2.69 
Non-expansion, Before 3.00 4.37 -2.44 
Expansion, After 2.84 4.45 -2.37 
Non-expansion, After 3.07 4.50 -2.28 
 
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a separate difference-in-difference regression. Analyses are 
based on aggregated CBSA-quarter prescription data by payer type and include all states. Data 
covers the period 2013Q1 to 2015Q1. All models include CBSA fixed effects, fixed effects for 
each quarter in the data, and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by state are 
reported in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 2-5: Effect on Medicaid Prescription Utilization, by state copayment 
 
Dependent variable: Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions) 
 (1) (2) 
  Low High 
   
Post x Expansion 0.22*** 0.17** 
 (0.07) (0.07)    
Range of copayments $0  $0.3-$4.4 
   
Observations 288 369 
 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate difference-in-difference regression. Regressions are 
based on aggregated state-quarter Medicaid prescription data covering 2013Q1 to 2015Q1. The 
pre-expansion period includes 2013Q1-2013Q4, while 2014Q1-2015Q1 represents the post-
expansion period. All models include state fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the data, 
and unemployment rate.  Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. *** Significant at the 1-
percent level.  
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Table 2-6: Effect of Drug Copayments on Medicaid Prescription Utilization 
Dependent variable: Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
  All classes Antibiotics Cardiovascular Diabetes  
      
Post x Expansion 
x Copay -0.038 -0.046 -0.021 -0.030   (0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.038)  
Post x Expansion 0.187*** 0.208*** 0.150* 0.186***  
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.079) (0.069)  
Post x Copay -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)        
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  GI Meds HIV/Hepatitis Psychotherapeutic Respiratory Other 
      
Post x Expansion 
x Copay -0.037 -0.013 -0.036 -0.049* -0.036 
 (0.025) (0.039) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) 
Post x Expansion 0.188*** 0.170* 0.186*** 0.188*** 0.197*** 
 (0.057) (0.101) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062) 
Post x Copay -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Notes: Regression estimates are based on aggregated state-quarter data covering 2013Q1 to 
2015Q1. The pre-expansion period includes 2013Q1-2013Q4, while 2014Q1-2015Q1 represents 
the post-expansion period. All models include state fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter in 
the data, and state quarterly unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by state 
reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1-percent level.  
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Table 2-7: Testing for Differential Pre-Expansion Trends in Medicaid Prescription 
Drug Utilization 
Dependent variable:  Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions)   
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Pre-treatment trend 
test 
Event 
study 
Event 
study 
    
Expansion x Trend (2014 Q1-Q4)  -0.002   
 (0.02)       
Expansion x 2013Q2  0.03 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Expansion x 2013Q3  0.02 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Expansion x 2013Q4  -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.061) (0.061) 
Expansion x 2014Q1  0.09 0.09 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
Expansion x 2014Q2  0.18** 0.18** 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
Expansion x 2014Q3  0.23*** 0.23*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
Expansion x 2014Q4  0.24*** 0.24*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) 
Expansion x 2015Q1  0.26*** 0.26*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
Includes Expansion x linear time 
trend Y N Y 
Observations 204 459 459 
 
Notes: Analysis is based on aggregated state-quarter Medicaid prescription data. Estimate in 
column (1) uses data covering 2013Q1-2013Q4 and only includes separate time trends for 
expansion vs non-expansion states, while those in columns (2) and (3) use data from 2013Q1 to 
2015Q1 and an event study approach. All models include state fixed effects, fixed effects for each 
quarter in the data, and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported 
in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. *** 
Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 2-8: Effect of the ACA Medicaid Expansions on Medicaid Prescriptions, 
Triple Difference (CBSA-level Analysis)  
Dependent variable: Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions) 
 (1) (2) 
  All States Excl. DC, DE, MA, NY, VT    
Panel A 
Post x Expansion x Pct Uninsured 2013 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Post x Expansion -0.047 -0.080 
 (0.064) (0.071) 
Post x Pct Uninsured 2013 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Median 2013 pct uninsured 33.7 34.4 
Standard deviation of 2013 pct uninsured 9.5 8.9    
Panel B 
Post x Expansion x Pct Poverty 2013 0.003 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Post x Expansion 0.181*** 0.208*** 
 (0.057) (0.058) 
Post x Pct Poverty 2013 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Median 2013 pct poverty 16.9 17.1 
Standard deviation of 2013 pct poverty 6.1 6.1    
Panel C 
Post x Expansion x Pct Minority 2013 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Post x Expansion 0.185*** 0.199*** 
 (0.054) (0.023) 
Post x Pct Minority 2013 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Median 2013 pct minority 12.6 12.9 
Standard deviation of 2013 pct minority 19.1 19.4      
Notes:  
1. Analysis is based on aggregated CBSA-quarter Medicaid prescription data from 2013Q1 to 
2015Q1. All models include CBSA fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the data, 
and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by CBSA are reported in 
parentheses.  * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-percent level. *** 
Significant at the 1-percent level. 
2. In column (1), estimates are based on all states being categorized into expansion vs non-
expansion states. 
a. Expansion states: AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, IN, IA, IL, KY, MD, MA, 
MI, MN, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, VT, WA, WV.  
b. Non-expansion states: AL, AK, FL, GA, ID, KS, LA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NE, NC, 
OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY.  
3. For the analysis corresponding to column (2), the early expansion states of DC, DE, MA, NY, 
and VT were dropped from the sample.  
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Figure 2-1:  Unadjusted Trends in Per Capita Prescriptions Filled by Payer, 2013Q1-
2015Q1 
 
Notes:  
1. January 2014 expansion states include: AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, HI, IL, IA, IL, KY, MA, 
MD, MN, NV, NY, NJ, NM, ND, OH, OR, RI, VT, WA, WV. IN, MI, NH, PA are excluded from 
this list and from this analysis as they expanded after January 2014 (but are included in the 
regressions with time-varying expansion definitions).  
2. Non-expansion states include: AL, AK, FL, GA, ID, KS, LA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NE, NC, OK, 
SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY.  
3. The first vertical line is drawn at 4th quarter of 2013, and the second vertical line is drawn at the 1st 
quarter of 2014, thus the area in between the two lines indicates the transition into the 2014 ACA 
Medicaid expansion. 
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3 The Effect of Medicaid on Adult Hospitalizations: Evidence from Tennessee’s 
Medicaid Contraction 
 Introduction 
One of the primary ways the Affordable Care Act (ACA) aims to reduce 
uninsurance is by expanding Medicaid to previously ineligible non-elderly adults. 
However, as several states have chosen not to implement these expansions, the reduction 
in uninsurance among the non-elderly has been considerably weaker in non-expansion 
states (DeLeire et al., 2014). The high rate of uninsurance in the US left hospitals 
shouldering the burden of almost 60 percent of all uncompensated 2013 health care costs 
nationwide (Coughlin et al., 2014). Expanded Medicaid coverage is expected to lower 
hospital uncompensated care costs through reductions in uninsured visits or by decreasing 
hospital admissions through improved access to preventive or outpatient care. Hospital 
costs may further decrease if health insurance reduces the role of emergency departments 
(EDs) as the primary source of care and redirects healthcare consumption towards 
preventive ambulatory care. Thus, estimates of Medicaid’s effects on the payer 
composition of hospitalizations and the corresponding implications for hospital finances 
are empirically relevant and of broader interest in current health care reform discussions.  
Previous research by Sommers (2017) has posited that state adult Medicaid 
expansions led to reductions in mortality among non-elderly (under age 65) adults in 
expansion states relative to non-expansion states. Although their study estimates that the 
pre-2010 Medicaid expansions reduced mortality by nearly 6 percent, the mechanism by 
which this reduction occurs is not clearly understood. Because health insurance is an 
important determinant of access to care, Medicaid may have a protective effect on health 
through utilization of medical services. Medicaid may also reduce mortality through 
competing avenues such as its beneficial effect on financial stress related to affordability 
and access to health care (Baicker et al., 2013; Finkelstein et al., 2012a).  
Most of the literature examining the effects of Medicaid has analyzed policies that 
extend health insurance coverage to low-income children and pregnant women, 
populations whose experience may not generalize to those targeted by the Medicaid 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, specifically non-elderly adults 
without dependent children. While several papers have examined the impact of Medicaid 
 93 
coverage among non-elderly adults by analyzing the changes in Oregon, Wisconsin and 
Tennessee, these studies tend to focus on insurance coverage and labor market effects. 
Little research has investigated how health insurance status affects health care utilization 
among newly eligible Medicaid populations, and the few studies that have been conducted 
do not provide consensus on these outcomes (DeLeire et al., 2013; Finkelstein et al., 
2012a).  
To analyze these implications empirically, we consider a 2005 policy change in 
Tennessee, which led to over 170,000 Medicaid beneficiaries losing coverage. We estimate 
the impact of this Medicaid contraction by comparing inpatient utilization in Tennessee to 
that in states that did not contract or expand Medicaid, before and after Tennessee’s policy 
change.  This identification strategy follows prior work on the labor market outcomes of 
Tennessee’s Medicaid contraction (Garthwaite et al., 2014) as well as studies on the impact 
of health insurance expansions on hospitalization (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012). Because 
Tennessee’s Medicaid contraction primarily affected non-elderly non-pregnant adults 
while leaving other population subgroups – children, the elderly and pregnant women – 
relatively unaffected, we are also able to use a triple-difference study design taking 
advantage of this variation in exposure.   
We begin by studying the impact of Tennessee’s 2005 Medicaid contraction on the 
level of Medicaid and uninsured inpatient admissions among non-elderly adults. We expect 
to see an unambiguous decrease in Medicaid admissions. To the extent that those losing 
Medicaid were able to find private or other insurance coverage, we expect little increase in 
uninsured hospitalizations; if, on the other hand, many of those losing coverage were 
unable to find coverage, or if those who were at risk of hospitalization were especially 
likely to remain uninsured, we expect to see substantial increases in uninsured 
hospitalizations. Under the premise that the uninsured seek less care than the insured 
(Decker et al., 2013), we also expect a decrease in the aggregate volume of hospitalizations. 
Additionally, we examine whether the policy influenced the entry point for uninsured 
hospitalizations (i.e., through the ED or directly to the inpatient unit) and whether the 
hospitalizations were for preventable conditions. Evidence that hospitalizations were more 
likely to originate in the ED and that hospitalizations increased for preventable conditions 
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would be consistent with reduced access to primary care or to a regular source of care 
(medical home) after the policy change.  
Restricting Medicaid eligibility in Tennessee led to a 21 percent decrease in 
Medicaid coverage and a 61 percent increase in uninsurance among non-elderly adult 
hospitalizations, relative to the baseline and to changes in other states. Such a change has 
implications for hospital revenue streams, because most uninsured visits result in unpaid 
bills (Glied and Kronick, 2011). The results from our preferred specification suggest that 
the volume of Medicaid inpatient hospitalizations decreased by 24 percent, and uninsured 
inpatient admissions increased by 55 percent, relative to the baseline. These results are 
consistent with the prior studies on the effect of Tennessee’s Medicaid policy change on 
insurance coverage and hospital uncompensated care costs (Garthwaite, Gross and 
Notowidigdo, 2014; 2015).  
We find that increases in admissions originating in the ED explain 75 percent of 
the overall increase in uninsured inpatient stays; this is not surprising because those who 
lose Medicaid coverage and become uninsured face a more difficult process in being 
admitted directly to inpatient care. Prior evidence showed that losing Medicaid coverage 
is associated with a higher incidence of preventable hospitalizations (Bindman et al., 2008). 
However, in our data uninsured hospital visits increased for both preventable and non-
preventable conditions by the same magnitude (more than 50 percent, compared to pre-
disenrollment levels). While this is consistent with a shift in the expected payment source 
of hospitalizations from Medicaid to uninsured after TennCare contraction, it does not 
suggest a loss in access to preventive care per se. When we examine how Medicaid 
contraction affected the total volume of inpatient hospitalizations among non-elderly adults 
in Tennessee, we estimate a 24 percent decrease. This suggests that changes in hospital-
based care may have played a role in explaining the connection between prior state 
Medicaid expansions and reduced mortality. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing the first empirical evidence on 
the hospital care utilization impact of one of the largest contractions in state Medicaid 
policy. In doing so, it adds to existing work on the economic impact of the TennCare 
disenrollment (Garthwaite et al., 2014, 2018).  By providing a new estimate we also 
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contribute to the broader literature on the effect of Medicaid on medical care use among 
non-elderly adults, an important population for current health policy. In contrast to the 
several concurrent policy changes occurring under the Affordable Care Act’s 2014 
Medicaid expansions, Tennessee’s Medicaid contraction is more of an isolated policy 
variation, allowing for a clearer interpretation of changes in Medicaid eligibility alone. Our 
results indicate the ACA Medicaid expansions can reduce uninsured hospitalizations, 
thereby decreasing hospital uncompensated care costs. Contraction of Medicaid coverage 
has received far less attention in the empirical literature than Medicaid expansion. Our 
study addresses this relatively understudied phenomenon and explores its consequences for 
access to care and use of uncompensated care. The results from our study provide 
information important for current policy discussions, given the future possibility of states 
reversing their ACA Medicaid expansions (Pear, 2017). 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional details 
of Tennessee’s Medicaid policy changes. Section 3 provides a review of the literature 
related to the causal effect of health insurance coverage on health care utilization. Section 
4 explains the data, identification strategy and empirical framework. In Sections 5 we 
present results and examine the robustness of our empirical specification. Finally, Section 
6 concludes and discusses implications for the ACA. 
 Institutional Background 
From its inception in 1965, Medicaid typically provided coverage only to low-
income populations that the federal government mandated it serve, such as children, 
pregnant women, parents and disabled individuals. Prior to the ACA, the federal 
government did not routinely share the costs of enrollees ineligible for traditional Medicaid 
(mostly low-income, childless adults), referred to as “optional” or “expansion” 
populations. Accordingly, most states denied Medicaid coverage to these populations.  
One of the ways in which states could extend Medicaid coverage to non-mandatory 
populations prior to the ACA was through section 1115 demonstration waivers of the 
Social Security Act. To do so, states had to obtain authorization from the Health Care 
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Financing Administration (HCFA).15 Tennessee obtained approval from the HCFA for its 
statewide Medicaid demonstration project, TennCare, in November 1993. TennCare was 
created with the objective of reducing uninsurance in Tennessee and reining in healthcare 
costs. In January 1994, Tennessee placed all of its Medicaid enrollees in managed care 
organization (MCO) contracted plans, aiming to control costs and use the savings generated 
to provide subsidized Medicaid coverage to optional populations. Uninsured individuals 
who qualified for TennCare coverage included those who did not have employer-sponsored 
insurance but whose annual income was too high to make them eligible for public 
insurance.16 The demonstration project resulted in Tennessee achieving the highest 
Medicaid coverage rate of any state in the country, with 23 percent of its population 
enrolled in TennCare in 2004 (Farrar et al., 2007).  
Despite these efforts, TennCare was unable to sustain its cost-control objective, and 
the state of Tennessee submitted a waiver amendment proposal to the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS, formerly HCFA) in September 2004. In November 2004, 
Governor Phil Bredesen announced that TennCare would stop covering the optional 
population (Chang and Steinberg, 2016). CMS approved the proposal in March 2005, 
which authorized disenrollment of TennCare beneficiaries over age 19 who were not 
eligible for the open Medicaid categories.  
The disenrollment took place within a span of 3 months beginning late July 2005.  
In 2004, administrative records showed that there were 1,340,824 beneficiaries of 
Tennessee Medicaid, of whom 1,079,975 were in mandatory categories and 260,849 were 
in optional categories. Nearly 160,000 adults belonging to the optional population had been 
                                               
15 States could use section 1115 waivers to expand their Medicaid programs subject to budget-
neutrality, such that a demonstration project would not cost the federal government more than the 
existing Medicaid program. This could be achieved by using existing Medicaid funds or 
savings/revenue from other state programs and restricting the benefit packages of new enrollees 
and streamlining service delivery options to limit costs  (Holahan et al, 1995). 
16 Eligibility in the optional categories of TennCare for the non-elderly required beneficiaries’ 
annual income to be less than 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) and included sliding 
scale premiums for beneficiaries with incomes above 100 percent FPL. These optional/expansion 
populations included non-elderly adults who either (1) were “uninsured” on March 1, 1993 and had 
continued to be without health insurance since or (2) belonged to the “uninsurable” category – 
individuals who were denied health insurance due to pre-existing health conditions (Moreno and 
Hoag, 2001). 
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disenrolled from TennCare by the fourth quarter of 2005, which represented a 12 percent 
reduction in Medicaid enrollment in the state. By 2006, the total number of adult TennCare 
beneficiaries disenrolled reached approximately 170,000. Comprising non-elderly adults, 
this disenrolled population from Tennessee was similar to those gaining coverage under 
the expanded Medicaid categorical eligibility provisions of the ACA; both groups were 
predominantly composed of adults without dependent children in the household 
(Garthwaite et al., 2014).  
Because the TennCare disenrollees and those gaining Medicaid eligibility through 
the ACA expansions share key characteristics, our results can potentially imply 
connections between Medicaid eligibility and health care utilization among the newly 
eligible population. However, because the health status of the Tennessee disenrollees could 
have been worse than those gaining coverage under the ACA Medicaid expansions, our 
estimates regarding the disenrollment must be interpreted with caution. On the other hand, 
the disenrollees could be healthier because of the healthcare they received while insured.17 
If the ACA Medicaid expansions induce unhealthier adults to opt out of private health 
insurance and take up Medicaid (Clemens, 2015), it is possible that our estimates will have 
greater external validity for extrapolating to the non-elderly adult population gaining 
coverage as a result of the ACA. 
 Literature on Health Insurance and Hospital Care Utilization 
Our paper is closely related to several quasi-experimental studies that examine the 
effect of health insurance on inpatient hospitalizations. Most of the prior research finds that 
extending health insurance coverage leads to increases in hospital utilization among 
children, young adults and the elderly (Anderson et al., 2012; Anderson et al., 2014; Antwi 
et al., 2015; Card et al., 2008; Dafny and Gruber, 2005). However, low-income non-elderly 
adults differ from these other populations in their prevalence of health conditions and 
                                               
17 Based on interviews with providers and current and former TennCare beneficiaries in the first 
year following the disenrollment, Farrar et al. (2007) report that 67,000 of the 170,000 Medicaid 
disenrollees were uninsurable as they did not qualify for any other insurance coverage due to poor 
health status; in addition, a large fraction of the disenrollees had multiple chronic conditions.  
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patterns of use (Decker et al., 2013), and thus health insurance may have distinct effects 
their use of hospital care.  
Recent studies on Medicaid expansions in Oregon and Wisconsin provide evidence 
on Medicaid’s hospital utilization effects among low-income adults. Using administrative 
data on hospital visits in Oregon, Finkelstein et al. (2012a) find that Medicaid coverage 
gained through random assignment led to a 30 percent increase in the probability of 
hospitalization among previously uninsured low-income adults who were categorically 
ineligible for traditional Medicaid. On the other hand, using administrative data from 
Wisconsin, DeLeire et al. (2013) find that inpatient hospitalizations decreased by 59 
percent when previously uninsured low-income childless adults automatically gained 
Medicaid (BadgerCare) coverage. Massachusetts reform that extends private as well as 
public coverage, however, does not appear to increase hospitalizations (Kolstad and 
Kowalski, 2012). Hence, the evidence from these studies is inconclusive with respect to 
Medicaid’s impact on inpatient hospital use among non-elderly adults.  
 Literature on TennCare Contraction 
A small body of research has examined the TennCare contraction using quasi-
experimental methods and shows sizable net increases in uninsurance and uncompensated 
care despite increases in private coverage. Garthwaite et al. (2014) examine the impact of 
the Medicaid contraction in Tennessee on insurance and labor market outcomes using 
within- and across-state variation in the Current Population Survey (CPS). They find that 
Medicaid coverage among non-elderly adults declined by 4.6 percentage points and that 
private insurance coverage increased by 1.6 percentage points in the two years following 
TennCare contraction. In a subsequent article, Garthwaite et al. (2018) examine aggregated 
administrative hospital-level data from the American Hospital Association and Joint 
Annual Reports from Tennessee Department of Health and find that uncompensated costs 
increased in Tennessee by 18 percent after the disenrollment compared to other states, and 
that the effects were concentrated in hospitals with EDs. The increase in prevalence of 
uninsurance after the Medicaid policy change in 2005 and the effect on hospital 
uncompensated care costs, suggests that healthcare utilization in Tennessee may have been 
affected as well.   
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Two observational studies report on ED health care use in Tennessee after the 
Medicaid contraction. Using a census of all Tennessee ED visits between 2004 and 2006 
(inclusive), Heavrin et al. (2011) describe a 22 percent decrease in adult Medicaid visits 
and a 39.5 percent increase in uninsured adult visits in Tennessee after the contraction. 
They also note a 2 percent increase in the fraction of uninsured ED visits that result in 
inpatient hospitalization. Emerson et al. (2012) use the census of ED discharges for one 
Tennessee county (Davidson, which includes the city of Nashville) for 2003-2007 and 
report increases in both the number of ED visits for ambulatory-sensitive conditions and 
hospital uncompensated care costs after the disenrollment. Although their data also 
contained inpatient hospitalizations, the paper focuses only on ED visits; they do, however, 
note that the number of uninsured inpatient admissions among non-elderly adults increased 
by 42 percent, but there was only a very minor decline of 0.6 percent in Medicaid hospital 
admissions. Because these studies only use Tennessee data, it is unclear that we can draw 
causal lessons from them because some changes may reflect national trends. Additionally, 
unlike scheduled direct inpatient hospitalizations that are price sensitive, ED visits are less 
responsive to insurance status. Therefore, while these studies based on data from ED visits 
are informative, it is also important to examine utilization of hospital-based care, both 
scheduled and otherwise, using a quasi-experimental study design. 
Our study goes beyond previous work as it is the first non-observational study to 
examine the healthcare-use impacts of Tennessee’s Medicaid contraction, and the first to 
focus specifically on inpatient hospitalization among non-elderly adults using patient level 
data. Our research contrasts with prior quasi-experimental studies from other states on adult 
Medicaid policy because we examine the impact of a loss of Medicaid coverage on 
healthcare utilization, whereas Finkelstein et al. (2012a) and DeLeire et al. (2013) analyze 
expansions of Medicaid coverage. Healthcare consumption may respond asymmetrically 
to Medicaid coverage gain or loss. For example, loss of Medicaid coverage may have less 
impact on utilization as patients are already familiar with the healthcare system, whereas 
transitioning from uninsurance to Medicaid may increase use of care but only after a lag 
due to difficulties in navigating the new and complex healthcare environment. We also 
extend the methods used in these earlier two studies: we use a cross-state identification 
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strategy as well as within-state controls, whereas the findings from Oregon and Wisconsin 
were based on within-state control groups only. 
The empirical approach comparing one state to several others is closest to that 
employed by Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) in studying the effect of the Massachusetts 
health care reform on inpatient hospitalizations, and to that of (Garthwaite et al., 2014, 
2018) in analyzing the effect of Tennessee’s Medicaid contraction on labor market 
outcomes. We also include within-state control groups to estimate a triple difference 
specification, similar to Garthwaite et al. (2014), who compare outcomes among those 
under 65 to those over 65. 
 Method 
 Data 
Our empirical analysis uses the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) 2001-2009, 
which is part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) of the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality and contains patient-level data on all inpatient stays from 
a 20-percent national sample of community hospitals.18 Each year of the data contains 
patient-level information on age, gender, race, source of admission, payer (including 
Medicaid, Medicare, private insurance, self-pay or no charge, Tricare, CHAMPUS, etc.), 
diagnosis and procedures performed for all admissions in a sampled hospital. The NIS 
includes state identifiers and, for some states, county identifiers for hospitals in the sample.  
Administrative hospital data has a number of advantages over survey data. First, 
administrative data is superior with regard to accuracy of information on payer source due 
to a higher potential for measurement error in self-reports. Second, these data allow us to 
use four full years from pre- and post-treatment periods. Unlike the Oregon and the 
Wisconsin studies which use only one year of post-treatment data, this broader time span 
                                               
18 The American Hospital Association (AHA) defines community hospitals as “all non-Federal, 
short-term, general and other specialty hospitals, excluding hospital units of institutions.” The NIS 
sample includes among community hospitals various specialty hospitals such as obstetrics-
gynecology, orthopedic, ear-nose-throat and pediatric institutions as well as academic medical 
centers and public hospitals and long-term acute care facilities, all since 2005. Short-term 
rehabilitation hospitals, long-term non-acute care hospitals, psychiatric hospitals and 
alcoholism/chemical dependency treatment facilities are excluded from the NIS sample. NIS 
increased the number of states represented each year, from 33 in 2001 to 44 in 2009. 
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will help us observe changes in the utilization of medical services that may take longer to 
manifest. One of the limitations of the NIS is the lack of longitudinal patient identifiers, 
which prevents us from examining hospitalization patterns specifically among formerly 
Medicaid-insured patients.  Furthermore, we are unable to observe utilization of primary 
care or outpatient care. Although alternative data sets (such as the Medical Expenditure 
and Panel Survey) contain individual-level information on health insurance coverage as 
well as socio-demographic characteristics and medical care utilization before and after the 
policy changes at the state level, the size of these datasets preclude the study of single-state 
policies for comparatively rare medical events like hospitalizations. Thus, as in prior 
studies on hospitalization responses to health insurance policy, we utilize cross-sectional 
administrative data. 
 Empirical Strategy            
Difference-in-difference framework 
To isolate the causal effect of TennCare contraction, we use several complementary 
identification strategies. Our main approach is a simple difference-in-difference framework 
similar to that used by Garthwaite et al. (2014) when studying labor-market outcomes. We 
compare hospitalizations among non-elderly adults in Tennessee with those in other 
Southern states (first difference) before and after Medicaid policy changes (second 
difference).19  Next, we exclude all birth-related hospitalizations for this specification, 
because they are arguably less likely to be affected by the disenrollment.20 Our reduced-
form estimating equation, similar to that of Kolstad and Kowalski (2012), uses hospital 
data aggregated at the hospital-quarter level and is as follows: 
 Ed+ = T + \34)'+ + µ]&F9'd + ^]&F9'd734)'+ + fd+/ + gd + W+ + @d+  (3-1) 
In equation (1) Ed+ denotes our outcome variable of interest for hospital h and time 
t. The regressor of principal interest here is TreatxPost, where (a) ]&F9'	is a binary 
                                               
19 Of the 17 states that the Census defines as the South region, the NIS does not include 4 of them 
(Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi and Washington, D.C.) during the years 2001-2009. 
20 Non-birth admissions indicate inpatient stays in the sample with a major diagnostic code (MDC) 
other than 14.  An MDC code of 14 indicates that the principal diagnosis for the date of discharge 
was pregnancy, childbirth or puerperium. 
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indicator that takes the value of 1 for Tennessee and 0 for other states; (b) 34)' is a binary 
indicator taking the value of 1 for year 2006 and after, 0 otherwise and (c) the parameter δ 
is the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of the Medicaid contraction in 
Tennessee. The vector fd+ includes patient-level demographic and clinical characteristics 
aggregated at the cell level.  
The model includes year- and quarter-fixed effects to capture aggregate time trends 
that are common to both the treatment and the comparison states. We include the 
unemployment rate, and an interaction between the treatment indicator and the 
unemployment rate, to control for the effect of business cycles or other macroeconomic 
factors.21 As the NIS is an unbalanced panel of hospitals, following Kolstad and Kowalski 
(2012) and Antwi et al. (2015), we include hospital-fixed effects to account for unmeasured 
hospital-specific factors that could affect utilization outcomes. We cluster standard errors 
at the state level to account for arbitrary correlations in error terms at the state level over 
time (Bertrand et al., 2004a). We exclude data from 2005, the year in which the contraction 
took place.22 Based on prior studies on the effect of health insurance expansions on 
inpatient care utilization (Antwi et al., 2015; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Miller, 2012), 
we use ordinary least squares to estimate the equation for ease of interpretation.  
Our difference-in-difference identification strategy uses plausibly exogenous 
variation in insurance coverage due to the disenrollment. This approach rests on an 
assumption that the control states serve as an appropriate counterfactual for Tennessee, 
                                               
21 We merge in unemployment rate data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics at the county-by-year level for the NIS states in which a county is 
identified; in other states, we merge in the statewide average annual unemployment rate. We also 
merge in county and state population estimates from the Census Bureau in a similar manner, for 
use in later specifications where outcomes are measured per capita. Because the population of 
Tennessee grew by roughly 9.7 percent between 2001 and 2009 (authors’ calculations based on 
Census estimates), the use of per-capita measures separates the effect of secular trends in population 
size from the impact of the disenrollment on the extensive margin. 
22 For cleaner identification, in our main specification we have dropped observations from the year 
2005, as disenrollment was announced in November 2004, began in July 2005 and continued 
through the last quarter of 2005. Following earlier work by Garthwaite et al. (2014), we have 
defined the post-period as the year 2006 and later. As there may have been anticipatory effects 
following the announcement of the policy change in the fourth quarter of 2004. We explored an 
alternative specification by dropping both years 2004 and 2005 from the analysis sample; we found 
our results to be similar (results available upon request). 
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absent Medicaid reform. This assumption is more likely to hold if pre-treatment trends 
between Tennessee and all other Southern states are similar; our empirical strategy tests 
this condition. We check the sensitivity of our DD results by augmenting this basic 
specification using two different approaches. First, we identify appropriate comparison 
states by utilizing (a) all states in the NIS as a comparison group, or (b) a group of NIS 
states identified through a synthetic control-matching procedure (Abadie et al., 2010). 
Second, we employ a triple-difference framework. 
Triple-difference framework 
We use a difference-in-difference-in-difference identification strategy to identify 
the causal effect of Medicaid on inpatient hospitalizations by using within-state comparison 
groups that were not directly affected by TennCare disenrollment. We exploit the fact that 
utilization among those under age 19, the elderly and pregnancy-related hospitalizations 
among the non-elderly is not likely to be directly affected by TennCare disenrollment.23  
Garthwaite et al. (2014) also use a DDD strategy by comparing labor market outcomes of 
the non-elderly to the within-state group over age 65. 
In equation (2), we compare changes in insurance coverage rates by payer type and 
utilization among non-elderly adults in Tennessee relative to our three possible within-state 
control groups, relative to other states before and after the policy change in 2005. Ehd+ = T + /2]&F9'd + /;34)'+ +	/<Yijh +	\2]&F9'd734)'+ + \;]&F9'd7Yijh +\<34)'+7Yijh + ^]&F9'd734)'+7Yijh + fhd+∅ + gd + W+ + @hd+  (3-2) 
The variable Ehd+ is the outcome of interest for inpatient admissions in age group g 
for hospital h and time t. The indicator variable Yij (within-state affected groups) takes 
the value of 1 for the targeted individuals between ages 20 and 64 (inclusive); it takes the 
value of 0 for each of the three alternative control groups in three separate specifications. 
This specification includes all covariates that were included in (1). Even though each of 
                                               
23 We use the elderly (age 66 and older) as a control group only to study total hospitalization volume 
outcomes. We do not use this control group strategy to study insurance outcomes because of the 
dominant role of Medicare. We identify the pregnancy group as non-elderly inpatient stays with 
primary diagnosis recorded as birth-related conditions (where the MDC code takes the value of 14). 
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the control groups is not directly affected by disenrollment, spillover effects may exist. To 
address this possibility, in the DDD framework we estimate whether TennCare 
disenrollment led to proportionally higher changes in the outcomes of interest among the 
affected group relative to those in the controls, in addition to comparing outcomes in 
Tennessee to those in other states before and after 2006. The coefficient of interest here 
again is δ. 
Compared to the DD estimation strategy, the DDD method allows us to control for 
confounding shocks to non-elderly hospitalizations that differ between Tennessee and 
other states at the time of the TennCare policy change. At a national level, one concern 
with incorporating data on those over age 65 is that the implementation of Medicare part 
D in 2006 could undermine the use of elderly hospitalizations in the DDD because of 
possible spillover effects from drug use to hospitalizations (Kaestner et al., 2014b). As 
there is no reason to expect these spillover effects to differ across states, we also estimate 
a DDD using those over 65 and find similar results as the DD. A potential drawback to 
using pregnant women and children as within-state controls is that in 2005, CMS 
authorized TennCare to restrict pharmaceutical benefits for continuing non-pregnant 
Medicaid beneficiaries. However, these changes appear minor, and it is unclear whether 
they were binding and actually instituted.  
 Hypotheses 
Following the Medicaid contraction in Tennessee, we expect to find that fewer 
hospitalizations in Tennessee were paid through Medicaid, and, to the extent that those 
losing Medicaid were unable to obtain other coverage, we expect to find that the share of 
uninsured hospitalizations increased. 24 Given that lack of health insurance increases the 
cost of obtaining medical care, we expect to find that the total volume of hospitalizations 
among non-elderly adults decreased after the Medicaid contraction as a result of a price 
                                               
24 Our measure of uninsured admissions includes inpatient stays categorized as self-pay (the patient 
was billed directly by the hospital) and no charge (neither patient nor insurer was billed; likely 
attributed to charity care). HCUP documentation reports that self-pay categories may not reflect 
full payment of outstanding charges, and that in the event of non-payment hospitals bear the burden 
of unpaid costs as uncompensated care (bad debt). On average, uninsured families with incomes 
less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level have enough assets to pay in full for only 4 percent 
of their hospitalizations (Glied and Kronick, 2011). 
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effect. Garthwaite et al. (2014) provide evidence that the Tennessee disenrollment 
increased private insurance coverage through an employment increase, thus partially 
offsetting the decrease in public coverage. However, those who are at risk of hospitalization 
are likely over-represented among those who were not able to find employment after losing 
Medicaid coverage. To the extent that disenrollees seeking hospital-based care obtained 
private insurance, we expect to also find an increase in private insurance coverage for 
hospitalizations.  
The uninsured tend to preferentially use the ED, as opposed to office-based care 
(Anderson et al., 2014), due to legislative provisions such as the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) requiring hospitals to provide stabilizing care to all 
patients presenting at emergency rooms regardless of their ability to pay. In the NIS, we 
are able to observe whether an inpatient admission originated in the ED, although we are 
unable to observe outpatient ED visits in our data. We decompose uninsured inpatient 
hospitalizations by source of admission, specifying ED or otherwise. We expect to find a 
higher number of uninsured hospitalizations resulting from ED following the TennCare 
contraction. 
A higher volume of uninsured hospitalizations could also reflect an adverse effect 
of coverage loss on access to primary or office-based care due to uninsurance, as the 
financial disincentives associated with lack of health insurance may induce the uninsured 
to forego ambulatory care, leading to more hospitalizations among the uninsured for 
preventable medical conditions. Therefore, we expect to find greater increases in 
hospitalizations among the uninsured for preventable relative to unpreventable conditions.  
 Results  
 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-1 presents sample statistics of inpatient admissions for non-birth-related 
conditions among those aged 20 to 64 from NIS 2001-2009 for Tennessee and the other 
Southern states that serve as the comparison group.25 There are broad similarities between 
                                               
25 The states included here are those that the U.S. Census Bureau defines as the Southern states 
and are a part of the NIS sample, namely Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South 
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Tennessee and the comparison states in the age, gender and racial composition of their 
inpatient stays before TennCare contraction. In addition, the means for clinical 
characteristics are not very different across the two groups. Unsurprisingly, given the broad 
scope of Tennessee’s Medicaid program prior to 2005, inpatient admissions in Tennessee 
are substantially more likely to be Medicaid insured and less likely to be uninsured relative 
to the comparison states in the pre-contraction period. After the TennCare disenrollment in 
2005, a smaller fraction of hospitalizations are Medicaid insured and a greater fraction are 
uninsured in Tennessee compared to before 2005, reaching the same levels as in the 
comparison states (a little over 16 percent of hospitalizations are Medicaid insured and 13 
percent are uninsured). By comparison, private insurance and Medicare move fairly 
similarly as sources of coverage among hospitalization in Tennessee and in control states 
over this time period. In the last panel, we present sample means for the population-
adjusted volume of hospitalizations. The changes in volume outcomes across insurance 
types correspond directly with the changes in health insurance composition of the 
hospitalizations. Medicaid hospitalizations decline from 5.6 per 1,000 population in the 
state to 2.5 per 1,000, and increase in uninsured hospitalizations from 1.3 per 1,000 to 2.0 
per 1,000, in Tennessee. Reflecting the larger decrease in Medicaid volume than the 
increase in uninsured volume, total volume of hospitalizations in Tennessee appears to 
have decreased in the post-contraction period. The volume of hospitalizations in total and 
by insurance type remained relatively stable in the comparison states.  
We examine further the changes indicated in Table 3-1 between pre- and post-
periods by depicting the exact trends in insurance composition and volume of 
hospitalizations by insurance type between years 2001-2009 in Figures 3-1 and 3-2. The 
three vertical lines in Figures 3-1 and 3-2 denote the announcement of TennCare 
contraction in 2004Q4, policy implementation in 2005Q3, and the beginning of the post-
period in 2006Q1. Figure 3-1 shows that there is a sharp decline in Medicaid admissions 
and an uptick in uninsured hospital admissions in Tennessee immediately after the 
announcement in the fourth quarter of 2004; the trend continues through 2005 into the post-
contraction period beginning in 2006. Figure 3-2 also shows the similarity in pre-policy 
                                               
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and 
Texas.  
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trends in volume of admissions by payment source between treatment and control states, 
and the pronounced changes in volume of Medicaid and uninsured admissions 2004Q4 
onwards in Tennessee compared to other states. 
 Effect on Insurance Coverage Among Hospitalizations 
The results in panel A of Table 3-2 come from the DD regression specification 
(equation 3-1) and demonstrate the effect of TennCare contraction on the insurance 
composition of non-elderly adult patients in the inpatient sample. The proportion of 
inpatient admissions with Medicaid decreased by 6.3 percentage points. This represents a 
21 percent decrease relative to the pre-treatment mean showing that 30.4 percent of 
hospitalizations in Tennessee were Medicaid insured. The proportion of uninsured 
inpatient admissions in Tennessee increased relative to the comparison states; the 
coefficient estimate of a 4.1 percentage point increase in column 5 of panel A implies an 
approximately 61 percent increase in the proportion of uninsured inpatient admissions 
following the policy change, relative to the pre-contraction mean of 6.7 percent. Taken 
together, these results on changes in insurance coverage composition suggest that the 
contraction led to a shift in the patient payment composition for hospitals from Medicaid 
to uncompensated care. Our estimate of the impact of the policy change on Medicaid 
coverage among inpatient hospitalizations is consistent with findings of general population 
level insurance changes in prior literature; Garthwaite et al. (2014) find reduced Medicaid 
coverage of 5.1 percentage points and an increase in private coverage by 1.7 percentage 
points, among non-elderly adults in Tennessee.  Our results suggest that estimates of 
increased private insurance in the general population do not generalize to this relatively 
unhealthy population seeking hospital-based care.  
 Effect on Volume of Admissions  
Panel B of Table 3-2 shows the impact of Medicaid contraction on the volume of 
inpatient admissions by insurance status. The dependent variable in panel B is the 
population adjusted rate of hospitalizations at the hospital-quarter level (number of 
admissions divided by county population in 10,000s). The point estimates for Medicaid 
and uninsured hospitalization in panel B have the same sign as the corresponding results 
in panel A and are all statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The estimates indicate 
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a decrease in Medicaid visits and an accompanying increase in uninsured visits. Relative 
to an average population adjusted Medicaid hospitalizations rate of 72.259 in Tennessee, 
the point estimate of -17.481 in column 1 implies a reduction of nearly 24 percent. The 
coefficient estimate of 11.066 on uninsured hospitalizations suggests that among the non-
elderly hospitalized population there was a 55-percent increase in the volume of uninsured 
visits post-disenrollment relative to the initial pre-treatment mean of 20.316 uninsured 
hospital admissions. These estimates are consistent with prior studies that find a decrease 
in Medicaid and an increase in uninsured inpatient hospitalizations following TennCare 
contraction (Emerson et al., 2012; Garthwaite et al., 2018; Heavrin et al., 2011). The last 
column in panel B shows that there a negative but statistically insignificant effect on overall 
admissions after the disenrollment. In all later specifications in section 5.7 using alternate 
control groups, this effect is statistically significant. This implies that some of those who 
lost Medicaid still incur hospitalizations but now with no source of insurance (replacing 
just over half of all Medicaid hospitalizations that would otherwise have occurred; 11.066 
/17.481), while the remaining hospitalizations are less likely to occur at all.26   
 Effect on Source of Uninsured Admissions  
To understand the nature of the change in inpatient admissions better, in Table 3-3 
we now examine whether contraction affected the source of uninsured admissions. The 
first 2 columns indicate whether the admission originated in the emergency room. Of the 
total increase of 11.066 per-capita uninsured admissions in Tennessee (DD estimate from 
Table 3-2, panel B, column 5), the estimates in columns 1 and 2 show that 8.391 of these 
took place through the ED, with the remaining 2.686 through non-ED sources. Both these 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that nearly 75 
percent of the total increase in volume of uninsured admissions in the post-disenrollment 
period was driven by an increase in those that originated in the ED, which is much larger 
than the increase in non-ED uninsured admissions. In other words, among uninsured 
                                               
26 We also estimate a triple-differences model using the over-age-65 inpatient admissions as the 
third within-state control group to obtain similar effects on total population adjusted hospital 
admissions, suggesting that the Medicaid contraction led to a decline in the aggregate volume of 
inpatient admissions (results are available upon request). 
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inpatient admissions, rise in admissions through the emergency room outpaced rise in 
admissions through non-ED sources.  
When compared to baseline means of per-capita uninsured visits, the implied 
treatment effect is 64 percent and 37 percent for ED and non-ED visits, respectively. This 
finding is consistent with a scenario in which cost-related barriers to care lead the uninsured 
to seek care through emergency rooms.  This result is comparable in direction to Heavrin 
et al. (2011), who find an increase in uninsured ED visits resulting in inpatient admission 
after the Medicaid contraction in Tennessee. Likewise, Garthwaite et al. (2018) find that 
TennCare disenrollment led to higher uncompensated care costs in Tennessee hospitals, 
and that the increase was more pronounced among hospitals with an ED.   
 Effect on Preventable Admissions Among the Uninsured 
Inpatient hospitalizations due to ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions27 (ACSC) 
are considered to be potentially preventable through timely and/or good-quality care 
provided in a less resource-intensive outpatient setting. Hence, the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) bases their prevention-quality indicators (PQIs) on inpatient 
ACSC hospitalizations to measure population-level access to good-quality preventive care 
in an outpatient or office-based setting.  Given this inverse relationship between access to 
primary care and preventable hospitalizations, we expect the disenrollment to increase 
uninsured hospitalizations for preventable medical conditions.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3-3 report DD estimates of the impact of the Medicaid 
contraction on uninsured inpatient admissions, decomposed by whether the medical 
condition is unpreventable in nature. While we expect that as Medicaid contracts, former 
Medicaid patients may now appear as uninsured patients and thus increasing uninsured 
hospitalizations, there may also be other implications for uninsured hospitalizations 
beyond this simple accounting effect.  If Medicaid contraction reduces access to 
ambulatory care for the newly uninsured, they may now appear more often for preventable 
hospitalizations. The direction of these point estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3-3 
                                               
27 The list of ACS conditions used in this study includes but is not limited to medical conditions 
such as COPD, hypertension, CHF, uncontrolled diabetes, angina without procedure and adult 
asthma as specified in AHRQ guidelines. 
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suggest that uninsured inpatient hospitalizations increased for preventable as well as non-
preventable conditions after the changes in TennCare eligibility, and by slightly more than 
50 percent relative to the baseline pre-disenrollment levels.  Thus, although we expect that 
Medicaid contraction also reduced access to ambulatory care, the pattern of hospitalization 
change does not provide evidence consistent with a shift in composition towards more 
preventable hospitalizations by this measure of “preventability.” These estimates must, 
however, be interpreted with caution, as they only provide implicit confirmation of our 
hypothesis given that our data does not provide information on utilization in other settings.  
In prior work, Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) find corresponding declines in 
preventable admissions among the non-elderly population after the Massachusetts health 
care expansion. Our results are also similar in direction to Emerson et al. (2012) who find 
that TennCare contraction was associated with higher uninsured ACSC admissions. 
 Effect on Intensity of Hospital Treatment 
The results from Table 3-2 suggest that the relative changes in payer mix may have 
had an adverse impact on hospital finances due to shifts in the expected source of payment 
for inpatient admissions; changes in patient health mix, however, could potentially 
exacerbate such an effect.  These second-order effects may capture changes in the 
characteristics of the patient pool. In particular, it can be argued that the disenrollment may 
have altered the health mix of the uninsured hospital admissions, as this group now includes 
individuals with poorer health status who do not qualify for health insurance from sources 
other than TennCare.  An increase in post-2005 intensity of treatment among the uninsured, 
as measured by the number of procedures performed during an inpatient stay and the length 
of stay, would provide evidence of such an effect. We display these results in Table 4.28  
In columns 1-6 of Table 3-4 we report findings on intensity of treatment among all 
admissions and in the sample of uninsured visits only. Columns 5 and 6 show that length 
of stay increased among uninsured hospital visits, while the number of procedures appears 
statistically unaffected (in column 4). This increase in length of stay among the uninsured 
                                               
28 The number of procedure codes reported in the NIS varies by state.  We record up to a total of 6 
procedures, which is the minimum number reported by the states during the period 2001-2009.  
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provides suggestive evidence that the disenrollment shifted the composition of uninsured 
patients towards the less healthy.  However, the disenrollment did not appear to have any 
effect on any of the measures of treatment intensity when all admissions were considered 
together. These effects on volume and treatment intensity together suggest an upward shift 
in the volume of uncompensated hospitalizations, a likely decrease in total hospitalizations, 
especially of those that are reimbursed, as well as an increase in resource intensity for 
treatment of the uninsured, which potentially exacerbates the fiscal pressure on hospitals. 
 Sensitivity Checks 
We test the validity of our DD identification strategy by employing a series of 
sensitivity checks. Although Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show that hospitalization trends in 
Tennessee seemed to match other Southern states in the period prior to TennCare 
contraction, here we formally test the assumption of parallel pre-treatment trends. We 
regress each of our outcome variables on the Tennessee indicator interacted with a linear 
time-trend (measured in quarters) using NIS data for 2001-2004. The results from this test 
are displayed in Appendix Table C-1, panels A and B. A statistically significant coefficient 
on the regressor TrendxTreat would indicate that Tennessee and the other Southern states 
experienced different trends in that outcome prior to the Medicaid contraction, and that a 
DD estimator might pick up the continuation of this divergence in trends. The key 
coefficients in panel A, where the outcomes are fractions of admissions by insurance type, 
are not statistically significant, and support our identification strategy. Among the volume 
outcomes of interest in panel B, the uninsured visits outcome has statistically significantly 
different pre-trends as indicated by the interaction terms, although the magnitude is 
substantially smaller than the corresponding DD estimate.29 For example, the uninsured 
column in panel B of Appendix Table C-1 shows a coefficient of 0.620 (p-value<0.01) 
while the DD coefficient corresponding to this model, in panel B of Table 3-2, shows a 
magnitude of 11.066 (p-value<0.01). Nevertheless, this raises the concern that our 
estimates may be biased if we do not account for these pre-existing trends, and so we 
include state linear time trends in a sensitivity analysis. In Appendix Table C-2 panel D, 
                                               
29 Appendix Table C-8 reports estimates from a similar pre-trend analysis where we use all other 
states in the NIS 2001-2004 as controls and obtain similar results. 
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we find that this inclusion does not change our estimates in a substantial way. The largest 
difference in magnitudes of the point estimates between Table 3-2 panel A and Appendix 
Table C-2 Panel D is in the Medicaid column; the coefficient in Table 3-2 is -0.063 and in 
Appendix Table C-2 Panel D is it -0.047 (with the state time trend included), and both are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We also present results using quadratic and 
cubic state time trends (Appendix Table C-2 and C-4); they too show consistent results.  
Our main analysis compared Tennessee to all other Southern states in our data. We 
estimate the sensitivity of this choice of control groups by using all states in the NIS sample 
as comparison states and present the coefficient estimates for the proportion and volume 
outcomes in panel A of Appendix Tables C-2 and C-4, respectively30. These results confirm 
our findings from the baseline model; the coefficients on our main outcomes of interest – 
Medicaid and uninsured visits – are similar in magnitude and precision. We explore the 
choice of control states further by using a synthetic control matching technique as outlined 
by (Abadie et al., 2010). We use both levels and trends of Medicaid hospitalizations and 
the control variables in the pre-treatment period as criteria to obtain the appropriate subset 
of control states after aggregating our patient-level data to state-year cells.31 As clustering 
at the state level tends to result in unreliable standard errors when the number of states is 
less than 11 (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), we cluster the standard errors in the synthetically 
matched DD specification at the state-year level, similar to (Courtemanche and Zapata, 
2014) analysis of the effect of the healthcare reform in Massachusetts using control states 
picked through a synthetic match. In Appendix Tables C-2 and C-4 (for payment 
                                               
30 Note that both Missouri and Massachusetts experienced considerable changes in health insurance 
coverage during the implementation and post-disenrollment periods in Tennessee. Because such 
contemporaneous changes can bias estimation, these two states are not entered as control states in 
any specification. Missouri introduced substantial cutbacks in its Medicaid program in 2005, 
resulting in more than 100,000 beneficiaries losing coverage. Massachusetts, meanwhile, adopted 
legislation in 2006 with the goal of attaining near-universal health insurance coverage in the state, 
which included a large-scale Medicaid expansion. 
31 The synthetic control group chosen by this algorithm when matched on per-capita Medicaid 
admissions (levels) is 36.7% KY, 24.1% NY and 39.3% TX. By matching on the rate of change in 
per-capita Medicaid admissions (trends) the resulting group of control states is composed of 13.1% 
CO, 30.6% MD, 42.2% NJ, 11.5% NY and 2.7% UT. Control variables include age, gender, race, 
unemployment rate, poverty rate and median income averaged over the 2001 to 2004 sample 
period. In both cases, we reweight the sample using the synthetic weights to obtain the control 
group. 
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composition and volume of hospitalizations, respectively), panel B presents the DD 
estimates where control states were matched on levels, while for the estimates in panel C 
the control group was matched on trends, using pre-2005 data on Medicaid admissions. 
The coefficients on Medicaid and uninsured admissions remain statistically significant 
across specifications and are largely similar when compared to the estimates in Table 3-2, 
providing further evidence that our DD estimates are not sensitive to the exact choice of 
control states. For all these tests described in Appendix Tables C-2 and C-4, we have also 
included linear, quadratic and cubic time trends (panels D, E and F) and find that, as with 
our main specification, results are largely insensitive to this addition.  
We next present results of our DDD specification (equation 3-2) using (1) the 
Southern states, and (2) all NIS states as comparison states. Appendix Tables C-3 and C-5 
present results in which we use two alternative within-state control groups: those aged 0-
19, and non-elderly hospitalizations that are pregnancy related.  Our results from this 
specification point to similar conclusions as those from the DD, although the DDD 
estimates are generally slightly larger. The largest difference in coefficients is for the 
volume of Medicaid hospitalizations, where the point estimate in Table 3-2 panel B (DD) 
is -17.481 and the DDD (Appendix Table C-5, panel B) is -24.222; both are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.   
To check the robustness of our results in Table 3-3 examining source of admission 
for uninsured hospitalizations and whether visits are for conditions considered preventable, 
we present in Appendix Tables C-6 and C-7 results of each of the specifications conducted 
for our main analysis. This check includes testing the sensitivity of control group choice, 
of including state time trends, and of estimating the DDD specifications. Overall, our 
conclusions remain unchanged, as evident in the similarity of the point estimates as well 
as statistical precision across specifications. These results confirm the earlier finding that 
the impact of the Medicaid contraction was disproportionately higher for uninsured 
admissions taking place through the ED and that both preventable and non-preventable 
uninsured admissions increased.32  
                                               
32 In addition, we estimated equation 2 by using those over age 65 as a within-state comparison 
group.  The DDD estimates for per-capita uninsured admissions and each of the four outcomes in 
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Finally, in Appendix Table C-9, we examine the impact on total volume of 
hospitalizations using different control groups and the results confirm our initial result from 
Table 3-2. Using all the NIS states as the control group, we now find that the Medicaid 
contraction led to a decline in total volume of hospitalizations (statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level, and similar in terms of magnitude). In the DDD specifications this 
negative effect remains statistically significant, suggesting that neither non-elderly nor 
Tennessee-specific factors are confounding these results. Therefore, we interpret these 
results for total volume of hospitalizations as evidence of a decrease in overall inpatient 
utilization in response to the Medicaid contraction.   
 Discussion 
Our estimates of the impact of Medicaid coverage changes on the utilization 
outcomes from Table 2 panel A and B are qualitatively comparable to findings from earlier 
literature on the impact of health insurance on inpatient hospitalizations among adults. In 
particular, using a similar difference-in-difference model and the same data source as our 
study, Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) find that the near-universal health insurance coverage 
expansion in Massachusetts resulted in a 2.31 percentage-point drop in uninsurance. 
Compared to the pre-reform uninsurance rate of 6.43 percent, this drop represents a decline 
of 36 percent. Furthermore, Antwi et al. (2015) find the dependent coverage mandate of 
the ACA to have decreased uninsured hospitalizations among young adults between ages 
19 to 29 in the NIS sample by 12.7 percent. Our results are also consistent with evidence 
from a randomized controlled trial conducted in Oregon that found a 30 percent increase 
in inpatient hospitalizations among those provided Medicaid (Finkelstein et al., 2012).  
However, our estimates differ from results in Wisconsin DeLeire et al. (2013), where 
insurance expansion is associated with a decrease in inpatient utilization. While the 
direction of the impact of the Medicaid contraction is similar to the effect of Medicaid 
expansions studied in prior literature, the effect on magnitude may not be symmetric. 
Medicaid expansions can potentially increase access and utilization of both inpatient and 
                                               
Table 4 are reassuringly similar to our estimates from the baseline specification in terms of 
direction, magnitude and precision (results are available upon request).   
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outpatient care that may be complements or substitutes in consumption. Consequently, the 
net effect on utilization will depend on the relative strengths of these opposing forces. 
Unlike our results for Medicaid and uninsurance, the coefficient estimates for 
Medicare, private and other insurance are generally less consistent across specifications in 
direction and precision, and are therefore not as informative. Garthwaite et al. (2014) 
present evidence that as public insurance coverage dropped, private insurance coverage 
increased, and a crowd-out rate of 34.6 percent resulted among childless adults in the 
Current Population Survey data in response to TennCare disenrollment. They argue that 
the disenrollment led to higher labor supply among childless adults, suggesting that the 
disenrolled beneficiaries who valued health insurance obtained jobs with health insurance. 
This may have contributed to higher private insurance coverage rates. In contrast, we find 
no systematic evidence that share of privately insured hospitalizations increased in our data 
possibly due to differences in the incidence and morbidity of health conditions between the 
populations covered in the CPS and the NIS. 
Given that the underlying health conditions of the population of interest in 
Garthwaite et al. (2014) are unknown, it is plausible that that their findings are not 
generalizable to a hospital-care-seeking population that is likely negatively selected in 
terms of health status. In particular, their estimate of crowd-out for the sub-sample 
reporting poor health was less than one-third of the size of the estimate for those reporting 
good health. This finding suggests that the comparatively unhealthy individuals seeking 
hospital-based care were unlikely to have obtained private insurance coverage after being 
disenrolled from Medicaid. Notably, in their subsequent analysis using aggregate hospital 
data, Garthwaite et al. (2018) report a decline in the number of privately insured 
hospitalizations in 2006. Although their study is limited to one year of post-disenrollment 
data in contrast to our four years, this result provides indirect evidence in support of our 
finding that there was no substantial increase in private insurance coverage in the sample 
of hospital admissions. 
One of the advantages of using aggregate hospital data is that it provides a clearer 
understanding of the spillover effect of TennCare disenrollment on the local healthcare 
market through its effect on hospital finances. Based on the volume results, not only do we 
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find a reduction in Medicaid admissions after the disenrollment, but we also find an 
increase in uninsured admissions. To the extent that the direction of this shift from 
Medicaid to uninsured represents a shift in expected source of payment towards 
uncompensated care, we conclude that, overall, TennCare disenrollment had a negative 
impact on hospital finances. Given that the ACA Medicaid expansions aim to reduce 
uninsurance, the direction of our estimates suggest that hospital uncompensated care costs 
should decrease in expansion states. This prediction is consistent with recent findings in 
the literature that the 2010 Medicaid expansion in Connecticut, under the ACA provisions, 
led to reductions in uncompensated care costs incurred by hospitals in the state (Nikpay et 
al., 2015). 
 Conclusion 
In this paper we present the first estimates of the impact of Tennessee’s Medicaid 
contraction in 2005 on inpatient hospital care utilization among non-elderly adults. By 
comparing the insurance composition of inpatient admissions in Tennessee to other 
Southern states using administrative data on a nationwide sample of inpatient hospital 
stays, we find that the prevalence of uninsurance among hospital admissions increased by 
nearly 60 percent after the Medicaid contraction. As expected, the prevalence of Medicaid 
among hospitalizations decreased by about 20 percent. The volume of hospitalizations with 
Medicaid decreased by 25 percent and uninsured hospitalizations were 60 percent higher. 
We also find increases in uninsured inpatient admissions that originated in the ED which 
is not surprising given that the uninsured have difficulty scheduling direct admission to 
inpatient care. There is also evidence that the contraction reduced the overall volume of 
hospitalizations, although this highlights the importance of control group choice, as the 
effect is statistically insignificant when other Southern states are used as the comparison 
group. This result is consistent with recent studies that find health insurance increases use 
of inpatient medical care in other populations (Anderson et al., 2012; Anderson et al., 2014; 
Antwi et al., 2015; Card et al., 2008; Dafny and Gruber, 2005). This finding also supports 
the possibility that Medicaid and mortality rates may be connected through increased 
hospital care utilization (Sommers, 2017).  
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While prior studies find that pre-ACA state Medicaid expansions reduced mortality 
among non-elderly adults, the mechanism driving this result was unclear. To date, evidence 
on whether Medicaid increases inpatient utilization among non-elderly adults is 
inconclusive. Given that the ACA state Medicaid expansions target non-elderly adults, it 
is valuable to understand how the newly eligible population utilizes medical care. The 
results from this study suggest that increased use of hospital-based care due to Medicaid 
coverage expansions may have been a plausible pathway leading to mortality reductions 
among the non-elderly population. This evidence also suggests that state Medicaid 
expansions following the ACA guidelines can potentially improve access and utilization in 
expansion states. Evidence already exists that early ACA provisions for young adults have 
reduced out of pocket costs for the uninsured (Busch et al., 2014), and that pre-ACA state 
Medicaid expansions decreased personal bankruptcies, plausibly through reductions in out-
of-pocket medical expenditures (Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011). Correspondingly, the 
ACA-related Medicaid expansions may lower out-of-pocket spending, particularly for 
high-cost hospital care.  
Our results also shed light on the potential negative spillover effect that Medicaid 
disenrollment may have on hospitals through increased uninsured visits. By focusing on a 
policy change that targeted non-elderly adults (who were neither disabled nor pregnant), 
our results suggest that Medicaid expansions will decrease uninsured hospitalizations, 
thereby reducing use of hospital uncompensated care. Back-of-the-envelope calculations 
suggest that a predicted 12-13 million increase in non-elderly Medicaid and CHIP 
enrollment due to the ACA (Congressional Budget Office, 2014) will reduce uninsured 
inpatient stays by 2.9 to 3.1 million each year in the expansion states. Under the assumption 
that the uninsured utilize inpatient care at the same rate as Medicaid beneficiaries, we 
divide 17.481, the point estimate of per-10,000 Medicaid inpatient visits, by the pre-
treatment mean of 72.259, and multiply by the estimated Medicaid enrollment increase of 
12-13 million. As of July 2015, 19 states have decided not to implement the ACA Medicaid 
expansions; if, following ACA guidelines, reductions in Medicaid and Medicare 
disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) payments outpace the decrease in uncompensated 
care costs at hospitals, then hospital finances may be adversely affected in non-expansion 
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states. Given that our analysis is based on a single-state study of a Medicaid contraction, 
these estimates must be interpreted with caution with respect to the ACA.  
 The income-based-eligibility approach of Medicaid and Medicaid’s re-enrollment 
policies may lead enrollees to involuntarily drop out of Medicaid over time due to 
fluctuations in income and employment, which can shift enrollees across income eligibility 
thresholds. Sommers (2009) estimates that nearly 43 percent Medicaid beneficiaries lose 
coverage within 12 months of enrollment due to transitions in employment, family 
structure or income, thereby facing uninsurance. Nonetheless, little is known about the 
implications of loss of Medicaid coverage for use of medical services or its effect on the 
healthcare system. We find evidence that the post-disenrollment increase in uninsured 
hospitalizations was primarily due to an increase in inpatient admissions originating in the 
ED. This finding provides suggestive evidence of the adverse effect of Medicaid 
disenrollment on access to medical care. Indeed, the increase in preventable 
hospitalizations among the uninsured lends further support to the adverse impact of loss of 
Medicaid coverage on access to care and to the potential negative spill-over effects on 
hospital finances. In light of these results, ACA Medicaid expansions that reduce 
uninsurance will likely decrease ED use by the uninsured as well as uninsured admissions 
for ambulatory-case sensitive conditions in expansion states, thereby reducing hospital 
uncompensated care costs.  
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 Tables and Figures 
Table 3-1: Summary Statistics for the Treatment and Comparison States 
  Tennessee  Southern States 
  Before After Before After 
     
Demographic characteristics         
Age 47.4 48.1 46.8 47.5 
Female 52.7% 51.9% 53.1% 52.2% 
White 75.4% 72.5% 48.1% 50.2% 
African-American 20.2% 17.8% 16.9% 18.3% 
Hispanic 0.6% 1.2% 8.5% 8.7% 
Other 2.3% 1.1% 2.9% 3.5% 
     
Clinical characteristics         
Number of diagnosis codes 5.50 7.74 5.45 7.36 
Length of Stay (LOS) 4.75 4.81 4.63 4.72 
Log(LOS) 2.22 2.23 2.16 2.18 
Number of procedure codes 1.60 1.66 1.48 1.62 
     
Health Insurance Status         
Medicaid 24.4% 16.6% 13.8% 15.0% 
Uninsured 5.8% 13.0% 12.4% 14.9% 
Private 46.6% 43.0% 50.3% 44.0% 
Medicare 20.9% 24.9% 16.9% 19.1% 
Other Insurance 2.2% 2.6% 6.6% 7.0% 
     
Hospitalization rates by Insurance Type    
Medicaid 5.6 2.5 1.8 1.6 
Uninsured 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.5 
Private 10.7 6.6 6.6 4.6 
Medicare 4.8 3.8 2.2 2.0 
Other Insurance 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.8 
Total  22.9 15.3 13.1 10.5 
     
Number of Observations 458,664 321,255 5,131,400 4,406,199 
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009 for all adults between ages 20-64. We use 
non-birth admissions only. Demographic characteristics (excluding age) and health insurance status 
variables are measured as percentages. Hospitalization rates are measured at the state-year level 
per 1,000 population. Before-period includes years 2000-2004 and after-period represents years 
2006 and later. Control states consist of the Southern states in the NIS except Tennessee. See 
section 4.5.1 for details. 
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Table 3-2: Effect on Inpatient Admissions by Source of Coverage (DD Estimates 
using Southern States as Comparison Group) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   
 A. Fraction of Admissions    
  Medicaid Private Other Medicare Uninsured   
       
 
PostxTreat -0.063*** 0.007 0.004 0.011*** 0.041***   
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)   
Dependent Variable Means        
Treatment, Before 0.304 0.349 0.016 0.265 0.067   
Control, Before 0.157 0.418 0.065 0.234 0.126   
Treatment, After 0.197 0.322 0.021 0.342 0.117   
Control, After 0.151 0.373 0.052 0.307 0.118   
       
 
Observations 11,479 11,479 11,479 11,479 11,479   
       
 
       
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   
 B.  Hospitalization Rate    
  Medicaid Private Other Medicare Uninsured  Total  
       
 
PostxTreat -17.481*** -5.454 0.120 -5.012 11.066***  -15.585 
 (3.146) (3.497) (2.166) (8.159) (1.237)  (13.172) 
Dependent Variable Means        
Treatment, Before 72.259 139.259 6.911 71.628 20.316  313.692 
Control, Before 46.416 145.397 23.148 63.242 34.674  314.018 
Treatment, After 56.918 122.881 8.022 104.416 33.399  328.367 
Control, After 59.908 125.561 20.079 94.101 35.329  335.777 
       
 
Observations 11,481 11,481 11,481 11,481 11,481  11,481 
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009 for all adults between ages 20-64. Each 
coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. We use non-birth admissions only and the 
Southern states as comparison group. We exclude year 2005 from sample. Hospitalization rates are 
measured at the hospital-quarter level per 10,000 population. Covariates include demographic 
characteristics, number of diagnoses, unemployment rate and unemployment rate interacted with 
treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include hospital-
fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
*Significant at 0.10, **significant at 0.05, ***significant at 0.01.  
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Table 3-3: Effect on Source and Type of Uninsured Admissions (DD Estimates using 
Southern States as Comparison Group) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dependent Variable: Uninsured Hospitalization Rate 
  
Uninsured 
Admissions 
through ED 
Uninsured  
Admissions not 
through ED 
Uninsured 
Admissions for 
Preventable 
Conditions 
Uninsured 
Admissions for 
Non-Preventable 
Conditions 
     
PostxTreat 8.391*** 2.686*** 1.993*** 9.073*** 
 (1.066) (0.357) (0.242) (1.027) 
Dependent 
Variable Means 
    
Treatment, Before 13.030 7.267 3.547 16.769 
Control, Before 23.873 10.684 5.788 28.886 
Treatment, After 23.992 9.355 4.762 28.637 
Control, After 24.512 10.664 5.108 30.222 
     
Observations 11,481 11,481 11,481 11,481 
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009 for full sample of adults between ages 20-
64. Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. We use non-birth admissions only 
and the Southern states as comparison group. We exclude year 2005 from sample. Hospitalization 
rates are measured at the hospital-quarter level per 10,000 population. Covariates include 
demographic characteristics, number of diagnoses, unemployment rate and unemployment rate 
interacted with treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and 
include hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the state level. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *Significant at 0.10, 
**significant at 0.05, ***significant at 0.01
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Table 3-4: Effect on Intensity of Treatment (DD Estimates using Southern States as 
Comparison Group) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Intensity (All Admissions) Intensity (Uninsured Admissions Only) 
  
Number of 
Procedures 
Length 
of Stay 
(LOS) 
Log of 
LOS 
Number of 
Procedures 
Length of 
Stay (LOS) 
Log of 
LOS 
       
PostxTreat -0.034 -0.036 0.002 -0.009 0.100** 0.019*** 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.004) (0.013) (0.033) (0.003) 
Dependent 
Variable Means       
Treatment, Before 0.944 3.999 1.385 0.870 3.380 1.260 
Control, Before 1.073 4.932 1.449 0.897 3.841 1.309 
Treatment, After 1.006 4.123 1.404 0.892 3.449 1.285 
Control, After 1.154 5.813 1.518 0.917 3.906 1.305 
       
Observations 11,481 11,481 11,481 9,930 9,930 9,930 
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009 for adults between ages 20-64. Each 
coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. We use non-birth admissions only and the 
Southern states as comparison group. We exclude year 2005 from sample. Hospitalization rates are 
measured at the hospital-quarter level per 10,000 population. Covariates include demographic 
characteristics, number of diagnoses, unemployment rate and unemployment rate interacted with 
treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include hospital-
fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *Significant at 0.10, **significant at 0.05, 
***significant at 0.01.  
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Figure 3-1: Insurance Status of Inpatient Admissions among Non-Elderly Adults
Notes:  
1. Sample estimates from the NIS 2001-2009. 
2. The first vertical line denotes the announcement of TennCare disenrollment in 2004, the 
second vertical line denotes its implementation in 2005, and the third vertical line represents 
the beginning of the post-period in our analysis.  
3. Sample includes non-pregnancy-related inpatient admissions among 20-64-year-olds. 
4. The solid red line and the dashed line indicates share of admissions per hospital in Tennessee 
and the control states, respectively. 
5. Control states consist of the Southern states in the NIS except Tennessee. See section 4.5.1 
for details.  
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Figure 3-2: Hospitalizations Among Non-Elderly Adults (by Payer)
Notes:  
1. Sample estimates from the NIS 2001-2009. 
2. The first vertical line denotes the announcement of TennCare disenrollment in 2004, the 
second vertical line denotes its implementation in 2005, and the third vertical line represents 
the beginning of the post-period in our analysis.  
3. Sample includes non-pregnancy-related inpatient admissions among 20-64-year-olds. 
4. The solid red line and the dashed line indicates number of admissions per hospital in 
Tennessee and the control states, respectively. 
5. Control states consist of the Southern states in the NIS except Tennessee. See section 4.5.1 
for details.  
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4 Appendices 
Appendix A 
Table A-1: Categorization of state Medicaid expansion status 
 
2014 Expansion States without 
substantial prior Medicaid 
expansion 
Expansion States with 
Substantial prior Medicaid 
expansion 
Non-Expansion States 
(Control group) 
   
Alaska1 Delaware11 Alabama 
Arkansas2 District of Columbia7 Florida 
Arizona3 Massachusetts12 Georgia 
California4,7 New York13 Idaho 
Colorado5 Vermont14 Kansas 
Connecticut  Maine 
Hawaii9  Mississippi 
Illinois  Missouri 
Indiana1  Nebraska 
Iowa6  North Carolina 
Kentucky  Oklahoma 
Louisiana1  South Carolina 
Maryland  South Dakota 
Michigan1  Tennessee 
Minnesota7  Texas 
Montana1  Utah 
Nevada  Virginia 
New Hampshire1  Wisconsin10 
New Jersey7  Wyoming 
New Mexico   
North Dakota   
Ohio   
Oregon8   
Pennsylvania1   
Rhode Island   
Washington7   
West Virginia   
      
 
Notes: This table shows the state classification for Medicaid eligibility used in this paper. These 
are mutually exclusive lists of states. Source: Reproduced from Table A1 of Ghosh et al. (2017). 
1 The Medicaid expansion became effective in January 2014 for all expansion states as of this 
writing, except for the following: Alaska (September 2015), Indiana (February 2015), Louisiana 
(July 2016), Michigan (April 2014), Montana (January 2016), New Hampshire (August 2014), and 
Pennsylvania (January 2015). Since this table records only expansion status as of January 2014, 
some of the states that later expanded Medicaid appear in the control group column. The remaining 
notes to this Table explain the categorization of expansion states into columns 1 or 2.     
2 Arkansas operated a limited-benefit premium-assistance program for childless adults who worked 
for small, uninsured employers (ARHealthNetworks waiver) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016) 
prior to the ACA. 
3 Since 2000, Arizona offered Medicaid-equivalent benefits to childless adults with income below 
100 percent FPL through a Section 1115 waiver program. However, the state closed the program 
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to new enrollees in July 2011 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016) and consequently experienced a 
significant expansion for childless adults in 2014. 
4 Although California expanded Medicaid for childless adults to some degree as part of the state’s 
1115 “Bridge to Reform” waiver, this was not available in all counties and was not full Medi-Cal 
benefits (http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/the-california-health-care-landscape/).  
5 Colorado had only very limited eligibility before 2014. Adults with income up to 10 percent FPL 
were eligible for Medicaid as of May 2012, and enrollment was capped to 10,000 adults (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2016). 
6 Under the IowaCare program, childless adults with income below 200 percent FPL were eligible 
for public health insurance since 2005. However, IowaCare provided limited services in a limited 
network, and so low-income adults in Iowa effectively underwent substantial expansion in coverage 
in 2014 (Damiano et al., 2013). 
7 California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington elected 
to enact the ACA Medicaid expansion in 2010 to 2011. However, New Jersey’s early expansion 
only extended to 23 percent FPL while the other five states extended at least until 50 percent FPL 
(Sommers et al., 2013). Also, Washington’s early expansion was limited to prior state plan 
enrollees  (Sommers et al., 2013). Hence, we treat New Jersey and Washington as full 2014 
expansion states.  
8 In 2008, Oregon enacted a small Medicaid expansion for low-income adults through lottery 
drawings from a waitlist. However, less than one-third of the 90,000 people on the waitlist were 
selected to apply for Medicaid in 2008 (Baicker et al., 2013) and so the 2014 expansion represented 
a significant increase in eligibility for low-income adults.  
9. In Hawaii, childless adults with incomes up to 100 percent FPL were eligible for the state’s 
QUEST Medicaid managed care waiver program (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016).  
10 Although Wisconsin was not an ACA expansion state, the state received federal approval to 
offer Medicaid to childless adults below 100 percent FPL through the BadgerCare program as of 
2009 (Gates and Rudowitz, 2014).  
11 In Delaware, childless adults with incomes up to 100 percent FPL were eligible for Medicaid 
benefits through the Diamond State Health Plan waiver (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). 
12 Massachusetts implemented reforms to expand insurance coverage to low-income adults in 2006 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016).  
13 In New York, childless adults up to 78 percent FPL were eligible for the Medicaid (Home Relief) 
waiver program and childless adults up to 100 percent FPL were eligible for the Family Health Plus 
waiver program (Heberlein et al., 2011).  
14 In Vermont, childless adults up to 150 percent FPL were eligible for Medicaid-equivalent 
coverage through the Vermont Health Access Plan waiver program (Heberlein et al., 2011). 
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Table A-2: Categorization of state family planning waivers/SPA adopted prior to 
2014 ACA Medicaid expansions 
 
  Base Light Moderate Heavy 
     
 Alabama Idaho California Alaska 
 Florida Kansas Connecticut Arizona 
 Georgia Nebraska Indiana  Arkansas 
 Idaho 
South 
Dakota Iowa Colorado 
 Maine Tennessee Louisiana Delaware 
 Mississippi Utah Maryland 
District of 
Columbia 
 Missouri1  Minnesota Hawaii 
 
North 
Carolina  Montana Illinois 
 Oklahoma  
New 
Hampshire Kentucky 
 
South 
Carolina  New Mexico Massachusetts 
 Texas1  New York Michigan 
 Virginia  Oregon Nevada 
 Wisconsin  Pennsylvania New Jersey 
 Wyoming  Rhode Island North Dakota 
   Washington Ohio 
   Vermont West Virginia      
Medicaid Family 
Planning Waiver / 
SPA Status 
Yes No Yes No 
     
ACA Expansion 
Status No No Yes Yes 
          
 
Notes:  
This table shows classification of states based on Medicaid expansion status under the ACA and 
pre-ACA Medicaid coverage of family planning services through family planning waivers or state 
plan amendments (SPA) used in this paper. These are mutually exclusive lists of states.  
 
1 Both Texas and Missouri provide family planning services to women older than 18 years of age 
and with incomes up to 185% FPL, through programs that are entirely state-funded. 
 
Sources: Classification of states based on Guttmacher Institute, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and 
Appendix Table 1. 
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Table A-3: Event study estimates of the effect of Medicaid expansion on fertility 
among women without a high school diploma 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births)       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total births First births 
High 
parity First births, Single      
Expansion x y2011q3 0.032** 0.040* 0.031* 0.042* 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022)      
Expansion x y2011q4 0.024 0.027 0.022 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023)      
Expansion x y2012q1 -0.006 0.011 -0.012 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.018) (0.026)      
Expansion x y2012q2 -0.013 0.043* -0.031** 0.037 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023)      
Expansion x y2012q3 -0.007 0.001 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) (0.026)      
Expansion x y2012q4 -0.021 -0.004 -0.026 -0.008 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028)      
Expansion x y2013q1 -0.040 -0.016 -0.048 -0.029 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.032) (0.040)      
Expansion x y2013q2 -0.022 -0.016 -0.025 -0.015 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.018) (0.029)      
Expansion x y2013q3 0.005 0.023 -0.001 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023)      
Expansion x y2013q4 -0.003 -0.024 0.001 -0.023 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.022) (0.037)      
Expansion x y2014q1 -0.049* -0.059 -0.047* -0.066 
 (0.028) (0.047) (0.024) (0.045)      
Expansion x y2014q2 -0.038 -0.041 -0.035* -0.047 
 (0.023) (0.043) (0.020) (0.043)      
Expansion x y2014q3 -0.002 -0.026 0.007 -0.019 
 (0.022) (0.038) (0.020) (0.036)      
Expansion x y2014q4 -0.042* -0.092* -0.025 -0.080 
 (0.025) (0.047) (0.021) (0.049)      
Expansion x y2015q1 -0.049* -0.058 -0.046* -0.040 
 (0.028) (0.041) (0.025) (0.043)      
Observations 624 624 624 624 
 
Notes: Analysis is based on NCHS 2012-2015 and the estimates in each column are obtained from 
a separate event study analysis, with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the state/year/quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women aged 18-44. 
Covariates include cell means of mother's age, race/ethnicity, marital status, state fixed effects, 
fixed effects for each quarter in the data, and state unemployment rate and poverty rate. Standard 
errors are clustered at state and presented in parentheses. Estimates are weighted using state by year 
population of women aged 18-44. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-
percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table A-4: Event study estimates of the effect of Medicaid expansion on fertility 
among women without a college degree 
Dependent variable: Ln (Births)       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Total 
births First births High parity First births, Single      
Expansion x y2011q3 0.010 0.005 0.014 0.010 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)      
Expansion x y2011q4 -0.003 -0.008 -0.000 -0.012 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012)      
Expansion x y2012q1 -0.002 -0.010 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)      
Expansion x y2012q2 -0.003 -0.020* 0.006 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)      
Expansion x y2012q3 -0.013 -0.022 -0.007 -0.026 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)      
Expansion x y2012q4 -0.007 -0.016 -0.001 -0.022** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)      
Expansion x y2013q1 -0.018 -0.027* -0.013 -0.028* 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)      
Expansion x y2013q2 -0.021*** -0.028*** -0.017** -0.029** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012)      
Expansion x y2013q3 -0.017* -0.020 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)      
Expansion x y2013q4 -0.007 -0.011 -0.004 -0.021 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014)      
Expansion x y2014q1 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.030 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018)      
Expansion x y2014q2 -0.029*** -0.018 -0.035*** -0.020 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016)      
Expansion x y2014q3 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)      
Expansion x y2014q4 -0.025** -0.019 -0.027*** -0.022 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.020)      
Expansion x y2015q1 -0.038** -0.045** -0.034** -0.051** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020)      
Observations 624 624 624 624 
 
Notes: Analysis is based on NCHS 2012-2015 and the estimates in each column are obtained from 
a separate event study analysis, with natural log of total births as the dependent variable. 
Observations are at the state/year/quarter/cell level. Sample includes births to women aged 18-44. 
Covariates include cell means of mother's age, race/ethnicity, marital status, state fixed effects, 
fixed effects for each quarter in the data, and state unemployment rate and poverty rate. Standard 
errors are clustered at state and presented in parentheses. Estimates are weighted using state by year 
population of women aged 18-44. * Significant at the 10-percent level. ** Significant at the 5-
percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table A-5: Event study estimates for Medicaid contraceptive use 
 
Dependent variable: Ln (Medicaid prescriptions per 100 population)     
Expansion x 2012q2 0.03 
 (0.07)   
Expansion x 2012q3 0.00 
 (0.07)   
Expansion x 2012q4 -0.03 
 (0.07)   
Expansion x 2013q1 0.11 
 (0.07)   
Expansion x 2013q2 0.16 
 (0.11)   
Expansion x 2013q3 0.05 
 (0.07)   
Expansion x 2013q4 0.03 
 (0.07)   
Expansion x 2014q1 0.08 
 (0.10)   
Expansion x 2014q2 0.20 
 (0.13)   
Expansion x 2014q3 0.32*** 
 (0.10)   
Expansion x 2014q4 0.33*** 
 (0.12)   
Expansion x 2015q1 0.32** 
 (0.12)   
Expansion x 2015q2 0.33*** 
 (0.11)   
Expansion x 2015q3 0.34*** 
 (0.11)   
Expansion x 2015q4 0.36*** 
 (0.12)   
Expansion x 2016q1 0.29** 
 (0.13)   
Expansion x 2016q2 0.35*** 
 (0.12)   
Expansion x 2016q3 0.28** 
 (0.13)   
Expansion x 2016q4 0.27** 
 (0.13)   
Observations 960 
 
Note: Analysis is based on aggregated state-quarter Medicaid prescription data and the estimates 
in each column are obtained from a separate event study analysis, with natural log of total Medicaid 
contraceptives per 100 population as the dependent variable. Observations are at the at 
state/year/quarter level. Data covers the period 2012Q1 to 2016Q4. All models include state fixed 
effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the data, poverty rate and unemployment rate. Robust 
standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10-percent level. 
** Significant at the 5-percent level. *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table A-6: Summary statistics 
  Expansion  Non-expansion   
  Before After Before After Data Source 
      
Mother's age 28.90 29.14 27.85 28.13 NCHS 
Married 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.59 NCHS 
Less than high school 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 NCHS 
Less than college 0.51 0.52 0.57 0.57 NCHS 
Master's or more 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 NCHS 
Female 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 NCHS 
Live birth order 1-8 2.09 2.11 2.15 2.17 NCHS 
White 0.51 0.52 0.58 0.55 NCHS 
Black 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.17 NCHS 
Hispanic 0.27 0.26 0.20 0.22 NCHS 
Other 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.06 NCHS 
Unemployment rate 8.63 6.52 7.66 5.73 BLS LAUS 
Poverty rate 14.52 14.54 15.64 15.66 SAIPE 
      
Total births  19,173.49 18,726.93 19,333.45 18,992.45 NCHS 
Total Medicaid contraceptives 61,983.65 65,708.50 39,338.94 35,296.47 SDUD 
            
 
Notes: This table displays summary statistics separately for 2014 Medicaid expansion and non-
expansion states.  
Source: NCHS 2012-2015; BLS 2012-2015; SAIPE 2012-2015; SDUD 2012-2016. 
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Appendix B 
Table B-1: Categorization of State Expansion Status 
 
2014 Expansion States 
without substantial prior 
Medicaid expansion 
Expansion States with 
Substantial prior Medicaid 
expansion 
Non-Expansion States 
(Control group) 
  
   
Arkansas1,2 Delaware11 Alabama 
Arizona3 District of Columbia7 Alaska 
California4,7 Massachusetts12 Florida 
Colorado5 New York13 Georgia 
Connecticut Vermont14 Idaho 
Hawaii9  Kansas 
Illinois  Louisiana1 
Indiana1  Maine 
Iowa6  Mississippi 
Kentucky  Missouri 
Maryland  Montana1 
Michigan1  Nebraska 
Minnesota7  North Carolina 
Nevada  Oklahoma 
New Hampshire1  South Carolina 
New Jersey7  South Dakota 
New Mexico  Tennessee 
North Dakota  Texas 
Ohio  Utah 
Oregon8  Virginia 
Pennsylvania1  Wisconsin10 
Rhode Island  Wyoming 
Washington7   
West Virginia   
   
 
Notes: This table shows the state classification for Medicaid eligibility used in this paper. These 
are mutually exclusive lists of states. We first examine states in the first two columns together, as 
expansion states. Later specifications separate expansion states into those with and without 
substantial pre-2014 Medicaid expansions. Source: Reproduced from Table A1 of (Ghosh et al., 
2017). 
1 The Medicaid expansion became effective in January 2014 for all expansion states as of this 
writing, except for the following: Alaska (September 2015), Indiana (February 2015), Louisiana 
(July 2016), Michigan (April 2014), Montana (January 2016), New Hampshire (August 2014), and 
Pennsylvania (January 2015). Since this table records only expansion status as of January 2014, 
some of the states that later expanded Medicaid appear in the control group column. However, our 
regressions categorize those states that expanded after January 2014 but before March 2015 as 
expansion states only in the quarters after the expansion was implemented.  The remaining notes 
to this Table explain the categorization of expansion states into columns 1 or 2.     
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2 Arkansas operated a limited-benefit premium-assistance program for childless adults who worked 
for small, uninsured employers (ARHealthNetworks waiver) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016) 
prior to the ACA. 
3 Since 2000, Arizona offered Medicaid-equivalent benefits to childless adults with income below 
100 percent FPL through a Section 1115 waiver program. However, the state closed the program 
to new enrollees in July 2011 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016) and consequently experienced a 
significant expansion for childless adults in 2014. 
4 Although California expanded Medicaid for childless adults to some degree as part of the state’s 
1115 “Bridge to Reform” waiver, this was not available in all counties and was not full Medi-Cal 
benefits (http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/the-california-health-care-landscape/).  
5 Colorado had only very limited eligibility before 2014. Adults with income up to 10 percent FPL 
were eligible for Medicaid as of May 2012, and enrollment was capped to 10,000 adults (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2016). 
6 Under the IowaCare program, childless adults with income below 200 percent FPL were eligible 
for public health insurance since 2005. However, IowaCare provided limited services in a limited 
network, and so low-income adults in Iowa effectively underwent substantial expansion in coverage 
in 2014 (Damiano et al., 2013). 
7 California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington elected 
to enact the ACA Medicaid expansion in 2010 to 2011. However, New Jersey’s early expansion 
only extended to 23 percent FPL while the other five states extended at least until 50 percent FPL 
(Sommers et al., 2013). Also, Washington’s early expansion was limited to prior state plan 
enrollees  (Sommers et al., 2013). Hence, we treat New Jersey and Washington as full 2014 
expansion states.  
8 In 2008, Oregon enacted a small Medicaid expansion for low-income adults through lottery 
drawings from a waitlist. However, less than one-third of the 90,000 people on the waitlist were 
selected to apply for Medicaid in 2008 (Baicker et al., 2013) and so the 2014 expansion represented 
a significant increase in eligibility for low-income adults.  
9 In Hawaii, childless adults with incomes up to 100 percent FPL were eligible for the state’s 
QUEST Medicaid managed care waiver program (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016).  
10 Although Wisconsin was not an ACA expansion state, the state received federal approval to 
offer Medicaid to childless adults below 100 percent FPL through the BadgerCare program as of 
2009 (Gates and Rudowitz, 2014).  
11 In Delaware, childless adults with incomes up to 100 percent FPL were eligible for Medicaid 
benefits through the Diamond State Health Plan waiver (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). 
12 Massachusetts implemented reforms to expand insurance coverage to low-income adults in 2006 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016).  
13 In New York, childless adults up to 78 percent FPL were eligible for the Medicaid (Home Relief) 
waiver program and childless adults up to 100 percent FPL were eligible for the Family Health Plus 
waiver program (Heberlein et al., 2011).  
14 In Vermont, childless adults up to 150 percent FPL were eligible for Medicaid-equivalent 
coverage through the Vermont Health Access Plan waiver program (Heberlein et al., 2011). 
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Table B-2: Event Study Estimates by Payer 
 
Dependent variable:  Ln (prescriptions per 100 population) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Uninsured (Cash and assistance programs) Commercial Medicare     
Expansion x 2013Q2 0.03* -0.01 0.01* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.005)     
Expansion x 2013Q3 0.03 -0.004 0.01* 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)     
Expansion x 2013Q4 0.03 -0.005 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)     
Expansion x 2014Q1 0.01 -0.01 0.001 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)     
Expansion x 2014Q2 0.003 -0.01 0.003 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)     
Expansion x 2014Q3 0.005 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)     
Expansion x 2014Q4 0.002 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)     
Expansion x 2015Q1 -0.01 -0.03 0.004 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)     
Observations 459 459 459 
 
Notes: Analysis is based on aggregated state-quarter Medicaid prescription data from 
2013Q1 to 2015Q1. All models include state fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter in 
the data, and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by state reported in 
parentheses.  * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table B-3: Event Study Estimates of Prescription Drug Utilization Based on 2013 
CBSA Uninsurance Rates 
 
Dependent variable: Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions) 
  (1) (2) 
  All States Excl. DC, DE, MA, NY, VT    
Pct Uninsured 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q2 -0.0002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002)    
Pct Uninsured 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q3 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003)   
Pct Uninsured 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q4 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Pct Uninsured 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q1 0.002 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Pct Uninsured 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q2 0.003 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Pct Uninsured 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q3 0.006** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Pct Uninsured 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q4 0.004 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003)    
Pct Uninsured 2013 x Expansion x 2015Q1 0.003 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Observations 7,029  6,714  
 
Notes:  
1. Analysis is based on aggregated CBSA-quarter Medicaid prescription data from 2013Q1 
to 2015Q1. All models include CBSA fixed effects, year by quarter fixed effects, and 
CBSA unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by CBSA reported in 
parentheses. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
2. In column (1), estimates are based on all states being categorized into expansion vs non-
expansion states. 
3. For the analysis corresponding to column (2), the early expansion states of DC, DE, MA, 
NY, and VT were dropped from the sample. 
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Table B-4: Event Study Estimates of Prescription Drug Utilization Based on 2013 
CBSA Poverty Proportions 
 
Dependent variable: Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions) 
  (1) (2) 
  All States Excl. DC, DE, MA, NY, VT    
Pct Poverty 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q2 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002)    
Pct Poverty 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q3 0.002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Pct Poverty 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q4 0.003 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Pct Poverty 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q1 0.005 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Pct Poverty 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q2 0.005 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Pct Poverty 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q3 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005)   
Pct Poverty 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q4 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005)    
Pct Poverty 2013 x Expansion x 2015Q1 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005)   
Observations 7,029 6,714 
 
Notes:  
1. Analysis is based on aggregated CBSA-quarter Medicaid prescription data from 2013Q1 
to 2015Q1. All models include CBSA fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the 
data, and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by CBSA reported in 
parentheses. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
2. In column (1), estimates are based on all states being categorized into expansion vs non-
expansion states. 
3. For the analysis corresponding to column (2), the early expansion states of DC, DE, MA, 
NY, and VT were dropped from the sample. 
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Table B-5: Event Study Estimates of Prescription Drug Utilization Based on 2013 
CBSA Minority Proportions 
 
Dependent variable: Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions) 
  (1) (2) 
  All States Excl. DC, DE, MA, NY, VT    
Pct Minority 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q2 -0.0004 -0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001)    
Pct Minority 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q3 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)   
Pct Minority 2013 x Expansion x 2013Q4 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001)   
Pct Minority 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q1 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002)   
Pct Minority 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q2 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002)   
Pct Minority 2013 x Expansion x 2014Q3 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002)   
Pct Minority 2013x Expansion x 2014Q4 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002)    
Pct Minority 2013 x Expansion x 2015Q1 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002)   
Observations 7,029 6,714 
 
Notes:  
1. Analysis is based on aggregated CBSA-quarter Medicaid prescription data from 2013Q1 to 
2015Q1. All models include CBSA fixed effects, fixed effects for each quarter in the data, and 
unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by CBSA reported in parentheses. * 
Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 
1 percent level. 
2. In column (1), estimates are based on all states being categorized into expansion vs non-
expansion states. 
3. For the analysis corresponding to column (2), the early expansion states of DC, DE, MA, NY, 
and VT were dropped from the sample. 
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Table B-6: Effect of the ACA Medicaid Expansions on Medicaid Prescription Drugs, 
State Specification, Restricted to data from CBSAs 
 
Dependent variable: Log (per capita Medicaid prescriptions) 
 (1) (2) 
  All States Excl. DC, DE, MA, NY, VT 
   
Post x Expansion 0.22*** 0.23*** 
 (0.03) (0.03)    
Year and quarter fixed effects Y Y 
CBSA fixed effects Y Y 
Observations 7,029 6,714 
   
Dependent variable means   
Expansion, Before 4.26 4.23 
Non-expansion, Before 4.68 4.68 
Expansion, After 4.59 4.57 
Non-expansion, After 4.79 4.79 
 
Notes: 
1. Analysis is based on aggregated CBSA-quarter Medicaid prescription data from 2013Q1 to 
2015Q1. All models include unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered by state 
reported in parentheses.  * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
2. In column (1), estimates are based on all states being categorized into expansion vs non-
expansion states. 
a. Expansion states: AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, IN, IA, IL, KY, MD, MA, 
MI, MN, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, VT, WA, WV.  
b. Non-expansion states: AL, AK, FL, GA, ID, KS, LA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NE, NC, OK, 
SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY.  
3. For the analysis corresponding to column (2), the early expansion states of DC, DE, MA, NY, 
and VT were dropped from the sample. 
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Appendix C 
Table C-1: Pre-Treatment Trend Test (Southern States as Comparison Group) 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   A. Dependent Variable: Fraction of Admissions  
  Medicaid  Private Other Medicare Uninsured 
       
TrendxTreat 0.000  0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Observations 5,250  5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 
       
       
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   B. Dependent Variable: Hospitalization Rate 
  Medicaid  Private Other Medicare Uninsured 
       
TrendxTreat -0.347  3.236 1.097* 0.329 0.620*** 
 (0.454)  (2.191) (0.499) (0.474) (0.175) 
       
Observations 5,252  5,252 5,252 5,252 5,252 
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2004 for adults between ages 20-64. Each 
coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. We use non-birth admissions only and the 
Southern states as comparison group. Hospitalization rates are measured at the hospital-quarter 
level per 10,000 population. All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include 
hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10, ** significant 
at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. 
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Table C-2: Alternative Difference-in-Differences Model Specifications 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Inpatient Admissions 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Dependent Variable: Fraction of Inpatient Admissions  
  Interaction Term  Medicaid Private Other Medicare Uninsured N 
A. Difference-in-difference estimates using all states as 
control 
PostxTreat  -0.071*** 0.012*** 0.004* 0.011*** 0.044*** 29,867 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
         
B. Difference-in-difference estimates using synthetic 
control states (level) 
PostxTreat  -0.046*** 0.001 0.007 0.014** 0.025*** 6,734 
  (0.013) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)  
         
C. Difference-in-difference estimates using synthetic 
control states (growth rate) 
PostxTreat  -0.051*** 0.001 -0.002 0.016** 0.036*** 4,687 
  (0.018) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)  
         
D. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as control, 
includes state-specific linear time trends 
PostxTreat  -0.049*** -0.005 0.007** 0.015*** 0.031*** 11,048 
  (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)  
         
E. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as control, 
includes state-specific squared time trends 
PostxTreat  -0.047*** -0.004 0.004 0.015*** 0.032*** 11,048 
  (0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)  
         
F. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as control, 
includes state-specific cubic time trends 
PostxTreat  -0.050*** 0.000 0.003 0.014*** 0.034*** 11,048 
  (0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009)  
                
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009 for adults between ages 20-64. Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. 
We use non-birth admissions only and exclude year 2005 from sample. Covariates include demographic characteristics, number of diagnoses, 
unemployment rate and unemployment rate interacted with treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include 
hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *Significant at 0.10, **significant at 0.05, ***significant at 0.01.  
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Table C-3: Alternative Triple-Differences Model Specifications 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Inpatient Admissions 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent Variable: Fraction of Inpatient Admissions 
  Interaction Term Medicaid Private Other Medicare Uninsured N 
        
A. Triple-difference estimates using 
Southern states 
PostxTreatxOver20 -0.075*** 0.009* 0.005 0.012*** 0.049*** 21,903 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  
        
B. Triple-difference estimates using 
Southern states 
PostxTreatxNon-birth -0.073*** 0.010* 0.004 0.014*** 0.045*** 19,068 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)  
        
C. Triple-difference estimates using all 
states 
PostxTreatxOver20 -0.084*** 0.020*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.050*** 57,779 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)  
        
D. Triple-difference estimates using all 
states 
PostxTreatxNon-birth -0.080*** 0.020*** 0.004** 0.009*** 0.046*** 52,253 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
               
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009. Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. We exclude year 2005 from 
sample. Covariates include demographic characteristics, number of diagnoses, unemployment rate and unemployment rate interacted with 
treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, 
*** significant at 0.01. 
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Table C-4: Alternative Difference-in-Differences Model Specifications 
Dependent Variable: Hospitalization Rate 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dependent Variable: Hospitalization Rate  
  Interaction Term Medicaid Private Other Medicare Uninsured N 
 
      
 
A. Difference-in-difference estimates using all states as 
control 
PostxTreat -17.677*** -8.055*** -0.022 0.612 11.470*** 29,881 
 (1.881) (2.175) (0.768) (3.722) (0.747)   
       
B. Difference-in-difference estimates using synthetic control 
states (level) 
PostxTreat -19.839*** -22.733*** 2.016 -14.774** 8.127*** 6,736 
 (4.820) (6.156) (1.559) (5.701) (2.120)   
 
      
C. Difference-in-difference estimates using synthetic control 
states (growth rate) 
PostxTreat -18.270*** -20.032*** -0.933 -8.966** 7.773*** 4,689 
 (5.501) (7.338) (0.664) (4.246) (2.437)   
       
D. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as control, 
includes state-specific linear time trends 
PostxTreat -13.332* -8.179 -4.470 3.105 11.194*** 11,050 
 (6.970) (8.051) (3.034) (12.111) (3.548)   
       
E. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as control, 
includes state-specific squared time trends 
PostxTreat -12.326* -5.738 -4.358 7.647 10.710** 11,050 
 (5.993) (6.656) (3.882) (10.522) (3.473)   
       
F. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as control, 
includes state-specific cubic time trends 
PostxTreat -12.493** -3.875 -3.096 10.803 10.196*** 11,050 
 (4.374) (5.555) (3.510) (8.293) (2.775)  
               
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009 for adults between ages 20-64. Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. 
We use non-birth admissions only and exclude year 2005 from sample. Hospitalization rates are measured at the hospital-quarter level per 10,000 
population. Covariates include demographic characteristics, number of diagnoses, unemployment rate and unemployment rate interacted with 
treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *Significant at 0.10, **significant at 0.05, 
***significant at 0.01.  
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Table C-5: Alternative Triple-Differences Model Specifications 
Dependent Variable: Hospitalization Rate 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dependent Variable: Hospitalization Rate  
 Interaction Term Medicaid Private Other Medicare Uninsured N 
        
A. Triple-difference estimates using Southern 
states 
PostxTreatxOver20 -19.895*** -5.788 0.862 -6.055 11.556*** 21,910 
 (2.005) (3.736) (2.474) (5.768) (1.627)          
B. Triple-difference estimates using Southern 
states 
PostxTreatxNon-birth -24.222*** -6.630* 0.524 -4.855 11.476*** 19,074 
 (1.775) (3.220) (2.602) (5.279) (1.718)          
C. Triple-difference estimates using all states PostxTreatxOver20 -19.684*** -9.735*** 0.196 2.027 12.327*** 57,779 
 (1.005) (2.654) (0.915) (3.442) (0.867)          
D. Triple-difference estimates using all states PostxTreatxNon-birth -22.875*** -10.286*** -0.015 2.200 12.584*** 52,276 
 (0.946) (2.646) (0.994) (3.382) (0.916)  
              
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009. Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. We exclude year 2005 from 
sample. Hospitalization rates are measured at the hospital-quarter level per 10,000 population. Covariates include demographic characteristics, 
number of diagnoses, unemployment rate and unemployment rate interacted with treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge 
weights and include hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses.  * Significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. 
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Table C-6: Alternative Difference-in-Differences Model Specifications 
Dependent Variable: Uninsured Hospitalization Rate 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Dependent Variable: Uninsured Hospitalization Rate  
  Interaction Term Uninsured ED 
Uninsured  non-
ED 
Uninsured 
ACSC 
Uninsured non-
ACSC N 
       
A. Difference-in-difference estimates using all states as 
control 
PostxTreat 9.382*** 2.127*** 1.711*** 9.759*** 29,881 
 (0.581) (0.288) (0.137) (0.652)  
 
      
B. Difference-in-difference estimates using synthetic 
control states (level) 
PostxTreat 7.192*** 0.949*** 1.033*** 7.094*** 6,736 
 (1.913) (0.302) (0.370) (1.870)  
  
     
C. Difference-in-difference estimates using synthetic 
control states (growth rate) 
PostxTreat 6.620*** 1.167*** 0.760 7.013*** 4,689 
 (2.126) (0.423) (0.462) (2.067)  
 
      
D. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as 
control, includes state-specific linear time trends 
PostxTreat 9.221*** 1.918* 1.756** 9.438*** 11,050 
 (2.693) (0.964) (0.618) (2.944)  
 
      
E. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as 
control, includes state-specific squared time trends 
PostxTreat 8.874*** 1.781* 1.712** 8.998*** 11,050 
 (2.793) (0.853) (0.610) (2.885)  
 
      
F. Difference-in-difference using Southern states as 
control, includes state-specific cubic time trends 
PostxTreat 8.557*** 1.596** 1.725*** 8.471*** 11,050 
 (2.358) (0.718) (0.512) (2.292)  
             
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009 for adults between ages 20-64. Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. 
We use non-birth admissions only and exclude year 2005 from sample. Hospitalization rates are measured at the hospital-quarter level per 10,000 
population. Covariates include demographic characteristics, number of diagnoses, unemployment rate and unemployment rate interacted with 
treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *Significant at 0.10, **significant at 0.05, 
***significant at 0.01.  
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Table C-7: Alternative Triple-Differences Model Specifications 
Dependent Variable: Uninsured Hospitalization Rate 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Dependent Variable: Uninsured Hospitalization Rate 
  Interaction Term 
Uninsured 
ED 
Uninsured  non-
ED 
Uninsured 
ACSC 
Uninsured non-
ACSC N 
       
A. Triple-difference estimates using 
Southern states 
PostxTreatxOver20 8.966*** 2.590*** 1.888*** 9.667*** 21,910 
 (1.456) (0.435) (0.194) (1.484)         
B. Triple-difference estimates using 
Southern states 
PostxTreatxNon-birth 8.903*** 2.588*** 1.794*** 9.682*** 19,074 
 (1.615) (0.351) (0.237) (1.514)         
C. Triple-difference estimates using 
all states 
PostxTreatxOver20  10.142***  2.169*** 1.736*** 10.591*** 57,779 
  (0.692)  (0.319) (0.136) (0.760)         
D. Triple-difference estimates using 
all states 
PostxTreatxNon-birth 10.281*** 2.300*** 1.649*** 10.935*** 52,276 
 (0.769) (0.297) (0.151) (0.793)  
             
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009. Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. We exclude year 2005 from 
sample. Hospitalization rates are measured at the hospital-quarter level per 10,000 population. Covariates include demographic characteristics, 
number of diagnoses, unemployment rate and unemployment rate interacted with treatment indicator.  All specifications are weighted using discharge 
weights and include hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10, **significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. 
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Table C-8: Pre-Treatment Trend Test (All States as Comparison Group) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  A. Dependent Variable: Fraction of Admissions  
 Medicaid Private Other Medicare Uninsured 
      
TrendxTreat -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
      
Observations 14,284 14,284 14,284 14,284 14,284 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  B. Dependent Variable: Hospitalization Rate   
  Medicaid Private Other Medicare Uninsured 
      
TrendxTreat -0.784*** 1.312 0.551** -0.443 0.484* 
 (0.252) (1.230) (0.255) (0.289) (0.273) 
      
Observations 14,286 14,286 14,286 14,286 14,286 
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2004 for full sample of adults between ages 20-
64. Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. We use non-birth admissions only 
and all states as comparison group. Hospitalization rates are measured at the hospital-quarter level 
per 10,000 population. All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include 
hospital-fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10, ** significant 
at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Massachusetts and Missouri have been excluded. 
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Table C-9: Effect on Total Volume of Hospitalizations (DD estimates) 
 
 
 A. South States - Main specification 
 Total (DD)   Total (Pre-Trend Test)     
PostxTreat -15.585 TrendxTreat 4.660 
 (13.172)  (3.419)   
Observations 11,481   5,252         
 B. All StatesA9 
 Total (DD)   Total (Pre-Trend Test)     
PostxTreat -12.704** TrendxTreat 0.808 
 (5.473)  (2.021)   
Observations 29,881 Observations 14,286      
C. Triple-difference estimates  
 
Southern 
states as 
control  
All states as control 
    
PostxTreatxOver20 -18.704** PostxTreatxOver20 -14.523*** 
 (8.245)  (4.505)   
Observations 21,910 Observations 57,779     
PostxTreatxNon-birth -23.122** PostxTreatxNon-birth -18.096*** 
 (7.833)  (4.885)   
Observations 19,074   52,276 
 
Notes: Sample estimates obtained from NIS 2001-2009. Each coefficient estimate represents a 
separate regression. Total volume of hospitalizations is measured at the hospital-quarter level per 
10,000 population. All specifications are weighted using discharge weights and include hospital-
fixed effects and year- and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10, ** significant at 
0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Massachusetts and Missouri have been excluded.  
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